Fair value accounting in South African banks : financial stability implications by De Jager, Phillip
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
1 
FAIR VALUE ACCOUNTING IN SOUTH AFRICAN BANKS: 
Financial stability implications 
by 
Phillip de Jager 
Thesis Presented for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
In the Department of Finance and Tax
Commerce Faculty
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN
August 2014
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
2 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Glen Holman, for his patience and 
nuanced corrections. Thank you to my wife, Nicola, for her late night editing and numerous 
apt suggestions. Friends and family, thank you for your kind words and prayers. I would also 
like to thank Jesus Christ for giving me Zoë life and for the numerous insights I got whilst in 
church. 
 
I would also like to acknowledge the financial support which contributed to the project. Thus, 
thank you to the Banking Sector Education and Training Authority (BANKSETA) for the 
funding received from their doctoral research development program. Thank you to the 
University of Cape Town Research Office for the research mentoring I received as well as for 
their funding support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article-based thesis consists of three main papers that examine the use of fair value 
accounting in banks and how it can influence behaviour with systemic effects; this helps in 
understanding the role of fair value accounting in the global financial crisis.  The examination 
consisted of two parts. The first part was the investigation of how fair value accounting was 
actually used by South African banks. The second part was the development of an analytical 
model that links together fair value accounting, bank capital regulation and economic 
outcomes. The South African case study was further divided into two parts. In the first part, a 
comparative design was used to investigate in detail how fair value accounting was 
implemented by two South African banks and what their motivations were. The second part 
sought to answer the question: did South African banks pay out higher dividends based on 
risky fair value accounting gains? 
 
The South African evidence indicates that fair value accounting materially impacts the profit 
and loss and the regulatory capital of banks. This component of regulatory capital proved to 
be risky. Dangerous pay-outs resulted from the increase in profits and bank assets grew the 
most during the period of risky capital formation. It was found that the use of a stock-flow 
consistent model of the economy was a commonality amongst those that predicted the global 
financial crisis. A stock-flow consistent model was shown to be descriptive of the South 
African evidence. The model showed fair value accounting to be at the centre of feedback 
processes that can weaken the banking system during the economic upswing. The study 
concludes that fair value accounting is central in processes that weaken the banking system 
during an economic upswing and thus demonstrates why the current call for prudent 
accounting in banks is justified. 
 
The study expands on current literature in a number of ways. It adds to the literature that fair 
value accounting is procyclical by demonstrating that this effect is not constant throughout 
the cycle and is more problematic during the upswing; this differs from the usual argument 
that fair value accounting accelerates the downturn. The South African empirical evidence 
showed that fair value accounting for available-for-sale assets is not the only avenue for fair 
value accounting to be dangerous; fair value accounting adjustments through profit and loss 
should also be monitored. The analytical model as well as the South African empirical 
evidence contradicts the common argument that the fair value measurement of financial 
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instruments must be pervasive in a bank and banking system to be dangerous. The South 
African empirical evidence shows that fair value accounting must be considered a possible 
avenue of earnings or capital management in banks. 
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THESIS AT A GLANCE 
 
Paper one 
Aim: To investigate in detail how fair value accounting is applied by banks. 
Approach: Comparative case study. 
Data: Quantitative and qualitative data gathered on the largest South African bank and from 
a bank on the border between systemic and not systemic. Four themes were used to guide the 
data collection process. 
Conclusion: It is found that FVA as applied by these two banks is not neutral. Also included 
is a demonstration of a method to derive the unrealised portion of profit and equity, the 
identification of the gap between assets and liabilities at fair value as the driver of where in a 
banking group profits and losses are realised, and the finding that the restatement of 
comparative figures was used to circumvent the prohibition on reclassifications into and out 
of the “designated as at fair value” category.   
 
Paper two 
Aim: To investigate whether South African banks paid dividends from unstable fair value 
accounting gains prior to the global financial crisis. 
Approach: Hypothesis testing in a co-integrated regression and hypothesis testing in a 
balanced panel data regression. 
Data: Monthly income statement data from the South African banking system and annual 
bank financial statement data. 
Conclusion: A study by Gonharov and van Triest (2011) found no empirical support that 
dividends increase in response to unrealised positive fair value adjustments to income. In 
contrast, when the setting is limited to only South African banks, this paper finds that South 
African banks did pay dividends from unrealised transitory gains.  
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Paper three 
Aim: To develop a plausible model that links together fair value accounting, bank regulatory 
capital and economic outcomes. 
Approach: Analytical model. 
Data: Previous financial crisis characteristics. 
Conclusion: The model shows FVA in banks to be an accelerator that amplifies the financial 
cycle upswing. Feedback effects noted in the model include changes in the demand for 
financial instruments and changes in demand in the real economy. Minsky-like, crisis is 
shown to be endogenous to the model, working through the fragility of balance sheets in the 
real sector as well as in the financial sector. Bank balance sheet fragility is caused by bad 
capital driving out good capital, banks reaching for yield and the inversion of the yield curve. 
The model shows that the practice of not meeting rising credit demand with increasing credit 
supply is an essential control mechanism in the financial cycle.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Background 
 
“Was the cigarette butt the cause of the forest fire, or was it the tinder dry condition of the 
forest?” – Larry Summers quoted in the report of the National Commission on the Causes of 
the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (NCCFEC) (2011:470) 
 
The aftermath of the global financial crisis, which arguably peaked with the failure of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, is still felt.  Growth remains subdued (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2012:ix) and exactly what caused the crisis is still unclear. Lo 
(2012) reviewed 21 books written about the global financial crisis and its causes and 
concludes that “there is still significant disagreement as to what the underlying causes of the 
crisis were” (Lo, 2012:173).  
 
The global financial crisis was triggered by a sharp fall in house prices in the United States of 
America (Posner, 2009:vii) and grew from the subprime crisis into the credit crisis, then into 
a financial crisis and finally into a global economic crisis that many feared might be similar 
to the Great Depression of the 1930s. There were opinions that accounting,1 especially FVA, 
played a key role in causing or at least worsening the crisis. This opinion was often held by a 
group that can be broadly called the “bankers” (Veron, 2008). One radical example of this 
viewpoint is the opinion held by Steve Forbes, chairman of Forbes Media, to the effect that 
mark-to-market accounting was the “principal reason” that the financial system melted down 
in 2008 (Pozen, 2009:85).  
 
The problem that this thesis will investigate is the role of FVA in the global financial crisis; a 
crisis that was identified by Ryan (2008:1606) as the “signal researchable-teachable moment 
of my two-decade-plus career as an accounting academic” due to the social costs of that crisis 
and the serious questions it raises for accounting. This problem has been investigated by 
                                                 
1
 Numerous books have become available that attempt to explain why the crisis happened and what needs to be 
done to prevent it from happening again. Examples include Roubini & Mihm (2010), Sorkin (2009), Prins 
(2009) and Fox (2010). Common reasons listed for the crisis include loans to people who could not afford them, 
overleveraging, interest rates too low for too long, an over-strong belief in the ability of markets to regulate 
themselves and greed. Accounting is not often named a direct cause of the crisis, but is often called a 
contributory factor (Cassidy, 2009:308).  
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others who usually find there is no empirical evidence that FVA during the global financial 
crisis added to the severity of the crisis (Pinnuck, 2012:1). Thus, the section to follow on the 
role of FVA in the global financial crisis will explain why the problem has not been resolved. 
But, first a detailed definition of FVA will be provided. 
 
2. Definition of FVA 
 
In the recent past, most financial reporting was based on historical cost. Assets (or liabilities) 
were shown on the balance sheet of companies at the original price paid for the asset or at the 
original price paid for the asset amortised over time. Under mark-to-market accounting, an 
asset (or a liability) is carried on the balance sheet at the market value of the financial 
instrument. Changes in mark-to-market value, in other words unrealised holding gains or 
losses, are recognised in current earnings or directly in reserves. In contrast, under historical 
cost accounting, increases in the market value of assets are usually only recognised when 
realised.2  
 
FVA is more complex than mark-to-market accounting. Fair value is the exchange value in 
an idealised market and can be determined in three ways, in order of preference:3  
 
• Mark-to-market accounting (level 1):  fair value is based on quoted market prices 
(unadjusted) in active markets for identical instruments. 
• Mix of mark-to-market accounting and modelling (level 2): fair value is determined 
through valuation techniques based on observable inputs; for example, adjusted 
market values for instruments that trade on inactive markets or adjusted market values 
for similar instruments.  
• Mark-to-model (level 3): fair value is determined through valuation techniques using 
significant unobservable inputs; for example, discounted cash flow valuation 
techniques. 
 
The different levels of FVA have a behavioural aspect to them; as one moves from level 1 to 
level 3 the valuations become more subjective. An avenue of accounting choice is thus to 
                                                 
2
 Historical cost accounting recognised declines in the market value of assets if that decline indicated 
impairment. 
3
 A formal order of preference only entered accounting standards under the IASB in October 2008 with an 
amendment to IAS 39 which adopted the American tiered system of fair value determination. 
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move from level 1 valuations to level 2 or level 3 valuations when you are not in agreement 
with the result of the valuation. Accounting standard setters have recognised this and require 
additional disclosure when moving between valuation levels with level 3 valuations requiring 
the most disclosure. The flipside to this asymmetry in disclosure is that market values are 
assumed to be objective; an assumption that holds for most non-financial firms but one that 
can be questioned for large, systemic banks that are often the market makers in financial 
instruments.4  
 
The core of FVA is thus first a stock variable; what is the fair value of the relevant items on 
the balance sheet? The difference between the new fair value of an item and its previous fair 
value gives rise to the flow variable that impacts the profit and loss statement (or capital 
directly for gains on available-for-sale (AFS) items). How often are these value changes 
calculated? South African banks have to report to the reserve bank in accordance with IFRS 
(Bakoro, de Jager & Parsons, 2013:190) on a monthly basis. According to the Standard Bank 
Group (the largest South African banking group) (2013:196) price validation is done on at 
least a monthly basis and daily where possible. The implication is that the fair values used in 
this thesis are at most a month out of date. 
 
The adoption of FVA for financial instruments was the culmination of the introduction of fair 
value into accounting (Magnan, 2009:192). IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement came into effect from 1 January 2001 and is the accounting standard on 
financial instruments under which the banks in the thesis reported. IAS 39 is summarised in 
the following table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Kay (2013) goes further and argues that market prices in active markets are likely to become disconnected 
from fundamental values due to speculation. 
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Classification of financial instruments Treatment 
ASSETS 
1.1 Held for trading financial instruments 
including derivatives 
Financial instrument valued at fair value and value change 
taken to profit and loss 
1.2 Financial instruments designated as at 
fair value through profit or loss 
2. Held-to-maturity financial instruments Financial instrument valued at amortised cost 
3. Loans and receivables Financial instrument valued at amortised cost 
4. Available-for-sale financial instruments Financial instrument valued at fair value and value change 
taken directly to capital. Impairments charged to profit and 
loss. 
LIABILITIES 
5.1 Held for trading financial instruments 
including derivatives 
Financial instrument valued at fair value and value change 
taken to profit and loss and thus ordinary capital 
5.2 Financial instruments designated as at 
fair value through profit or loss 
6. Other financial liabilities Financial instrument valued at amortised cost 
Table 1.1 Disclosure categories for financial instruments according to IAS 39. 
 
In Table 1.1 assets numbered 1.1, 1.2 and 4 as well as liabilities numbered 5.1 and 5.2 are 
valued at fair value on the balance sheet. Fair value changes are not all treated the same 
though. For item 4 value gains are not booked through profit and loss and taken directly to 
capital as part of AFS reserve. The focus in this thesis is not on FVA for AFS assets as those 
reserves were not available as regulatory capital under Basel II (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2006:245). In addition, empirical research (Badertscher, Burks and Easton, 
2012; Shaffer, 2010) found that the impairment of AFS assets during the global financial 
crisis was not material. Rather, the focus is on FVA for those items that impact profit and loss 
and thus end up in retained income via profit and loss. A simplified example will now be 
given to clarify some of the complexity of IAS 39 and the difference between FVA gains that 
impact profit and loss and those that impact capital. The example is based on Enria, 
Cappiello, Dierick, Grittini, Haralambous, Maddaloni, Molitor, Pires, and Poloni (2004:8)’s 
argument that profit and capital increased by FVA can lead to the overextension of credit and 
dangerous pay-outs.   
 
Bank A’s assets are made up out of a cash asset of R5, a loan asset of R60 that is accounted 
for at amortised cost, an investment of R5 that is accounted for as an AFS asset and an 
interest rate sensitive financial instrument asset of R30 that is a trading security. The R100 of 
assets are financed by R15 of deposit liabilities designated at fair value, R80 of deposit 
liabilities accounted for at amortised cost and R5 of issued share capital. 
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ASSETS EQUITY & LIABILITIES 
Cash 5 Share capital 5 
Financial instrument asset 30 Deposit liabilities – fair 
valued 
15 
Investment 5 Deposit liabilities – 
amortised cost 
80 
Loan 60   
 100  100 
 
The simple regulatory capital ratio of our bank is equal to 5/100=5% and 5/5=100% of the R5 
of capital is available in cash.  
 
The loan asset generates 10% of cash interest per year whilst the deposit liabilities cost 1% of 
cash interest per year. The cash asset, investment asset and financial instrument asset 
generates no cash return. The market value of the investment asset increases to R8 inter alia 
due to a reduction in interest rates. The interest rate reduction also impacts the financial 
instrument asset which increases to a value of R35. The fair valued deposit liability is of very 
short maturity and thus does not change in value due to the interest rate change. The earnings 
flow calculation for the year is as follows. 
 
 Rand 
Interest received (60x10%) 6 
Interest paid (95x1%) (0.95) 
Value increase in financial instrument asset (35-30) 5 
Net profit (tax ignored) 10.05 
 
The new balance sheet is as follows. 
 
ASSETS EQUITY & LIABILITIES 
Cash 10.05 Share capital 5 
Financial instrument 35 Retained income 10.05 
Investment 8 AFS reserve 3 
Loan 60 Deposit liabilities – fair 
valued 
15 
 
 
Deposit liabilities – 
amortised cost 
80 
 113.05  113.05 
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The flow related to the value increase in the investment is booked directly to the AFS reserve. 
The new simple regulatory capital ratio is (5+10.05)/113.05=13.3%. AFS reserve was not 
included as it does not form part of regulatory capital. Of the regulatory capital 
10.05/(5+10.05)=66.7% is available in cash and 5/(5+10.05)=33.3% is caught up in the 
unrealised increase in the financial instrument asset. Bank management is worried that the 
return on equity of the bank will suffer due to the now excess capital. Excess capital can be 
reduced by originating more debt or by paying a dividend (or remuneration). 
 
The bank targets a dividend cover of 2. The retained income calculation is as follows. 
 
 Rand 
Interest received (60x10%) 6 
Interest paid (95x1%) (0.95) 
Value increase in financial instrument asset (35-30) 5 
Net profit (tax ignored) 10.05 
Dividend (5.025) 
Retained income 5.025 
 
The changed balance sheet is as follows. 
 
ASSETS EQUITY & LIABILITIES 
Cash 5.025 Share capital 5 
Financial instrument 35 Retained income 5.025 
Investment 8 AFS reserves 3 
Loan 60 Deposit liabilities – fair 
valued 
15 
 
 
Deposit liabilities – 
amortised cost 
80 
 108.025  108.025 
 
The new simple regulatory capital ratio is (5+5.025)/108.025=9.3%. By paying a dividend 
retained income was reduced by R5.025. The payment was made using cash resources with 
the size of the dividend determined as a portion of earnings. The eventual effect is that 
retained income was reduced from R10.05 previously to R5.025 – paid out of retained 
income effectively. Of the regulatory capital 5.025/(5+5.025)=50.1% is available in cash and 
5/(5+5.025)=49.9% is caught up in the unrealised increase in the financial instrument asset. 
The capital ratio is still almost double the starting capital ratio. By originating R92.475 of 
new loan asset, financed by newly created debt, the original capital ratio of 5% can be 
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restored (this process of money creation might seems surprising but is explained by the Bank 
of England, 2014:14 and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1994) . 
 
The changed balance sheet is as follows. 
 
ASSETS EQUITY & LIABILITIES 
Cash 5.025 Share capital 5 
Investment 8 Retained income 5.025 
Financial instrument 35 AFS reserves 3 
Loan 60 Deposit liabilities – fair 
valued 
15 
New originated loan 92.475 Deposit liabilities – 
amortised cost 
80 
 
 
New deposit liabilities 92.475 
 200.5  200.5 
   
The new simple regulatory capital ratio is (5+5.025)/200.5=5% and the original capital ratio 
has been restored. 
 
The simplified example illustrated how FVA is first a valuation exercise (stock variables). 
The change in these values gave rise to the flow variables that in the one case impacted profit 
and loss and thereafter retained income and in the other case impacted AFS reserves. The 
AFS reserves were excluded from regulatory capital and also did not play a role in the 
example’s process of dividend determination. By paying a larger dividend than what would 
have been paid, determined only on cash earnings, the example demonstrated how the portion 
of regulatory capital available as cash was reduced. The example also demonstrated how 
additional regulatory capital can provide the impetus for additional debt financed loan 
origination.  
 
3. FVA and the global financial crisis 
 
Pinnuck (2012) reviewed the literature that examines the performance of financial reporting 
in the global financial crisis. He argues numerous times that more attention is needed on the   
role of FVA in the years preceding the crisis with the implication that most authors focused 
on the role of FVA during the crisis. Theoretical papers by Allen and Carletti (2008) and by 
Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2008), which argue that mark-to-market accounting makes a 
downturn worse, illustrate the focus on the time period during the crisis. Empirical papers on 
the link between FVA and the crisis, such as those by Badertscher, Burks and Easton (2012), 
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Shaffer (2010) and United States Securities and Exchange Commission (2008), gathered 
evidence limited to the time period during the crisis. Empirical and theoretical evidence from 
before the global financial crisis is sparse. A related question is why authors tend to not 
consider the time period before the crisis.  
 
This is not to imply that the idea of looking at the time period before the crisis (upswing) for 
FVA’s role is new; already in 2004 in a study by the European Central Bank on FVA and 
financial stability, Enria, Cappiello, Dierick, Grittini, Haralambous, Maddaloni, Molitor, 
Pires, and Poloni (2004:8) argued that FVA might increase the pro-cyclicality of lending with 
“as more accentuated increases in bank profits and capital during upturns would support the 
overextension of credit”. They also argued that during the upturn dangerous pay-outs might 
occur: “The upward revaluations of assets would be reflected in bank profits and bank 
management could face pressure from shareholders to distribute dividends, including 
unrealised gains on assets remaining in the bank portfolio”. Laux and Leuz (2009:827) 
considers both the upswing and the downturn by arguing that FVA can be procyclical both 
during the boom and the bust and that behavioural issues can make the implementation of 
FVA difficult. 
 
FVA implementation issues can result from inexperience or earnings management. Brown 
and Tarca (2012:322) argue that the consequences of a lack of expertise in IFRS (of 
preparers, auditors and information systems) may be significant. Thus, FVA could have 
played a role prior to the global financial crisis due to inexperience. Banks mistakenly 
making additional pay-outs, based on unrealised gains, is a possible example of such 
inexperience.  
 
In terms of dividend pay-outs, Andersson, Haslam, Lee and Tsitsianis (2007) concluded that 
the consequences of FVA are not neutral and increase cash distributed to equity holders in 
S&P 500 firms. In contrast, Goncharov and van Triest (2011) used a setting of Russian firms 
to investigate whether unrealised positive fair value adjustments were paid out as dividends 
by firms and concluded that Russian firms in fact reduced their dividends when profit 
contained unrealised FVA gains. Onali (2014) focused solely on banks and the period 2000 to 
2007 and found a positive relationship between bank risk-taking and dividend pay-out ratios 
(in contrast to non-financial firms). Onali (2014:131) also writes that the banking literature 
has so far overlooked the topic of dividend policy.  
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Studies by Healy (1985) and Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) show that managers use 
accruals to manage earnings so as to influence their bonuses. For banks realised security 
gains (gains trading), loan loss provisions and loan write-offs are the common avenues of 
earnings management (Collins, Douglas and Shackelford, 1995:267; Healy and Wahlen, 
1999:378). Laux and Leuz (2009) argue that gains trading was a major impetus for FVA. If 
gains trading was a common avenue for earnings management and was replaced by FVA then 
perhaps FVA became the replacement earnings management avenue.  
 
The problem of FVA’s role in the global financial crisis is thus not resolved, first due to most 
studies overlooking the possibility that the role is to be found in the time-period before the 
crisis (the crisis thus being an endogenous process and not an exogenous event). By 
implication very little empirical evidence is available on the use of FVA by banks prior to the 
crisis. Some studies argue that FVA implementation issues might have played a role before 
the crisis. Literature on the payment of dividends show that FVA gains in profit might lead to 
increased dividend payments (argued by two papers above), or not (as argued by Goncharov 
and van Triest (2011)). Banks making pay-outs from unrealised earnings before the crisis 
would have made them more fragile. Earnings management literature shows that bank 
managers might also have used FVA to inflate profits before the crisis and in the process 
make the banks more fragile.  
 
A further commonality amongst some of the papers that focus on the time period during the 
financial crisis is that the papers argue for the impairment of available-for-sale assets as the 
only channel through which FVA could have played a role in worsening the crisis 
(Badertscher, Burks and Easton, 2012; Barth and Landsman, 2010; Shaffer, 2010). Value 
adjustments on held for trading financial instruments (including derivatives) and financial 
instruments designated at fair value impact profit and loss directly and was not investigated 
as a channel through which FVA could have played a role in the financial crisis. Evidence for 
the significance of FVA entries that affect profit and loss can be found in the study by the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (2008:4) which observed that “fair value 
measurements did significantly affect financial institutions’ reported income”. FVA through 
profit and loss should be investigated. 
 
Some argue that FVA could not have played a role in the crisis due to its limited use (a 
minority of assets and liabilities of banks are fair valued) (Gebhardt, 2012; Laux and Leuz, 
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2010; United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008:4). Can the limited use of 
FVA by commercial banks not still be dangerous?  
 
How banks use FVA in practice can be investigated in the South African context. It is 
possible to get close to the data in South African for the following reasons. First, the South 
African banking market is very concentrated (the largest four banks accounted for 84.1% of 
banking-sector assets in 2011 (Bank Supervision Department of the South African Reserve 
Bank, 2011:55)) and by studying the behaviour of five banks one can cover almost all of the 
South African banking market. The advantage is that the scope of the work required (such as 
the analysis of minute financial statement details and interviews with key informants) is more 
limited. Second, the Banking Project Group is a forum that brings together representatives of 
the large South African banks, their auditors and bank supervisors at the South African 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Johannesburg with the objectives of participating 
proactively in accounting standard setting and examining legislative issues that impact on the 
banking industry. The advantage is that it is possible to gain exposure to most of the key role-
players in one forum. Finally, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) makes available 
bank-specific balance sheets on a monthly basis as well as a consolidated industry income 
statement. Analysis of this relatively higher frequency accounting data should be an 
advantage compared to other jurisdictions where this data might not be available. South 
African evidence should be of interest internationally because of the level of standardisation 
in banking (Basel Accords and IFRS). 
 
4. Research objectives and research questions 
 
The literature review above showed that few researchers have considered the impact of FVA 
during the upturn. Empirical evidence from before the crisis is also not available. Four 
possibilities emerged from the review: FVA can possibly be linked to the overextension of 
credit before the crisis; FVA can possibly be linked to dangerous pay-outs before the crisis; 
the implementation of FVA before the crisis could have been problematic due to inexperience 
and the implementation of FVA before the crisis could have been problematic due to earnings 
management. Therefore, the first objective of this thesis is to determine how FVA was 
practically applied by banks, both before and after the global financial crisis.  
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In the literature review it was shown that most researchers investigated the impairment of 
available-for-sale assets as the only channel through which FVA could have played a role in 
worsening the crisis and ignored FVA entries that impact profit and loss. A second objective 
of this thesis is to investigate the significance and impact of FVA entries that impact profit 
and loss from held for trading financial instruments (including derivatives) and financial 
instruments designated at fair value.  
 
Related to the above objectives is the third objective to evaluate whether the observed usage 
of FVA before the global financial crisis is due to implementation issues (inexperience or 
earnings management) or due to FVA itself. 
 
It was shown in the literature review that some argue that FVA could not have played a role 
in the crisis due to a minority of assets and liabilities valued at fair value. A fourth objective 
of this thesis is to investigate whether the limited use of FVA can impact systemic fragility. 
 
It was also shown in the literature review that banks are likely to make pay-outs from 
unrealised FVA gains, contrary to the findings of Goncharov and van Triest (2011). A fifth 
objective of this thesis is to establish whether their findings hold in a setting of South African 
banks.  
 
A sixth objective of this thesis is to investigate how FVA was used by South African banks 
for reasons specified next. First, the South African bank regulator and banks maintain high 
international profiles. With high profiles come high expectations in terms of behaviour. René 
van Wyk, South African Registrar of Banks, is the chairman of the Accounting Task Force 
sub-committee of the Basel Committee and the World Economic Forum rated the soundness 
of South African banks as being second in the world in 2012 (World Economic Forum, 
2012). Second, in 2014 the South African income tax regime for banks was changed to a fair 
value tax on financial instruments. This was largely based on the argument that most bank 
fair valued financial instruments are liquid. Empirical data can show whether that assumption 
is valid. 
 
The literature review showed that a minority of researchers (Enria, Cappiello, Dierick, 
Grittini, Haralambous, Maddaloni, Molitor, Pires, and Poloni, 2004; Laux and Leuz, 2009, 
Pinnuck, 2012) did consider the possibility that FVA played a role in the global financial 
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crisis prior to the crisis. However, the idea was not developed further by gathering empirical 
evidence and presenting a formal explanatory framework. The final objective of this thesis is 
to find or develop theory that can explain what was observed.  
 
An overarching research question, that links together the objectives above, is: Did FVA gains 
in profit and capital during the upturn support the overextension of credit and motivate 
dangerous pay-outs in South African banks? The question is based on Enria, Cappiello, 
Dierick, Grittini, Haralambous, Maddaloni, Molitor, Pires, and Poloni’s (2004:8) proposition 
as quoted in the literature review above. The question is provisional as it makes certain 
assumptions: The assumption that FVA gains in profit and capital (before the crisis) are 
material and risky; the assumption that the South African evidence will support the focus on 
the upturn and not on the role of FVA (that impacts profit and loss) during the downturn and 
the assumption that FVA for AFS assets can be ignored.  
 
The research question above is split into three subquestions answered in three related papers. 
The research subquestions and how each paper will address the research objectives are as 
follows. 
 
Paper one’s (Liberal fair value accounting in banks: A South African case study) research 
question is: What can be learned from large South African banks’ practical use of FVA 
before and after the global financial crisis? The purpose of the paper is to explore and thus 
the approach is flexible. In the process empirical evidence on the use of FVA and the 
motivations behind that use (from before and after the global financial crisis) will be 
obtained. Therefore, the paper primarily addresses the first research objective. However, 
FVA entries that relate to AFS assets and FVA entries that impact profit and loss will both be 
considered. This paper will therefore also address the second research objective. By 
attempting to understand why the banks used FVA like they did the paper will start to address 
the third research objective. By using South African banks as the case study, the paper will 
also address the sixth research objective.  
 
Paper two’s (For banks fair value adjustments do influence dividend policy) research 
question is: Did South African banks pay increased dividends based on FVA gains? The 
purpose of the paper is to describe and therefore the approach is fixed beforehand. This paper 
thus specifically addresses the fifth objective above. However, the paper has a minor 
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exploratory purpose in that monthly data from the South African bank supervisor will be 
considered and might shed additional light on the other research objectives. 
 
Paper three’s (Fair value accounting, fragile bank balance sheets and crisis: a model) research 
question is: What theoretical perspective can best explain the South African and international 
observations? The paper is focused on the final objective of the thesis. 
 
5. Dissertation based on research papers5 
 
This thesis is based on research papers. The use of research papers in a PhD thesis is allowed 
by the University of Cape Town (University of Cape Town, 2013:2). This has structural 
implications for the thesis, such as no separate method chapter and the inclusion of the 
published papers verbatim. However, this type of thesis at the University of Cape Town 
differs from the norm in the following respects. 
 
Focus: Björn Gustavii in his book How to prepare a scientific doctoral dissertation based on 
research articles (2012:50) does not suggest the use of a thesis statement to tie together a 
thesis by papers; he suggests the use of research objectives. At the University of Cape Town 
a tighter specification is required in the form of a thesis statement. 
 
Flow: The University of Cape Town (2013: 3) requires “that each paper is prefaced by a 
synopsis of how the paper contributes to the thesis aims and objectives” (University of Cape 
Town, 2013:3), whilst the norm for a dissertation based on research papers is to present the 
three research papers together with a global introduction and conclusion that demonstrates the 
thematic coherence of the papers. To comply with this university specific requirement each 
paper will be prefaced by a synopsis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Also called an “article-based thesis” or a “compilation thesis” (Gustavii, 2012).  
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6. Thesis statement 
 
FVA had negative financial stability implications in South African banks prior to the global 
financial crisis. 
 
The thesis statement will be addressed by answering the four research questions presented 
above. The first paper that forms part of the South African case study will show how and why 
large South African banks used FVA before and after the crisis. It can be expected that FVA 
during the crisis in South Africa did not play a major role in impacting the profit and capital 
of the banks, similar to what was found for international banks. Based on the literature review 
it can be expected that the South African banks used the flexibility in FVA standards to avoid 
losses during the crisis. This leaves the time period before the crisis. Paper two investigates 
whether there were dangerous pay-outs in South Africa. Paper three should show how FVA 
can be part of a process where financial crisis is endogenous.    
 
What the thesis statement brings into focus, in addition to the four research questions, is the 
third research objective. Is FVA itself or rather the way it was used responsible for the 
overextension of credit and dangerous pay-outs? The overextension of credit and dangerous 
pay-outs are second order effects that cannot be directly attributed to FVA.  
 
7. Delineations and limitations 
 
It is not the objective of this thesis to find and prove the exact cause of the global financial 
crisis. The crisis is likely to have been caused by the confluence of multiple factors6 of which 
FVA might be one. The focus of the thesis is on the interaction between accounting, banking 
and the economy and not on any other possible causes for the crisis and their relative 
importance.   
 
It is essential to note as a limitation that this thesis will be based on research articles with 
each main chapter as a stand-alone paper. An important implication is that the focus of the 
three papers combined will, by construction, not be as tight and coherent as a monograph 
thesis. 
                                                 
6
 Please refer to the books on the subject mentioned earlier in the background section. 
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It is acknowledged that accounting, by itself, cannot directly make anyone do anything; 
human actors make their own decisions and are responsible for their actions. But, accounting 
can influence behaviour and thus it is within this perspective that the study will progress. This 
approach is similar to the “New Accounting literature” that views accounting as influencing 
economic reality, rather than just reporting on it (Suzuki, 2003:472). It is expected that 
accounting in banks will also influence economic reality as bank accounting is an integral 
part of national payment systems. A recent paper by Bensimhon and Biondi (2011) 
demonstrates another way in which FVA can influence economic reality. These writers used 
experimental evidence to show that the use of FVA removes a fundamental reference point in 
price determination and thus amplifies the formation of financial bubbles with a strong role in 
feedback effects (the feedback in their paper is via the information channel and not the 
money supply channel).  
 
The empirical work that will be done is limited only to South African banks and to the period 
from 2001 to 2011. As the problem (the role of FVA in the global financial crisis) is global in 
scope it is evident that considering only South African evidence is a serious limitation that 
requires further explanation. There are reasons to believe that the impact of this limitation is 
not as serious as it first seems. Given the rise of IFRS and the greater homogeneity of 
financial regulation, it is to be expected that South African evidence should have some 
relevance for the international community. If banks within a financial system that is rated 
third (and second for soundness of banks) in the 2012 Global Competitiveness Report (World 
Economic Forum, 2012) use FVA in a certain way then it can be argued that banks in lower 
rated regimes might be more aggressive in their use of FVA. The years 2001-2011 were 
chosen because one main contention of this study is that FVA potentially influenced bank 
behaviour prior to the global financial crisis that started in 2007. 
 
The model that will be developed is only applicable to commercial banks that form an 
important part of the monetary economy of a country in that commercial bank deposits is 
seen as “money”. Likewise, the South African empirical evidence that will be considered are 
from commercial banks only and thus the results of the thesis are limited to commercial 
banks and are not applicable to other companies.  
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8. Overall research design 
 
A combination of two research designs is planned as the overall approach for the thesis; these 
designs are the use of a case study and an analytical model, informed by the case study. The 
overall approach can thus be qualified as consistent with the qualitative research paradigm 
based on a flexible design and an inductive approach. 
 
A case study design is useful because accounting cannot directly make anyone do anything 
and the most it can do is to influence behaviour. Thus, it is necessary to get close to the data 
to get a better understanding of bank management behaviour and motivations. This approach 
is feasible in the South African setting as it is possible to work with a limited number of 
banks and to cover most of the financial system; moreover, it is possible to gain access to and 
interview bank managers and bank supervisors and it is also possible to interact with the 
forum where bank supervisors, accounting standard setters and bank managers meet.  
 
Jensen (1983:23) argues that “much of the best evidence on these propositions will be 
qualitative” related to research on organisations. This is based on the nature of institutional 
evidence that can often not be summarised using real numbers and on the acknowledgement 
that “in the early stages of development” theory should not “be vastly inconsistent” with the 
available evidence. However, whenever feasible “it is desirable to obtain quantitative 
predictions of a form amenable to the usual testing procedures”. In addition, he warns against 
qualitative evidence that is “incomplete” or “inappropriate” and indicates uncaring and 
sloppy research. In response, evidence for the overall South African case study will be 
obtained using two different processes. In the one process a comparative case study will be 
performed that focuses on the details of FVA disclosure by two large South African banks 
(Paper one). The other process will test theory by making use of total South African banking 
system data, obtained from the local bank regulator (Paper two). Thus, some of the case study 
evidence will be obtained from a process “amenable to the usual testing procedures”. To 
guard against “incomplete” or “inappropriate” qualitative evidence (in Paper one) use will be 
made of a multiple-case design where the comparative nature of the investigation forces more 
rigour into the process. 
 
External validity is a major barrier in doing case studies (Yin, 2009:43; Bryman and Bell, 
2007:63) including this overall South African case study. One must ask: will it be possible to 
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generalise the results? The answer is that the findings from a case study can never be 
generalised statistically (as if the case study was a sample from a population) but they can be 
used for analytic generalisation; this situation is similar to the result of an experiment being 
used to support a theory. According to Bryman and Bell (2007:64) case study researchers 
often argue that “they aim to generate an intensive examination of a single case, in relation to 
which they then engage in a theoretical analysis”; the use of the case study approach in this 
thesis agrees with this description.    
 
The analytical model is useful to make sense of and summarise what was observed in the 
overall South African case study. The main limitation of the analytical model design is that 
no model is reality; it will always be a simplification of reality.7 The question that arises is: 
what degree of simplification is appropriate? Milton Friedman (1953:14) helped when he 
wrote that “A hypothesis is important if it "explains" much by little: that is, if it abstracts the 
common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances 
surrounding the phenomena to be explained and permits valid predictions on the basis of 
them alone”. An aim of the model is thus to explain the core aspects of the research problem 
as simply as possible whilst retaining good explanatory power. A simple test of the 
workability of the model is to evaluate whether it is applicable to, and its predictions 
descriptive of, the reality found in the South African case study. 
 
The use of a combination of two research designs (the use of a case study and an analytical 
model) and the interaction between those two designs help to overcome, partly, the 
shortcomings of each individual design. The case study informs and enriches the analytical 
model. The analytical model supports the argument that the results of the case study can be 
generalised. 
 
9. Underlying assumptions 
 
The concept of FVA as used in this thesis is limited to the use of FVA for the subsequent 
measurement of financial instruments by banks. Cairns (2006:10) notes that fair values are 
used in financial statements in four main ways and only one of those ways is for the 
subsequent measurement of values of assets and liabilities. Even when fair value is used for 
                                                 
7
 “Models tell you merely what something is partially like” is how Derman (2011:109) puts it. 
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the subsequent measurement of assets and liabilities, the fair valuation of financial 
instruments is only one of a long list of possible applications. It is thus an assumption of this 
thesis that the use of FVA by banks to account for financial instruments is the most important 
use of FVA and that the other uses of FVA can safely be ignored. 
 
This assumption underlies most of the research into the role of FVA in the global financial 
crisis (Badertscher, Burks & Easton, 2012;  Ball,  2008;  Barth & Landsman, 2010;  Laux & 
Leuz, 2010;  Laux & Leuz, 2009;  Magnan,  2009;  McMahon,  2011;  Pozen,  2009;  Shaffer,  
2010;   NCCFEC,  2011;  United States Securities and Exchange Commission,  2008;  Veron,  
2008;  Wallace,  2009). 
 
It is an assumption of this thesis that the use of FVA for AFS securities can be ignored as 
irrelevant to the role of FVA in the global financial crisis. As discussed under section two 
AFS reserves are excluded from capital by Basel II. 
 
10. Significance of research 
 
On a practical level the empirical evidence obtained in this thesis from before the global 
financial crisis financial crisis will contribute towards alleviating the shortage of such 
empirical evidence. The evidence should be useful for accounting standard setters as the best 
standards might not work in practice as intended.    
 
The South African evidence in this thesis should also be of interest to the South African bank 
regulator who expects prudency from South African banks and certainly not earnings 
management (Bakoro, de Jager & Parsons, 2013). Another party that should be interested in 
the detail of how taxpayers (South African banks) use FVA is the National Treasury of South 
Africa, which in July 2012 announced its intention to tax banks on their FVA profits 
(National Treasury (South Africa), 2012). A rationale for this change in approach is the 
concept of notional realisation in respect of liquid financial instruments; according to this 
concept a testable assumption is created to the effect that most fair valued instruments in the 
South African banking system are fairly liquid. 
 
On a theoretical level the thesis emphasises an alternative perspective on the role of FVA in 
the global financial crisis (that it influenced behaviour before the crisis in such a way that the 
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banks became more fragile). This perspective is not new but also not mainstream and refined 
with the argument the flexibility in FVA explains why no empirical evidence was found that 
FVA made the global financial crisis worse (during the crisis). 
 
11. Chapter overview 
 
The chapters to follow are briefly described in this section. 
 
11.1  Chapter two (literature review): The global financial crisis and the role of fair value 
accounting 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the role of FVA in the global financial crisis to 
identify areas where a contribution is possible.  
 
11.2  Chapter three: The South African context 
This is not one of the main chapters (or papers). It is merely an introductory chapter to the 
South African case study chapters and is intended to provide context for that case study. The 
intention is to focus this chapter on South African bank regulations and the interaction with 
South African accounting standards. It might be possible to argue that the South African 
context is not unique and therefore, South Africa should be seen as a representative case. 
 
11.3  Chapter four (paper one): Liberal fair value accounting in banks: A South African 
case   study 
The use of FVA by two large South African banks will be investigated in this comparative 
case study. One is the largest bank in the South African banking system and the other is a 
smaller bank on the borderline between systemic or not. This chapter is expected to answer in 
detail the question of how and why these banks used FVA in the way they did before and 
after the global financial crisis. 
 
11.4  Chapter five (paper two): For banks fair value adjustments do influence dividend 
policy 
This chapter will start with a theoretical discussion why the payment of dividends from a 
bank’s unrealised FVA profits is likely to have negative implications for bank stability. 
Reference will be made to a paper by Goncharov and Van Triest (2011) who found that 
Russian companies did not pay out dividends from unrealised FVA gains and it will be 
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explained why this paper expects to find a different answer for South African banks; that they 
do pay out dividends from unrealised FVA gains. Data will be obtained from the South 
African bank regulator and it is anticipated that this will show that FVA gains, during the 
upswing, formed a significant part of the profits of South African banks. If a panel data 
regression then shows that South African bank dividends are increased by these accounting 
profits then the hypothesis will be upheld.  
 
11.5  Chapter six (paper three): Fair value accounting, fragile bank balance sheets and 
crisis: a model 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a realistic model to help in understanding the interface 
between FVA, bank capital regulation and the economy. The paper will start by reviewing 
past crises to identify any potential role of FVA in them; those crises include the Great 
Depression, the S&L crisis, the Enron crisis and the global financial crisis. The next section 
of this paper will look at the standard explanation for the monetary transmission mechanism 
as the model will describe the interaction between banks and the economy and thus needs to 
be linked to the literature. Use will probably be made of a “Post-Keynesian stock-flow 
consistent accounting model of the economy” as this model type is more descriptive of the 
characteristics of global financial crises actually observed, such as feedback effects, systemic 
risk and the crisis emanating from the financial sector. The intention is to demonstrate the 
workings of the model with a running example and to draw theoretic conclusions based on 
the model. An empirical example will also be provided. 
 
11.6  Chapter seven: Separating fair value accounting from its use 
A possibility suggested in this introduction chapter is that a perfectly good accounting 
standard can be implemented in a way that impacts on financial stability. This chapter is 
about whether the South African results are due to implementation issues (inexperience or 
earnings management) with FVA or due to FVA itself.  
 
12. Conclusion 
 
This general introduction chapter showed that the common theme that binds together the 
three papers to follow is the global financial crisis and the role of FVA in that crisis. The 
reality that even perfect accounting standards can be misused argues for the performance of a 
detailed case study that investigates how FVA was applied in practice; such a case study can 
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be realised in the South African context. The chapter that follows is a literature review of 
FVA and the global financial crisis.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ROLE OF FAIR 
VALUE ACCOUNTING 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will review the role of FVA in the global financial crisis. The review will help to 
contextualise the larger study. The chapter will show that there is not yet consensus on the 
cause of the global financial crisis and even less so on the role of FVA. The section on the 
role of FVA in the crisis will show that empirical and theoretical evidence from before the 
crisis is needed and that the focus should not just be on FVA for available-for-sale assets. The 
next section of the chapter will investigate the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) and the 
idea that market prices are always aligned with fundamentals; if true an argument for FVA to 
have played a role in the global financial crisis becomes more difficult. This chapter 
concludes by linking the review with the research objectives of the thesis.    
    
2. The global financial crisis 
 
The root cause of the global financial crisis is usually traced back to a boom and a bust in the 
American housing market. Fox (2010:312) writes that during the 1990s, house prices were 
rising mostly due to fundamental factors such as an excessive demand for housing in certain 
areas. The housing market received a further boost when the Federal Reserve Bank dropped 
short term interest rates in the aftermath of the bursting of the technology stock market 
bubble. In the 2000s, house prices started to rise above the increase reasonably attributable to 
these fundamental factors; this excessive increase was due to the development of complex 
feedback mechanisms that drove prices higher and even higher. Increased house prices meant 
that fewer and fewer people could afford houses under the traditional underwriting standards. 
To keep up loan origination volumes and to feed the securitisation machinery that banks  had 
set up (as will be discussed shortly), the banks lowered their underwriting standards, 
eventually advancing credit to people of doubtful credit quality (for example low-doc or no-
doc loans) and on conditions that only made sense if house prices were a one-way bet. 
Borrowers started to realise that there was good money to be made from the housing boom; 
for example, by house flipping or house equity withdrawal. Consequently, the demand for 
more credit increased simultaneously, driving up house prices.  
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were not allowed to buy most subprime mortgages or any loans 
larger than $322 700 in 2003 (Fox, 2010:313), but they were allowed to buy mortgage-
backed securities based on these loans. Wall Street investment banks stepped forward to fill 
this gap by packaging subprime loans into securities on which they obtained the AAA credit 
rating necessary for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and also for other investors such as pension 
funds. Rating agencies were conflicted in the process as they were paid by the investment 
banks and not by investors and the agencies assisted in many cases to slice and dice a 
portfolio of bad loans in such a way that it became seemingly low risk. These mortgage-
backed securities offered higher returns than normal AAA instruments at superficially the 
same risk and therefore demand from investors increased, which increased the demand for the 
underlying loans, leading to increasing house prices. The drop in underwriting standards and 
the aggressive lending described all took place within the context of relaxed bank regulations 
under the assumption that markets are self-correcting.  
 
In 2006, house prices levelled out and started to fall (Lo, 2012:153). The securities market 
based on these loans was initially unperturbed but in August 2007 the first serious problem 
emerged when a BNP Paribas money market fund froze fund redemptions. A shockwave 
rippled through the financial industry and central banks had to step in to keep liquidity 
flowing. The tide was going out and in September 2008 the investment bank Lehman 
Brothers declared bankruptcy and the world was on the brink of disaster. In hindsight this is 
regarded as the height of the global financial crisis. Central banks were able to save the 
banking system but five years later the world is still mired in anaemic growth.   
 
Lo (2012) reviews 21 books written about the global financial crisis and its causes and 
concludes that “there is still significant disagreement as to what the underlying causes of the 
crisis were” (Lo, 2012:173). Indicative of the complexity of the crisis is the report of the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that spent 18 months and interviewed 700 witnesses and 
came to three different conclusions as to what caused the crisis (Lo, 2012:152). It can be 
argued that the Commission’s report was influenced by party politics. Thus, the Democrat 
members of the Commission all approved the report, whilst the Republican members of the 
Commission all dissented.1 Nevertheless the rest of this brief global financial crisis review 
                                                 
1
 Another interpretation is that the divide is simply a manifestation of how a different understanding of the way 
the economy works, can lead to different conclusions. A similar divide in worldviews becomes apparent when 
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will be based on the Commission’s report as it constitutes the most detailed official account 
of the crisis.  
 
The list that follows summarises the conclusions of the Commission: 
• “We conclude this financial crisis was avoidable” (The National Commission on the 
Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (NCCFEC), 
2011:xvii) - The crisis was not a once-off freak event. Its roots were to be found in 
previous actions over a number of years. 
• “We conclude widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision proved 
devastating to the stability of the nation’s financial markets” (NCCFEC, 2011:xvii) - 
Markets were not self-correcting and banks could not effectively regulate themselves 
and so they got out of control under a policy of deregulation. 
o “We conclude collapsing mortgage-lending standards and the mortgage 
securitization pipeline lit and spread the flame of contagion and crisis” 
(NCCFEC, 2011:xxiii) - This point was put below the previous point as it is 
related; if regulation was effective then underwriting standards would not have 
deteriorated to the level that they did (regulators allowed banks to make low-
doc or no-doc loans) and the securitisation pipeline would not have grown so 
large. 
• “We conclude dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at 
many systemically important financial institutions were a key cause of this crisis” 
(NCCFEC, 2011:xvii) - There were corporate governance and risk management 
failures in large banks because those banks took on excessive risk and shareholders 
did not prevent it; possibly due to the low levels of capital. Skewed incentives 
encouraged individuals and banks to take excessive risks. 
• “We conclude a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of 
transparency put the financial system on a collision course with crisis” (NCCFEC, 
2011:xix) - Banks and individuals became too indebted during the boom period to be 
able, safely, to take on the levels of risk that they did take on. When the crisis arrived 
there was no buffer. Risk was also hidden in the shadow banking industry. 
• “We conclude the government was ill prepared for the crisis, and its inconsistent 
response added to the uncertainty and panic in the financial markets” (NCCFEC, 
                                                                                                                                                        
the role of FVA in the crisis is reviewed; thus, there are those who see accounting as simply a messenger and 
those who see accounting as influencing economic interactions and thus the real economy.  
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2011:xxi) - This conclusion is perhaps most influenced by party political 
considerations and this view is supported as it argues for more government oversight. 
If regulation was already effective as previously pointed out would this point really be 
necessary? 
• “We conclude there was a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics” 
(NCCFEC, 2011:xxii) - Greed definitely played a role because the system allowed it 
to prosper. 
• “We conclude that over-the-counter derivatives contributed significantly to this crisis” 
(NCCFEC, 2011:xxiv) - Derivatives allowed banks and insurance companies to gear 
even higher without always having much with which to back up their positions (low 
levels of capital relative to the risk). In other words, derivatives allowed the bubble to 
inflate even further. 
• “We conclude the failures of credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of 
financial destruction” (NCCFEC, 2011:xxv) – Without the approval of these agencies 
the mortgage securities at the heart of the crisis would not have been marketable. The 
false sense of security brought on by these investment grade credit ratings facilitated 
the expansion. 
 
As mentioned, some of the commissioners dissented. The first dissenting group (Hennesey, 
Holtz-Eakin and Thomas) chose to emphasise the role of the United States government’s 
housing policies in the weakening of underwriting standards (NCCFEC, 2011:452). The 
second dissenting report (Wallison) comes to a similar conclusion by a different path. Mark-
to-market accounting was mentioned in this dissenting report (NCCFEC, 2011:482) as the 
final step in a process through which government housing policies transmitted losses to the 
largest financial institutions. Basically, government policies overinflated the housing bubble, 
the bubble burst with no cause indicated. Liquidity was then withdrawn from the financial 
institutions that held mortgage-backed securities and mark-to-market accounting transmitted 
this credit and liquidity shock in a downward price spiral. What is clear is that accounting is 
not popularly regarded as a cause of the crisis and that even when it is mentioned it is only 
mentioned as a factor during the crisis period and not prior to the crisis period.  
 
The purpose of this review was to contextualise FVA within the global financial crisis. The 
review revealed that there is no consensus yet on the causes of the global financial crisis and 
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that FVA might have played a minor role in the crisis as part of a feedback process. The next 
section will examine the role of fair value accounting in the global financial crisis and will 
review what has been written. The brief description of the global financial crisis, presented 
above, will be returned to in chapter six of this study where the results of the three papers will 
be related back to the conclusions and findings of the NCCFEC to bolster the case for 
theoretical generalisation. 
  
3. The role of fair value accounting in the global financial crisis 
 
This review starts with the Great Depression and the use of mark-to-market accounting at that 
time in American banks. Friedman and Schwartz (1971:Chpt.7, 100-102) describe and 
provide evidence of how the fall in the market value of bond portfolios was the most 
important source of bank capital impairment during the Great Depression. They also point out 
that, paradoxically, the most liquid assets were the most serious threat to bank solvency due 
to the mark-to-market regime for liquid assets rather than bonds for “which there was no 
good market and few quotations” carried at cost. These observations from the Great 
Depression are relevant to the discussion that follows for the following reasons. First, the 
feedback process described by Friedman and Schwartz where marked-to-market bond 
portfolios lost value, leading to further bond sales and lower prices, is similar to arguments 
made about the effect of FVA during the global financial crisis (see for example Pozen, 
2009:85-86; Badertscher, Burks & Easton, 2012:600). Second, mark-to-market accounting in 
the Great Depression caused harm due to its impact on bank capital; this is also the primary 
channel of FVA causing harm investigated during the global financial crisis. Third, FVA is a 
more flexible regime than strict mark-to-market accounting as banks that disagree with 
market prices can make use of the flexibility built into FVA; for example, a bank can move 
from mark-to-market to mark-to-model or in certain circumstances, change from FVA to cost 
accounting.2 Thus, the impact of FVA during the global financial crisis can be expected to 
have been less severe than the impact of mark-to-market accounting during the Great 
Depression. Finally, Friedman and Schwartz did not consider the possibility that the bond 
portfolios were perhaps overvalued after a decade-long bull market with a number of asset 
bubbles; similarly, most investigations of FVA focused on the crisis period and not on what 
                                                 
2
 Readers who are interested in more detail are advised to read the FVA definition section in the introduction 
chapter. 
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went before. The rest of this section will elaborate on these observations using evidence from 
the global financial crisis.  
 
Cassidy (2009:308-309) uses a fictional Wall Street firm’s balance sheet to illustrate the 
systemic effects of mark-to-market accounting. A small drop in asset values is recognized 
straight away and reduces capital significantly (due to the leveraged nature of banks). The 
bank’s capital ratio is now too low and in order to restore its target capital ratio the bank has 
to sell assets and pay down debt. Again, due to the leveraged nature of banks, this asset sale 
is significant and if other banks are doing exactly the same, then the asset sales will lead to 
lower asset values. Those lower asset values are then marked-to-market immediately by the 
banks and the process starts again; this is a downward spiral. Similar feedback processes are 
described in other crisis-related studies such as United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (2008:1), Ball (2008:1), Laux and Leuz (2009:831), Pozen (2009:86), Magnan 
(2009:200), Shaffer (2010:3), Badertscher, Burks and Easton (2012:600) and Khan (2010:2).  
 
At the request of the U.S. Congress, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
conducted an investigation into FVA’s contribution to the 2008 crisis and concluded that 
FVA did not cause or contribute to the crisis (United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2008). Their conclusions were based on an analysis of the financial statements 
and FVA disclosure of a sample of 50 financial institutions. It was observed that a minority 
of assets (45%) and liabilities (15%) were fair valued and that for an even smaller percentage 
of assets (25%), changes in fair value impacted on income. FVA changes over three years 
were analysed and their effect on capital adequacy was assessed relative to other factors, such 
as incurred losses on loans. One shortcoming of the Commission’s study was the inclusion of 
smaller banks and insurers with less focus on large banks who are the prime users of FVA. 
Two other shortcomings were the attempt to link failed banks to changes in their regulatory 
capital positions when banks usually fail due to a lack of liquidity, and the exclusion from the 
study of a role for FVA before the crisis. This second shortcoming is illustrated by the 
following quote from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s explanation of what caused 
the global financial crisis: “Rather than a crisis precipitated by fair value accounting, the 
crisis was a “run on the bank” at certain institutions, manifesting itself in counterparties 
reducing or eliminating the various credit and other risk exposures they had to each firm” 
(United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008:3). The crisis is thus explained as 
the result of an unforeseen/external event: a “run on the bank”.  The question that is not asked 
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is why the run happened. Consistent with this view the study did not consider a role for FVA 
before the crisis and the possibility that FVA write-downs were delayed by management 
utilising the available flexibility in FVA. 
 
Theoretical models by Allen and Carletti (2008) and by Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2008) 
examined the impact of mark-to-market accounting on capital markets and show that mark-
to-market accounting worsens a downturn. Their studies have a shortcoming when attempting 
to explain the global financial crisis; mark-to-market accounting is not the same as FVA and 
managers can use the flexibility inherent in fair value accounting to decide not to accept 
market values that they believe are incorrect. This is argued by Laux and Leuz (2009:827) 
who also acknowledge that FVA can be procyclical both during the boom and the bust and 
that behavioural issues can make implementation of FVA difficult. They argue that the 
increase in profit and capital from asset value increases under FVA is also available as “gains 
trading” under historical cost accounting and thus that the two are similar during the upswing, 
but this argument is not exactly correct. FVA is a much faster process than gains trading that 
is inherently lumpy. Bonuses and dividends paid from gains trading are paid from increased 
cash resources whilst bonuses and dividends from FVA gains only decrease cash resources. 
The implication is that FVA is more able than gains trading to be at the centre of a feedback 
process and that FVA during a boom can leave the banking system with reduced cash 
resources. 
 
Shaffer’s (2010) paper is an empirical study “to determine whether fair value did in fact play 
a significant role in the crisis through the rapid destruction of bank capital and related 
procyclical effects by observing the actual impact of stress events on the regulatory capital of 
financial institutions”. He only looked at the “largest financial institutions” (Shaffer, 2010:9) 
in the United States using the criterion of total assets greater than $100 billion. This focus is 
justified by arguing that the large banks’ utilisation of FVA is far greater than smaller banks 
and also that large banks tend to be the investors in complex and illiquid investments 
(Shaffer, 2010:9). Shaffer finds that FVA had “minimal impact on the capital of most banks in 
the sample during the crisis period through the end of 2008” (Shaffer, 2010:22). Possible 
shortcomings of his study were the exclusion of a role for FVA before the crisis, not 
considering the possibility that FVA write-downs were delayed by management utilising the 
available flexibility in FVA, and limiting FVA’s influence during the crisis to other-than-
temporary impairments on available-for-sale assets. If management delayed the immediate 
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recognition of FVA write-downs, for example, by reclassifying financial instruments to cost 
or changing the valuation level of financial instruments from mark-to-market to mark-to-
model, then it becomes possible that Shaffer’s results did not completely capture the FVA 
write-downs following the global financial crisis as he only considered the year 2008.  
 
Pinnuck (2012:7) writes that “there is preliminary evidence that corporate managers may 
have delayed write-downs during the GFC”. Deep and liquid markets for financial 
instruments disappeared during the global financial crisis causing managers to not trust 
market values and by implication the assumptions behind mark-to-market accounting did not 
hold. Shaffer’s (2010:10) argument for focusing only on available-for-sale securities is also 
problematic. Thus, FVA adjustments from the trading book were excluded because “There 
are few who would argue that fair value is inappropriate for measuring investments held for 
trading purposes where deep and active markets exist”. If most instruments for trading 
purposes were actually traded on deep and active markets then they would have been shown 
at level 1 (mark-to-market) on the fair value hierarchy. The United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (2008:62) found that for banks, most derivatives and trading assets 
were at level 23 and not at level 1 and for investment banks almost all derivatives and trading 
assets were at level 2 and not level 1. The conclusion is that trading assets and derivatives 
were not traded on deep and active markets and that the FVA adjustments based on those 
assets should not have been ignored. A related argument is that as trading assets and 
derivatives were marked-to-market during the 1990s and no global financial crisis took place 
in that time, then the FVA entries from these instruments should be ignored when looking at 
causes for the current global financial crisis. The problem with this argument is that it ignores 
the fact of financial innovation over time. During the 1990s, financial markets were much 
smaller and contained few of the complicated financial instruments that characterised the 
global financial crisis. The financial markets were also not dominated by the large banks. In 
addition, Shaffer’s exclusion of financial instruments under the fair value option due to that 
option being “an explicit decision by management to value these assets this way and thus they 
are not included in the analysis” can also be questioned as it implicitly assumes that management 
will not abuse the fair value option.  
 
                                                 
3
 The potential impact of instruments at level 2 for FVA purposes is demonstrated in the example on page 149 in 
chapter six.  
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The empirical study by Badertscher, Burks and Easton (2012) also concludes that little 
evidence can be found for FVA driving a downward spiral in asset prices. In a way similar to 
that of Shaffer (2010), one can also criticise these writers’ focus on available-to-sale assets as 
the only source of FVA write-downs that impacts regulatory capital. On the contrary, Khan 
(2010), in an empirical study, did find evidence of FVA worsening the global financial crisis 
by finding that “increase in the use of fair value accounting is associated with additional bank 
contagion. The increase in bank contagion is most severe during periods of market 
illiquidity”.  
 
Two commonalities can be identified from these papers that investigate the link between 
FVA and the global financial crisis. The first is the focus on finding FVA’s role during the 
global financial crisis and not before the crisis (United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2008; Ball, 2008; Allen & Carletti, 2008; Plantin, Sapra & Shin, 2008;  Pozen, 
2009; Magnan, 2009; Khan, 2010; Shaffer, 2010; Barth & Landsman, 2010; Badertscher, 
Burks & Easton, 2012). The second is the often-used refrain that accounting is only a 
messenger (United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008:2; Ball, 2008:1; Laux 
& Leuz, 2009:806; Pozen, 2009:86; Wallace, 2009:9). Pinnuck (2012), in his review of the 
evidence of the role of financial reporting in the global financial crisis, agrees numerous 
times that more attention on the years preceding the crisis is needed: “… and have ignored 
the role for FVA in the years immediately preceding the GFC” (Pinnuck, 2012:5); “In 
summary, further research is required into the role of FVA in the years immediately 
preceding the crisis to determine the extent to which inflated values of subprime securities, 
and the recording of these FVs in the balance sheets of banks, contributed to excessive 
lending” (Pinnuck, 2012: 6);  “There is lack of debate as to whether financial accounting 
failed its valuation objective in the years preceding the GFC” (Pinnuck, 2012:10” and “There 
has been a lack of attention as to whether FVA in the years immediately preceding the crisis 
could have contributed to excessive lending” (Pinnuck, 2012:10).  
 
Some evidence emerged during the review to suggest that an investigation of the role of FVA 
before the crisis is warranted. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
(2008:34) wrote that mark-to-market accounting for banks was changed in 1938 for reasons 
that included the impact of mark-to-market accounting on bank behaviour: “Further, prior to 
1938, banking organizations were required for supervisory purposes to use market value 
accounting for their investment securities portfolios. Serious concerns on the part of the U.S. 
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Treasury and the bank regulators over how this affected the banks’ financial performance and 
investment decisions led the agencies to abandon in that year the use of this accounting 
concept for supervisory purposes”. Laux and Leuz (2009:829) mention that “FVA and asset 
write-ups allow banks to increase their leverage in booms, which in turn makes the financial 
system more vulnerable and financial crises more severe” but these writers reason that these 
effects are likely to be similar under historical cost accounting with gains trading. It has 
already been shown that this argument ignores important aspects of FVA that imply a greater 
build-up of systemic vulnerabilities under FVA during a boom. Cassidy (2009:310) writes 
that during good times, rising asset values under FVA will give a boost to banks’ equity 
capital that encourages further debt financed asset expansion. Pinnuck (2012:9) speculates 
that the market for subprime mortgages might not have expanded as quickly as it did if firms 
had to account conservatively; in other words, by not recognising increased asset values. It 
was shown that the impact on capital and income that stems from trading assets and 
instruments for which the fair value option has been chosen, cannot simply be ignored as 
argued by Shaffer (2010:10).    
 
The purpose of this section was to review the results of investigations into the role of FVA in 
the global financial crisis. What emerged from the review is that few researchers consider the 
possibility that FVA encouraged dangerous behaviour prior to the global financial crisis and 
even less researchers gathered empirical evidence from before the crisis. There seems to be 
no empirical evidence that FVA during the crisis added to the severity of the crisis. Evidence 
suggested the possibility that bank managers used the flexibility available in FVA to 
postpone losses during the crisis. The review also showed a focus on FVA adjustments 
related to available-for-sale assets as the channel for FVA to have played a role in the crisis. 
It was argued that FVA adjustments through profit and loss should be investigated.  
 
The next section of the review will explore the relationship between FVA and the EMH. This 
relationship is a plausible reason for why so few studies considered FVA’s role before the 
global financial crisis. The argument is further bolstered by points of view above that the 
crisis was caused by exogenous events or that “accounting is only a messenger”. The EMH 
and its validity is important for this thesis because the argument that market prices are always 
equal to fundamental values makes it impossible for FVA (level 1) to have played a role prior 
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the global financial crisis.4 In writing the next section the author is not arguing for the 
validity or not of the EMH but rather aims to focus the discussion on the relationship between 
the EMH and FVA. 
 
4. The relationship between fair value accounting and the efficient market hypothesis 
 
There have been studies that investigated the relationship between FVA and the EMH. 
Milburn (2008), based on an examination of IASB and FASB pronouncements, found that an 
assumption of reasonable market efficiency is behind the relevance of fair value. Whittington 
(2008), based on a discussion of the issues raised by the IASB’s public pronouncements, 
found that the fair value worldview assumes perfect and complete markets. Arnold (2009) 
investigated the implications of the financial crisis for accounting and states that conventional 
accounting research needs to go beyond the assumption that accounting provides the 
transparency for capital markets to function efficiently. It is important to note that although 
these three writers’ findings seem similar, one of them is different from the other two; a 
contradiction that will be returned to later in this section. Thus, the first two papers found that 
efficient markets are a necessary condition for FVA whilst the third paper argues that FVA 
makes markets more efficient.  
 
The section that follows will review the EMH and the questions regarding its validity. 
Arguments will then be proposed for and against a strong relationship between FVA and the 
EMH. The implications of the findings will conclude this section. 
 
4.1 The efficient market hypothesis 
John Cassidy, in his book on the global financial crisis and its possible causes, places the 
EMH within the broader context of free market ideology (Cassidy, 2009:87). The EMH is a 
theory about how financial markets process information and is distinct from, but related to, 
the concept of economic efficiency. The original link between market efficiency and 
economic efficiency can be clearly seen in the following quote from Eugene Fama who 
popularised the EMH (Fama, 1970:383): 
 
                                                 
4
 Market values equal to fundamentals would not exclude a role for FVA prior to the crisis based on 
inexperience or earnings management. 
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The primary role of the capital market is allocation of ownership of the economy’s 
capital stock. In general terms, the ideal is a market in which prices provide accurate 
signals for resource allocation: that is, a market in which firms can make production-
investment decisions, and investors can choose among the securities that represent 
ownership of firms’ activities under the assumption that securities prices at any time 
‘fully reflect’ all available information. 
 
This link between market efficiency and economic efficiency did not last long. Joseph Stiglitz 
is famous for his work on information and its role in market failures. Stiglitz showed that an 
informationally efficient asset market need not generate allocative or production efficiency in 
the economy (Stiglitz, 1981). More generally, an economy may fail to generate an efficient 
allocation of resources for two broad reasons; market power and the nonexistence of markets 
(Rosen, 1995:51). Included in the term “nonexistence of markets” are issues such as 
asymmetric information, externalities and public goods.  
 
This was not the only change over time; the meaning of information efficiency also changed. 
Initially an efficient market was a market which “adjusts rapidly to new information” (Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen & Roll, 1969:1). Later, it was one where asset prices “fully reflect all available 
information”5 (Fama, 1991:1575) and finally it was “the idea that competitive markets 
ruthlessly exploit all available information when setting security prices” (Ball, 2009:8). 
Whilst these definitions seem similar at first glance, the fundamental change over time is a 
move away from the idea that prices are aligned with fundamentals, towards the lesser 
requirement of competition on the stock market making it difficult to beat the market (Fox, 
2010:299). Fama and French (2007:683) conclude inter alia that “for prices to converge to 
rational values, the beliefs of misinformed investors must converge to those of the informed, 
so eventually there is complete agreement about old news”. This is a roundabout way of 
saying that prices are most of the time not rational as convergence is highly unlikely with the 
requirement of homogenous expectations.  
 
                                                 
5
 Concurrent with this development of the EMH, the world economy experienced a long period of high inflation 
in the 1970s. During high inflation, the historical cost of an asset or liability loses relevance quickly and 
accountants started looking for alternatives to historic cost accounting. The information qualities of market 
prices as predicted by the EMH made FVA very attractive; by incorporating market prices into the accounting 
records one is actually incorporating a summary measure that “fully reflect all available information”. 
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Beechey, Gruen and Vickery (2000:4), in their evaluation of the validity of the EMH, write 
that information is not instantaneously incorporated into price as predicted by the EMH; also, 
almost all market participants use technical trading techniques in contrast to the weak form of 
the EMH and, the existence of financial crises points to asset price misalignments. Milburn 
(2008:299) finds similarly that information is not always instantaneously incorporated into 
price, even in deep markets, and that asset prices can deviate from fundamental values. It is 
arguably the occurrence of financial crises that cast the most serious doubt on the continued 
validity of the EMH. The current global financial crisis generated harsh criticism of the EMH 
with reasoning that boils down to this: investors and regulators neglected to investigate and 
verify the true values of traded securities due to a belief in the notion that market prices 
reflect all available information (Ball, 2009:8). In addition, the global financial crisis is an 
example of where the market prices of securities adjusted materially downwards (some 
securities became worthless as liquidity dried up completely) without any underlying 
information flow that caused the change.  
 
Economics commentator and visiting professor of economics at the London School of 
Economics, John Kay, writes that FVA is based on the EMH and that the reality of the past 
decade has “mugged” the EMH (Kay, 2013). Interestingly as well as important for the 
discussion in later chapters, he also argues that market prices in active markets6 are likely to 
be disconnected from fundamental values due to speculation: “Concern is often expressed 
about the difficulty of applying mark-to-market principles when there is no active market. 
Actually, the larger problem arises when there is an active market. The greater the volume of 
trading, the greater the extent to which prices are determined not by informed assessment of 
fundamental value but by speculation”. Prof. Kay wraps up his argument by proposing 
industry-specific financial reporting. 
 
The history of the EMH thus explains why market prices are usually regarded as being 
important summary measures of information and perhaps explains why accounting standard 
setters wanted to incorporate that information into accounting records. Doubt on the validity 
of the EMH derives from what is collectively known as behavioural finance (Ball, 2009:15). 
The end result of price anomalies related to the EMH is that the proponents of the EMH had 
                                                 
6
 Accounting standard setters have arguably accepted the notion that inactive markets are not likely to be 
(information) efficient and have put more onerous disclosure requirements in place for information derived from 
inactive markets. The unstated assumption seems to be that active markets are likely to be (information) 
efficient. 
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to reduce the extent of its implications. What remains is the view that competition on capital 
markets makes it difficult to beat the market and what fell away was the notion that capital 
market prices are consistent with economic fundamentals. FVA built on an EMH where asset 
prices “fully reflect all available information” makes a great deal of sense and makes it 
impossible for mark-to-market accounting (FVA level 1) to play a role in feedback processes. 
In contrast, FVA built on a foundation of the EMH that is no more than the idea that it is 
difficult to beat the market, is open to challenge.  
 
4.2 How strong is the relationship between fair value accounting and the efficient market 
hypothesis? 
 
Accounting research 
Accounting researchers seem to have two opposing views on the relationship between FVA 
and the EMH. Some researchers argue that the causality is usually from an efficient market to 
FVA. In contrast, other researchers argue the opposite and claim that the causality is usually 
from FVA to an efficient market. A number of researchers even argue for both directions. 
Milburn (2008:293) analyses the arguments put forward by the IASB and the FASB for the 
relevance of fair value for financial reporting and concludes that an assumption of reasonable 
market efficiency is its essence. Whittington (2008:139) writes that the fair value view 
assumes that markets are relatively perfect and complete and that the alternative view 
assumes relatively incomplete and imperfect markets. Hitz (2007:325) finds that the 
informational contribution from fair value measurements under conditions of complete and 
perfect markets is without question, but then cautions that the contribution is unclear in the 
more realistic setting of imperfect markets. In contrast Scott (2009:195) argues that FVA 
improves market efficiency by “helping investors overcome behavioural biases”. Underlying 
Scott’s argument is a departmentalised view of capital markets where the reporting 
company’s share market is assumed to be inefficient and capable of being improved, while 
the capital markets on which the assets or liabilities of the reporting company trade are 
assumed to be efficient. A problem with this view is that share markets are generally believed 
to be more efficient than other markets; Scott’s argument implies that information from the 
less efficient markets can improve the efficiency of the most efficient market. Pinnuck (2012) 
reviews the role of financial reporting in the global financial crisis and inter alia argues for 
both directions of causality. According to him, financial reporting reduces information 
asymmetry “thus providing the transparency needed for capital markets to function 
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efficiently” (Pinnuck, 2012:1) and later he states that “A critical assumption that underpins 
FVA is that markets are efficient (as it is from markets that FV prices are obtained)”.  
 
In contrast to the conclusions of Milburn and Whittington, above, stating that the IASB has a 
strong EMH orientation, Al Jifri and Citron (2008: 124) write that the IASB’s preference for 
disclosure versus recognition indicates a weaker relationship between the EMH and FVA. If 
markets processed information efficiently then it should not matter whether any new 
information is to be found in the notes of the financial statements or in the body of the 
financial statements. 
 
The argument that accounting is only a messenger  
The defenders are prone to calling the attack on FVA, following the global financial crisis, as 
a case of killing the messenger (The Economist, 2009; Ball, 2008; Magnan, 2009:208; Pozen, 
2009:86). The argument is clearly closely related to the information view of accounting and it 
implies a belief that accounting plays no economic role other than to provide information. 
The underlying assumption is that investors would be able to see through the accounting veil 
to the economic fundamentals. The market would price instruments according to their 
fundamentals and thus this argument demonstrates a strong belief in the validity of the EMH. 
In commercial banks accounting plays a key role in the money supply. 
 
Language used by the standard setting bodies 
“Fair value is the amount for which an asset could be exchanged or a liability settled, 
between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction” (Vorster, Koornhof, 
Oberholster, Koppeschaar, Coetzee, Janse van Rensburg, Binnekade, Leith & Hattingh, 
2008:601). For markets to function efficiently, one important assumption is that the market 
participants are well informed; in other words, there are no information asymmetries between 
them. The use of the word “knowledgeable” in the above quotation points to this assumption. 
IFRS also allows for the use of valuation techniques if the market for an instrument is no 
longer active (Vorster et al., 2008:601). This use of the word “active” is only understandable 
in the context of the market for the instrument being efficient enough to produce a reasonable 
estimate of value. Thus the use of these terms indicates the EMH as a foundation for FVA, a 
conclusion which concurs with Milburn’s (2008) conclusion based on an analysis of the 
language used by the IASB and FASB in their accounting statements and other publications. 
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In response to the financial crisis, the IASB created an external Expert Advisory Panel in 
May 2008 to consider issues relating to measuring fair value in illiquid markets. The use of 
the word “illiquid” makes sense in the context of an efficient market; is the market liquid 
enough to process information efficiently and thus provide a reasonable estimate of value? 
Another IASB body, the Financial Crisis Advisory Group, states in its report that “Financial 
reporting is also dependent on the generation of reliable data by well-functioning markets that 
have proper infrastructure …” (2009:5). A well-functioning market with proper infrastructure 
makes sense within the EMH framework.  
 
In summary: the IASB and FASB never refer directly to the EMH as the foundation for FVA, 
but the language used in their reports only makes sense if the EMH is at the heart of the 
argument.  
 
Public opinion 
Catalano (2009) accuses the FASB of being radical efficient marketers who ignored decades 
of behavioural finance research when they proposed mark-to-market accounting. Kay (2009) 
writes that the founders of the accounting profession believed that only birds in the hand 
mattered; in contrast, modern accountants have been trained in modern finance theory where 
markets are efficient and those accountants mark assets and liabilities to market. Kay states 
that the use of mark-to-market accounting in the hands of a creative man such as Jeff Skilling 
from Enron enabled Skilling to profit from a good idea as soon as he thought of it.  
 
Arguments used to justify fair value accounting 
The transparency argument is the main argument in favour of fair value (Hitz, 2007:323). The 
argument is that historic prices are outdated and not relevant to current decision making. 
FVA on the other hand is based on current market prices which incorporate all relevant 
information. Lee (2009) agrees that FVA makes for transparent accounting that puts the 
emphasis on potentially dangerous businesses and their positions. Ryan (2008) emphasises 
that FVA provides market participants with the most accurate and complete information 
needed to stem the crisis.  
 
The FASB (2006b) rationalises the superior relevance of fair values as follows: 
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1. Fair value incorporates the current market assessment of the future, including the 
amount, timing, and uncertainty of future cash flows attributable to a financial 
instrument. Fair value information provides a benchmark measurement that users of 
financial statements may adjust to reflect their own expectations. Fair value 
information permits financial statement users to make decisions on the basis of 
information about current conditions rather than on information about conditions 
that existed at the time an entity purchased a financial asset or incurred a financial 
liability. 
2. As a concept, fair value reflects the collective assumptions and expectations of 
market participants rather than entity-specific assumptions and expectations. Fair 
value information facilitates period-to-period comparisons for a single entity, as well 
as comparisons between different entities. 
 
The FASB and IASB believe that markets are efficient enough to produce information of 
interest to users of financial statements. Even a weak form of the EMH, by definition, implies 
that all historic price information is known by that market and is incorporated into the price 
of securities; thus, informing the market via the accounting records of price information 
should be of no value to a reasonably efficient market. The dichotomy is that markets are 
believed to be efficient enough to provide useful information, but are also believed to be so 
inefficient that current price information will be news.   
 
Conclusion on the relationship between FVA and the EMH 
The evidence leads to the conclusion that a strong relationship exists between the concepts of 
FVA and the EMH whilst recognising that there are differences concerning the nature of the 
relationship. The differences noted are the lack of clarity on the direction of causality 
between FVA and the EMH as well as the IASB’s preference for recognition versus 
disclosure. These differences are probably the result of the way that accounting standards and 
theory are developed with the influence of normative and positive approaches. The question 
on causality can be resolved by allowing for feedback effects between FVA and market 
prices. Feedback effects are an important aspect of the model that will be developed later in 
the thesis.  
 
What is left of the EMH does not include the assumption that market prices are always 
aligned with fundamentals. The implication for this thesis is that the possibility of FVA 
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playing a role in feedback processes cannot simply be argued away as impossible under the 
EMH. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The objective of this chapter was to review the role of FVA in the global financial crisis. The 
chapter also explored the link between FVA and the EMH as a possible reason for scholars 
not considering FVA’s role prior to the global financial crisis. The review helps to 
contextualise the larger thesis study. The chapter showed that there is not yet consensus on 
the cause of the global financial crisis and even less so on the role of FVA in the crisis.  
 
The section on the role of FVA in the crisis showed that empirical evidence from before and 
after (and not just during) the crisis are needed and that the focus should not just be on FVA 
for available-for-sale assets. It was also shown that empirical evidence suggests that FVA did 
not add to the severity of the crisis during the crisis as management could use the flexibility 
allowed in FVA to avoid losses.  
 
The review of the role of FVA in the global financial crisis revealed a link between the EMH 
and FVA which was explored further as a the EMH assumption that market values are equal 
to fundamental values can explain the disregard of the possibility that FVA’s role in the crisis 
is to be found before the crisis. The review showed that there is a strong relationship between 
FVA and the EMH and that what remains of the EMH does not include prices that are always 
aligned with fundamentals. Thus FVA (level 1) can play a role in feedback processes. The 
more subjective levels (2 and 3) of FVA allows for FVA to have played a role in the global 
financial crisis independent of the validity or not of the EMH and its impact on FVA. Bank 
management could have inflated profits and/or capital with inflated fair values. This 
possibility is further investigated in the final chapter before the conclusion.     
 
This thesis will make a contribution to the literature by obtaining evidence on how banks 
practically applied FVA before and after the global financial crisis. This can be realised in the 
South African context with fewer banks in the system, rich data available from the reserve 
bank and the opportunity to meet with bankers, their auditors and regulators. Unlike other 
studies the focus will not be on FVA adjustments related to available-for-sale but rather on 
FVA adjustments that impact profit and loss. FVA adjustments that end up in retained 
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income forms part of regulatory capital whereas available-for-sale reserves do not form part 
of regulatory capital under Basel II. No other study has investigated how FVA was used by 
South African banks even though such a focus is warranted. First, the South African bank 
regulator maintains a high international profile and thus exemplary behaviour from South 
African banks can be expected which should be tested. Second, in 2014 South Africa 
switched to a fair value based income tax regime for banks based on assumption that include 
the argument that most financial assets held by South African banks are marked-to-marketed. 
 
The next three chapters of this study will narrow the focus and investigate how FVA was 
implemented within the South African banking system. The next chapter contextualises this 
South African case study by investigating the similarities and differences between large 
South African banks and other Western banks. This knowledge of commonalities and 
differences will be needed to evaluate whether the South African results can be generalised. 
The subsequent two chapters will present empirical findings on the South African banks; one 
paper will look at individual bank level data and the other paper will look at South African 
banking system data. The results of the South African case study will be useful to inform and 
enrich the model developed in the final paper. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This study can be divided into two parts; a model part and a South African case study part. 
The purpose of the model part is to develop theory that explains bank behaviour when capital 
regulations and accounting standards meet. The purpose of the South African case study is 
twofold; first, to observe in detail the use of FVA in practice and second, to inform and 
enrich the theory developed in the model. This section focuses on the case study part and 
specifically provides some context to the South African case study. According to Robson 
(2002) case studies always occur in a specified social and physical setting and cases cannot 
be studied devoid of their context. The specific context that will be provided is an overview 
of the development of bank regulatory standards and how they were and are applied in South 
Africa. That overview examines the development and application of accounting standards in 
South Africa culminating in the requirement in 2005 that all listed South African companies 
adopt IFRS (Prather-Kinsey, 2006:142). Both bank regulatory standards in South Africa and 
accounting standards in South Africa will be evaluated to determine the similarities and 
differences between South Africa and other countries. 
 
2. Bank regulation 
 
2.1 International 
The financial system and banks in particular have certain characteristics that provide the 
rationale for the extensive regulation of the industry. Examples of some of these 
characteristics include the essential role of money in the economy and the possibility of a 
systemic crisis when bank failures occur (Heffernan, 2005:175; Howelss & Bain, 2008:548-
549). Typically a country’s central bank plays the supervisory role in bank regulation.  
 
With the deregulation of global financial markets and the development of sophisticated and 
complex financial products, the need arose to standardise banking regulations and to provide 
a framework for minimum capital standards to be maintained by large and internationally 
active banks. The rest of this section will focus on the capital adequacy aspect of bank 
regulations as this is where FVA and its effect on bank capital becomes relevant. 
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Bank capital is the ultimate defence against risk (Howelss & Bain, 2008:560; Rose & 
Hudgins, 2008:479). The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, based at the BIS in Basel 
Switzerland, spearheaded the development of a standardised framework for capital 
measurement. This culminated in the Basel Capital Accord (Basel I) which was adopted in 
1988 by the Group of Ten countries and subsequently implemented by more than 100 
countries world-wide. The framework was improved during the period 2001 to 2006, 
resulting in the introduction of Basel II. 
 
2.1.1. Basel I 
Basel I provides a standardised framework for measuring capital adequacy and it imposes 
minimum required capital reserves. This can be expressed in the following simplified 
formula: 
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 	  > Required percentage (usually 8%)                                  (1) 
 
Basel I initially distinguished between two types of capital; Tier 1 capital (core capital) and 
Tier II capital (supplementary capital).  Core capital consisted mainly of shareholders’ equity, 
disclosed reserves that were available to cushion losses, retained earnings and non-
cumulative preferred shares less goodwill. Supplementary capital consisted of funds not fully 
owned or controlled by the bank, such as “general” provisions that the bank set aside against 
unidentified future losses and medium or long-term subordinated debt issued by the bank (the 
information in this paragraph is mostly from Howelss and Bain (2008:563). Tier II capital 
was limited to 100 percent of Tier 1 capital. A reasonable summary of Tier II capital is as 
follows; accounting capital plus “general” provisions plus long-term subordinated debt less 
goodwill. What is clear is that regulatory capital is primarily an accounting concept. 
 
The risk weighting of assets at first incorporated only credit risk and consisted of five simple 
risk buckets. However, banks are also exposed to market risk via their trading activities and 
therefore, in 1996, an Amendment to Basel I was issued to account for market risk. The four 
different forms of market risk recognised in the Amendment include: equity price risk, 
interest rate risk associated with fixed income securities, currency risk and commodities price 
risk (Howelss & Bain, 2008:186). Under the Amendment, one of two approaches to market 
risk could be adopted; either the internal model approach or the standardised approach. Under 
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the internal model approach banks were allowed to use their own internal value at risk 
models to calculate the amount of capital to set aside for market risk. Under the standardised 
approach the amount of capital to be set aside was determined by an additive process based 
on the four market risk categories. In each risk category, all derivatives were converted into 
spot equivalents and a capital charge determined. No allowance was made for portfolio 
diversification in this process (Howelss & Bain, 2008:190). 
 
Basel II was primarily motivated by the need to use internal models to assess credit risk, 
instead of the “one size fits all” broad risk buckets under Basel I. Another motivation was the 
need to incorporate operational risk in the process, in addition to credit risk and market risk. 
The greater use of asset securitisation by banks was also a factor (Howelss & Bain, 
2008:566). Implementation was to take place on 1 January 2008 (Mathews & Thompson, 
2008:198). 
 
2.1.2. Basel II 
Basel II is not just focused on capital adequacy, unlike Basel I. It makes use of three 
interactive, “mutually reinforcing” pillars: Pillar 1 (minimum capital requirements), Pillar 2 
(role of bank supervisors) and Pillar 3 (use of market discipline) (Heffernan, 2005:194). Our 
focus is on Pillar 1 (capital adequacy). The changes made to capital adequacy from Basel I to 
Basel II can be seen in the following formulas that are variants of the formula previously 
presented for Basel I: 
 
Basel I (with the 1996 Amendment): 
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Basel II: 
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A major change, in addition to the inclusion of operational risk, was that the calculation of 
credit risk and the capital required was changed from a “one size fits all” approach to a more 
                                                 
1
 In South Africa, under Basel II, the required percentage was 9.5% due to the concentrated nature of the South 
African market; in other words, there are few banks in that market. (Bakoro, de Jager & Parsons, 2013:6). 
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individualised and bank orientated approach. Three approaches were specified for credit risk 
to suit different levels of risk and sophistication according to the operations of the bank 
(Mathews & Thompson, 2008:198). The standardised approach was an extension of the Basel 
I approach of risk buckets; the difference with Basel II was that the risk buckets were being 
ordered according to the credit ratings assigned to assets by external rating agencies. Banks 
that had more sophisticated risk management controls were, with the permission of their local 
regulatory authority, allowed to apply their own internal ratings; in other words, they could 
use their own models and credit history to determine what level of capital to hold for credit 
risk. For securitisation exposures, banks were now required to calculate the capital needed as 
if they were exposed to the underlying assets in the securitisation transactions.  
 
2.1.3. Basel III 
In a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation revealed by the global financial crisis, 
the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision introduced Basel III. This strengthens bank capital 
requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements for bank liquidity and bank 
leverage. 
 
2.2 South Africa 
According to Botha and Makina (2011:32), prior to the 1980s, South African bank regulation 
was out of line with international best practice. Capital requirements were based on simple 
ratios of capital to total assets. Off-balance sheet activities and derivatives were unregulated. 
The De Kock Commission of 1987 recommended the regulation of specific activities and the 
adoption of risk-weighted measures of capital adequacy. The Banking Act of 1990 
implemented these recommendations and had the important effect of steering South African 
bank supervision towards international best practice, as based on the Basel rules. 
 
The Banking Act of 1990 made bank supervision the responsibility of the Department of  
Bank Supervision of the SARB. From the beginning, the Department actively engaged with 
international best practices and the Basel rules and over the next fifteen years the mission 
statement of the department transformed from “To promote the soundness of banks through 
effective supervision” (Bank Supervision Department of the SARB, 1995:1) to “To promote 
the soundness of the domestic banking system and to minimise systemic risk through the 
effective and efficient application of international regulatory and supervisory standards” 
(Bank Supervision Department of the SARB,  2011:c); this transformation reflects even 
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greater conformance with international practice. A possible culmination of the South African 
adherence to international best practice is the World Economic Forum which rated the 
soundness of South African banks as being second in the world in 2012 (World Economic 
Forum, 2012). 
 
South Africa’s strict adherence to international standards was demonstrated by the fact that 
while Basel II was implemented in South African by the effective date of 2008, countries 
were allowed to assess their own readiness, and as a result not all countries implemented 
Basel II at that time (the United States of America is a significant example) (Bank 
Supervision Department of the SARB, 2009). South African implementation of Basel III will 
start in 2013 (Bank Supervision Department of the SARB, 2012:16) and Basel II is in place 
until then. 
 
Another area where the SARB followed international best practice was with the adoption of 
inflation targeting in February 2000 (Van der Merwe, 2004:2). Importantly for this study the 
adoption of inflation targeting coincided with a structural reduction in interest rates in the 
South African economy with the prime interest rate (an important short-term reference rate) 
falling from 21% at the beginning of the 1990s to single digits by 2010; this reduction in 
interest rates had a material impact on the valuation of fixed income securities. 
 
It can be concluded that in terms of bank regulation the modern South Africa is comparable 
to developed countries that subscribe to the Basel Accords.   
 
3. South African accounting standards 
 
Submissions by South African banks had to be consistent with South African generally 
accepted accounting practice (GAAP) before 2005. This changed to the requirement that 
listed South African banks had to prepare their consolidated financial statements in 
accordance with IFRS for years ending on or after 31 December 2005 (Bank Supervision 
Department of the SARB,  2006:27). Banks not listed were allowed to continue in accordance 
with South African GAAP but the bank supervisor notes in its annual report of 2005 that “the 
Accounting Practices Board, which issues accounting standards in South Africa, has reissued 
all South African GAAP statements and interpretations when there were differences between 
these standards and those issued by the IASB.” (Bank Supervision Department of the SARB, 
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2006:27). Finally, South Africa wrote IFRS into South African law under Regulation 3 of 
2008 of the Banks Act of 1990, by requiring that all submissions made by banks for 
regulatory purposes be prepared in terms of IFRS. 
 
The adoption of FVA for financial instruments was the culmination of the introduction of the 
fair value concept into accounting (Magnan, 2009:192) and is the key FVA standard for this 
study. IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement came into effect from 1 
January 2001 and was adopted into South African GAAP as AC 133 from that date. 
Important for the banks in this study is that their accounting practices, even for the period at 
the beginning of the 2000s under South African GAAP, can be regarded as being consistent 
with IFRS (Prather-Kinsey, 2006:145).2  It can be concluded that in terms of accounting 
standards the modern South Africa is comparable to developed countries that implemented 
IFRS.   
 
South Africa’s timely implementation of IFRS and South Africa’s active participation in the 
activities of the Basel Committee are illustrated by the appointment of the current South 
African Registrar of Banks, René van Wyk, as the chairman of the Accounting Task Force 
sub-committee of the Basel Committee.    
 
4. Why did no South African banks fail during the financial crisis? 
 
It was argued in the previous sections that South’s Africa’s compliance with bank regulations 
and accounting standards is at a high level, comparable with developed countries, as far as 
the Basel Accords and IFRS are concerned. The question that arises in the context of the 
global financial crisis is as follows: if South African banks are so typical then what explains 
why none of them failed? The aim of this section is to highlight the differences that explain 
why no South African banks failed during the financial crisis. 
 
One significant way in which the operating environment of South African banks differs from 
that of other international banks, are exchange controls. In the words of Brian Kahn, the 
SARB’s then head of the Research Department, South African banks were isolated: “With 
respect to banks, there are restrictions in terms of the exchange control act, on the types of 
                                                 
2
 Local accounting standards in South Africa have been harmonized with international accounting standards 
since the mid-1990s  (UNCTAD Secretariat, 2007:3; Prather-Kinsey, 2006:145). 
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assets or asset classes they may get involved in (cross-border). These include leveraged 
products and certain hedging and derivative instruments. For example banks cannot hedge 
transactions that are not SA linked. Effectively it meant that our banks could not get involved 
in the toxic assets floating that others were scrambling into. They would have needed 
exchange control approval which would not have been granted, as they did not satisfy certain 
criteria” (Padayachee, 2012:8). The protection offered by exchange controls limited exposure 
to subprime-related products in the United States and this is one reason why no South African 
banks failed during the crisis (International Monetary Fund, 2008:11; BIS, 2011:365). 
Another reason why no South African banks failed is that South African loan underwriting 
standards never declined to the same extent as in the United States (BIS, 2011:371).  
 
5. Fair value accounting and prudential filters 
 
Some authors such as Barth and Landsman (2010) argue that prudential filters in the Basel 
framework neutralise most fair value gains and losses and thus remove the volatility of those 
gains or losses from bank capital. It is thus of importance to focus on this specific issue in the 
calculation of capital adequacy. If FVA gains and losses are specifically excluded from bank 
capital by the bank regulator (generally elsewhere and in South Africa) then it becomes 
unlikely that fair value could have possibly played a role in influencing bank behaviour prior 
to the global financial crisis. 
 
A study by Bakoro, de Jager and Parsons (2013) specifically addressed this matter of 
prudential filters. They found that the South African bank supervisor adjusts accounting 
capital in the area of impairments (bank regulators require forward looking impairments) and 
for reserves resulting from available-for-sale instruments, cash flow hedging, share based 
payments and foreign currency translation. The general principle in Basel II is that Tier 1 
capital should be equity capital made up from permanent shareholders’ equity and disclosed 
reserves that, importantly, are required to have been posted through profit and loss (BIS, 
2006: 245). The implication is that accounting entries posted directly to reserves would be 
excluded. This explains the exclusion of available-for-sale reserves, cash flow hedging 
reserves and foreign currency translation reserves. Share based payment expenses, even 
though posted via profit and loss, do not represent a decrease in total capital available to 
absorb losses and are thus added back: it is a transfer from current shareholders to new 
shareholders. Fair value adjustments that were posted directly to profit and loss such as those 
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that relate to trading assets and assets for which the fair value option was chosen are, 
however, not excluded from regulatory capital; consequently, all or most volatility will not be 
removed, contrary to the findings of Barth and Landsman (2010). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this chapter was to provide a contextualisation of the use of FVA by 
South African banks. As explained earlier, the objective of the larger study is to investigate 
the role of FVA in the global financial crisis by gathering empirical evidence on the use of 
FVA by South African banks (with the focus on the time period before the crisis) and then to 
develop a theoretical perspective on the problem. Case studies should always be considered 
within their specific context. In terms of capital adequacy and how it is determined in South 
Africa, it was found that South Africa takes part in the setting of and implements promptly 
the latest international best practice in terms of bank supervision. Basel II was implemented 
in South Africa on 1 January 2008 and Basel III will be implemented on the dates set by the 
Basel Committee. The accounting standards under which South African banks operated 
during the 2000s can be regarded as IFRS.  
 
The South African context thus indicates that a study of banks in South Africa can be 
regarded as a representative case study; this is because of the country’s propensity to 
implement international accounting and bank supervisory standards quickly. It is reasonable 
to expect that the findings of the South African case study will be more internationally 
descriptive than if South Africa were a unique case. Differences were identified that can 
explain why no South African banks failed during the financial crisis; unlike banks in the 
United States and in Europe. These differences are firstly, exchange controls that limited the 
exposure of South African banks to subprime-related instruments and secondly, better loan 
underwriting standards in South Africa. These differences will be kept in mind when 
considering whether the South African case study results can be generalised.  
 
The argument that prudential filters remove the volatility in bank capital resulting from fair 
value adjustments was found not to be fully accurate. Fair value adjustments that are booked 
directly to reserves without passing through profit and loss are removed by the bank 
supervisors in accordance with the prudential filter argument. However, fair value 
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adjustments that are booked to profit and loss are not removed by prudential filters and form 
part of retained income and thus regulatory capital. 
 
The following two chapters form the South African case study. Chapter four will use data 
obtained from individual South African banks. Chapter five will use individual bank data as 
well as data obtained from the total South African banking system. The next chapter, four, 
will be exploratory in the sense that it aims to investigate how South African banks applied 
FVA in practice before and after the global financial crisis. Some variability is built into the 
investigation by using a comparative case design where the one bank selected is the largest 
South African bank (comparable in size to a large Western bank) and the other bank is a 
smaller bank on the dividing line between systemic or not. The variability might help to 
delineate between effects driven by bank size and other effects. What both selected banks 
have in common is that they are universal banks; in other words, a combination of a retail 
bank and an investment bank. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: LIBERAL FAIR VALUE ACCOUNTING IN BANKS: A SOUTH 
AFRICAN CASE STUDY1 
 
1. Synopsis2 
The overall objective of the larger study is to investigate the role of FVA in the global 
financial crisis by gathering empirical evidence on the use of FVA by South African banks 
(with the focus on the time period before the crisis) and then to develop a theoretical 
perspective on the problem. Chapter two reviewed the global financial crisis and the role of 
FVA in that crisis. Chapter three contextualised the empirical work which is a South African 
case study. The main aim of this chapter is to observe in detail how FVA was used in practice 
by two large South African banks.  
 
An objective of the thesis is to determine the use of FVA by banks in practice. This is 
possible in this South African case study of two large banks. The results indicate that the 
South African banks did not use FVA in a neutral manner; instead FVA adjustments that 
increased profits (and thus capital) were accepted whilst FVA adjustments that decreased 
profits were actively avoided. This asymmetry in application, with FVA losses slow to follow 
the global financial crisis (in Investec Bank Limited’s case postponed by two years), speaks 
to the objective of the thesis to focus on the time period before the crisis as well as on the 
time period after the crisis. In both banks the unrealised portion of retained income was 
material, peaked just before the crisis and thus proved risky.   
 
FVA adjustments can be posted directly to capital reserves or through profit and loss. A 
common assumption is to only focus on FVA for available-for-sale assets. An objective of 
this thesis is to rather focus attention on FVA adjustments through profit and loss. This focus 
is justified by the results in this paper (especially Table 4.2) which shows how FVA 
adjustments posted directly to capital reserves are immaterial compared to FVA adjustments 
posted through profit and loss. The FVA adjustments through profit and loss proved to be 
risky as evidenced by the patterns observed. 
                                                 
1
 Paper was published in the journal Australian accounting review (volume 24, number 2 of 2014). 
2
 The three main chapters are papers that have been published and are included in the thesis verbatim and are 
thus standalone papers. The Guidelines for the inclusion of publications in a doctoral thesis of the University of 
Cape Town require that each paper is prefaced by a synopsis of how the paper contributes to the thesis aims and 
objectives.  
65 
 
Another objective of the thesis is to investigate to what extent the financial instrument assets 
and liabilities of a bank must be accounted for under FVA before potential dangerous effects 
are possible; must it be most financial instruments or a much smaller portion of financial 
instruments? This paper demonstrates two cases where the average portion of assets at fair 
value was small (33% and 28%) and the average portion of liabilities at fair value was also 
small (17% and 25%), yet large impacts on profit and capital were observed that could be 
dangerous. 
 
The investigation of the use of FVA by two large South African banks also had the following 
benefits for the specific parties listed. The South African bank supervisor should be interested 
in the extent of unrealised FVA adjustments through profit and loss and thus in regulatory 
capital, and in the Standard Bank of South Africa’s (SBoSA’s) avoidance of the prohibition 
on reclassifications by adjusting comparative figures. The shareholders of the SBoSA should 
be interested in the R26 992 million mistake picked up in the 2011 annual report. The 
revenue authority of South Africa, who changed the taxation on financial instruments for 
banks, assumes in their discussion document that most financial instruments are valued at 
market values. The two cases in this paper show that most financial instruments are in fact 
not valued at market values but rather at level 2 of the FVA hierarchy. 
 
Other researchers should be interested in the finding that profits and losses from FVA can be 
influenced, not by tweaking the individual valuations, but rather on a macro level by 
managing the gap between assets at fair value and liabilities at fair value. Accounting 
standard setters should be interested in the use of one accounting standard (IAS 8) to get 
around the requirements of another accounting standard (IAS 39). 
 
The published paper follows.   
 
2. Abstract 
 
Research findings on the role of fair value accounting (FVA) in the global financial crisis can 
be interpreted as showing that FVA is not applied neutrally by banks. The results of FVA are 
accepted when they contribute to higher profits and are actively resisted when they lead to 
losses. The aim of this article is to investigate in some detail how FVA is practically applied 
by banks. The focus is on banks as most of their assets are financial instruments and thus 
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potentially fair valued, and banks’ behaviour is significantly influenced by their regulatory 
environment. The research objective is pursued by using a case study of two South African 
banks. One of these is the largest and most systemically important bank in the South African 
system and the other is on the crossover between systemic and not systemic. It is found that 
FVA as applied by these two banks is not neutral. Also included is a demonstration of a 
method to derive the unrealised portion of profit and equity, the identification of the gap 
between assets and liabilities at fair value as the driver of where in a banking group profits 
and losses are realised, and the finding that the restatement of comparative figures was used 
to circumvent the prohibition on reclassifications into and out of the “designated as at fair 
value” category.   
 
3. Introduction 
 
Modern accounting information should be neutral according to standard setters. Neutrality is 
defined as free from bias and incompatible with conservatism (International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), 2008:49). In contrast, evidence from the global financial crisis can 
be interpreted as pointing towards the liberal use of FVA by banks. 
 
The upswing period that preceded the crisis could have been amplified by the effects of FVA. 
The Bank of England, in its Financial Stability Report (2009:43), writes that a tendency for 
excessive risk-taking during the upswing of the credit cycle was one of the root causes of 
financial instability. Writers Taylor (2009), McMahon (2011) and Kusano (2011) argue that 
FVA was an important factor behind this tendency. FVA increases bank capital, makes the 
bank seem less risky (even though bank capital is increasingly full of unrealised profits and 
unstable gains) and encourages further risk-taking. Lifschutz (2002) found that in the period 
1997-2000, American banks took advantage of the flexibility in Statements of Financial 
Accounting Standards (SFAS) 115 Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity 
Securities to manage earnings; consequently, these accounting standards influenced certain 
decisions of managers and the result was that the neutrality of accounting was impaired. 
Lunawat, Pronin, Stecher and Zhang (2012) write that mark-to-model accounting has an 
optimistic bias. 
 
The downturn period that followed the crisis could also have been amplified by the effects of 
FVA accounting. FVA was accused of worsening the global financial crisis with an excessive 
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write-down of asset values depleting bank capital; according to this argument, the effects of 
FVA could have been exacerbated by liquidity issues and/or other feedback effects (Cassidy, 
2009:308; Laux & Leuz, 2009; Pozen, 2009; Shaffer, 2010). Accounting research into the 
global financial crisis has tackled the excessive write-down argument and found it to be 
invalid (Badertscher, Burks & Easton, 2012; Shaffer, 2010; United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2008). In fact, Laux and Leuz (2009) found that banks overvalued 
financial assets during the crisis. Vyas (2011) concurred by finding that write-downs were 
less timely than implied by the movement in credit indices. These findings should be 
considered within the context of the Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS) current belief 
that banks have not fully recognised the impairment in asset values stemming from the crisis 
(BIS, 2012:9). 
 
The argument that FVA is procyclical3 (BIS, 2008; Kusano, 2011) is closely related to the 
feedback effect argument presented above. A possible difference is that procylicality requires 
the effect to be present both in the upswing and the downturn whilst the bulk of the feedback 
effect arguments were made only in respect of the downturn. McMahon (2011:54) argues for 
feedback effects during both the upswing and the downturn but qualifies “feedback loops also 
occur during upswings, although not quite as fast”.  
 
An interpretation of the findings presented above is that FVA provides bank managers with 
enough flexibility to avoid being neutral in application. When profits are increased by FVA 
the results are accepted but when profits are decreased by FVA the results are not accepted 
and actions are taken to avoid the losses. The aim of this article is to investigate how FVA is 
practically applied by banks. Accounting can be viewed as a social science (Gaffikin, 2006) 
where the best and well-designed accounting rules are applied and audited by people with 
their individual objectives and incentives. George Soros, in a speech about the Euro crisis 
(2012), argues that feedback loops and people’s behaviour are related and important factors 
behind boom and bust cycles. 
 
A research design entailing a comparative-case case study is used, with a mixed methods 
research strategy, to investigate the research question. The units of analysis are two banks; 
one is the largest South African bank and the other is a South African bank, the size of which 
                                                 
3
 It amplifies the business cycle. 
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is on the border between systemic and not systemic. It is expected that a too-big-to-fail bank 
will be less inclined than a smaller bank to use FVA as a profit and capital management tool. 
Four themes will be used to guide the data gathering process: 
 
• How important is FVA for the banks? 
• What is disclosed under FVA by the banks? 
• Why did the banks use FVA in the way they did? 
• How do the banks manage FVA? 
 
The specificity of the case study design enables the demonstration of where and how 
discretionary practices were applied opportunistically by specific entities. It also indicates the 
presumed motivations for the practices and their consequences. These are all required 
research results for “passionate” accounting research (Briloff, 1997:14). 
 
The study makes four contributions to accounting literature, accounting standard setters and 
bank supervisors. First, it suggests that neutral FVA is unlikely to result from practices by 
banks. Second, it demonstrates a novel method to derive the unrealised portion of profit and 
equity due to FVA on financial instruments, using deferred tax balances. Third, the gap 
between assets and liabilities at fair value is identified as a key instrument that determines 
where eventual fair value profits or losses realise in a banking group. This contributes to the 
on-going discussion on whether the fair value option leaves too much flexibility in 
management’s hands. Finally, the study identifies the restatement of comparative figures as a 
way to avoid the International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39 – Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement prohibition on reclassifications into and out of the “designated 
as at fair value” category. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 3 discusses related literature, section 4 describes the 
methods and the data that will be used to address the research question, section 5 discusses 
and interprets the results and section 6 provides the conclusion. 
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4. Theoretical background 
 
The qualitative research approach adopted in this paper necessitates only a brief theoretical 
section as an over-emphasis on theory could restrict insights and create bias. 
 
4.1 Fair Value Accounting 
In the recent past, most financial reporting was based on historical cost. Assets or liabilities 
(but for brevity, only assets are discussed in this paragraph) were shown on the balance sheet 
of companies at the original price paid for the asset or at the original price paid for the asset 
amortised over time. Under mark-to-market accounting, an asset is carried on the balance 
sheet at the price the asset could fetch in the current market. Changes in mark-to-market 
value, in other words unrealised holding gains or losses, are recognised in current earnings. In 
contrast, under historical cost accounting, changes in value are usually only recognised when 
realised.4  
 
FVA is more complex than mark-to-market accounting. Fair value is the exchange value in 
an idealised market and can be determined in three ways, in order of preference:5  
 
• Mark-to-market accounting (level 1):  the significant inputs are quoted prices on an 
idealised market for similar instruments. 
• Mix of mark-to-market accounting and modelling (level 2): the significant inputs are 
directly observable market inputs other than Level 1 inputs; for example, adjusted 
market values etc.  
• Mark-to-model (level 3): significant inputs are not based on observable market data; 
instead, an estimate is made of what the value of the instrument would be if it were to 
be traded. 
 
The adoption of FVA for financial instruments was the culmination of the introduction of fair 
value into accounting (Magnan, 2009:192). IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement came into effect from 1 January 2001 and is the accounting standard on 
                                                 
4
 Historical cost accounting recognised declines in the market value of assets if that decline indicated 
impairment. 
5
 A formal order of preference only entered accounting standards under the IASB in October 2008 with an 
amendment to IAS 39 which adopted the American tiered system of fair value determination. 
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financial instruments under which the banks in the study reported. IAS 39 is summarised in 
the following table. 
 
Classification of financial 
instruments 
Treatment Reclassification allowed? 
ASSETS 
1.1 Held for trading financial 
instruments* 
Financial instrument valued at 
fair value and value change 
taken to profit and loss and thus 
ordinary capital 
1.1  Can be reclassified out 
of this category if non-
derivative, change of 
intention and “rare 
circumstances” or meets 
definition of loans and 
receivables 
1.2 Financial instruments 
designated as at fair value 
through profit or loss 
1.2 No reclassification 
allowed in or out 
2. Held-to-maturity financial 
instruments 
Financial instrument valued at 
amortised cost 
Reclassification possible 
subject to “tainting” rule 
3. Loans and receivables Financial instrument valued at 
amortised cost 
Reclassification possible 
4. Available-for-sale financial 
instruments 
Financial instrument valued at 
fair value and value change 
taken directly to capital 
Can be reclassified to 3. if 
change of intention and 
meets definition of loans 
and receivables 
Can be reclassified to 2 & 3 
if change of intention and 
“rare circumstances” 
LIABILITIES 
1.1 Held for trading financial 
instruments* 
Financial instrument valued at 
fair value and value change 
taken to profit and loss and thus 
ordinary capital 
1.1  Can be reclassified out 
of this category if non-
derivative, change of 
intention and “rare 
circumstances” or meets 
definition of loans and 
receivables 
1.2 Financial instruments 
designated as at fair value 
through profit or loss 
1.2 No reclassification 
allowed in or out 
2. Other financial liabilities Financial instrument valued at 
amortised cost 
Reclassification possible 
Table 4.1 Disclosure categories for financial instruments according to IAS 39. 
* - Includes all derivatives. 
 
Two matters in Table 4.1 warrant further explanation as they become relevant in the rest of 
the study: 
 
1) Financial instruments designated at fair value through profit and loss: IAS 39 permits 
the designation of any financial asset or financial liability to be measured at fair value 
even if the item would ordinarily, by its nature, be measured at amortised cost. In 2005 
the IASB issued an amendment to IAS 39 that restricted the use of the fair value option. 
The revision limited the use of the fair value option to the elimination or reduction of an 
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accounting mismatch (so called macro hedging/ portfolio hedging) or to where a group 
of financial assets, financial liabilities or both are managed on a fair value basis. The 
basis for conclusions that accompanied the amendment explained that some 
constituents, including prudential supervisors of banks, securities companies and 
insurers, were concerned that the fair value option might be used inappropriately and 
that the use of the option might increase profit and loss volatility. In other words there 
were worries that bankers might finesse the option in an unacceptable way. 
 
2) Reclassification changes in the midst of the global financial crisis: on 13 October 2008, 
and in response to the global financial crisis, the IASB issued amendments to IAS 39 
and the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 7 Financial Instruments: 
Disclosure.  These amendments created the space for banks to reclassify non-derivative 
financial instruments from the held-for-trading category in “rare circumstances” or if 
those instruments met the definition of loans and receivables. Similar reclassifications 
from the Available-for-sale category were made possible if the item met the definition 
of loans and receivables. The amendment reiterated that no reclassification out of the 
designated at fair value category is allowed. 
 
IFRS 9 Financial Instruments, is expected to become effective from 1 January 2015 but with 
early adoption allowed. This will replace the classification and measurement provisions of 
IAS 39. The four categories of IAS 39 will be reduced to two categories; one measured at 
amortised cost and the other at fair value. Financial instruments with basic loan features, 
managed on a contractual yield basis and not classified as at fair value at initial recognition, 
will be carried at amortised cost. Other financial instruments will be at fair value. The fair 
value option under IAS 39 will be retained. 
 
Reclassifications and movements between the levels of fair value measurement are the 
official IAS 39 channels of accounting choice. How do bank managers make use of this 
flexibility? 
 
4.2 The use of accounting numbers in bank capital 
According to Berger, Herring and Szego (1995) banks differ from other firms in two 
important respects that affect their capital structure: the first difference is the existence of a 
72 
 
regulatory safety net that protects the soundness of the sector and the second is the imposition 
of minimum required capital levels. 
 
The combination of a regulatory safety net that encourages “risk shifting” behaviour where 
banks take more risk than normal (Merton, 1977) and a declining return on assets (ROA) due 
to competition from other firms, incentivises bank managers to increase leverage. One way in 
which bank managers can maintain or achieve the expected return on equity (ROE), even 
when ROA is decreasing, is to increase leverage.  
 
Banks are thus highly leveraged institutions and the primary protection offered to depositors 
against bank failure is a prescribed minimum level of capital. The Basel Accord provides a 
standardised framework for measuring capital adequacy and it imposes minimum required 
capital reserves. These are expressed in the following formula (highly simplified): 
 
Accounting capital 
> required % 
Risk weighted assets 
 
This combination of a regulatory safety net and a minimum capital level can be used to 
explain an asymmetry in the acceptance by bank managers of FVA profits and losses.  
 
During the business cycle upswing, profits are likely to be generated by FVA as asset values 
are increasing. More profits provide flexibility, making it possible for the bank to take on 
more debt to increase gearing and maximise future profits and remuneration, or pay out 
increased levels of remuneration or dividends. 
 
During crisis periods, banks would be incentivised to carry higher levels of capital. This is 
not only because banks want to signal health to potential depositors but also because they are 
often directly required by bank supervisors to carry those higher levels of capital. However, 
capital is expensive or unavailable during crisis periods and thus retained earnings are the 
usual source of capital during crisis periods, putting pressure on accounting and FVA results 
for positive results. This is especially true if there are reversals of previously increased asset 
values or if there are assets that are held to maturity but should be written down.   
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5. Research approach and units of analysis 
 
5.1 Research approach 
The quantitative research tradition has been closely linked to positivism, the aim of which, 
according to Coetsee (2010:84), “is to record an objective reality that exists independently 
from human behaviour”. This paper, however, investigates the possibility that human 
interventions hamper accounting neutrality and a world view that assumes an objective 
outside reality is thus inappropriate; therefore a more qualitative approach is needed. 
However, the choice of a qualitative approach is not at the total exclusion of quantitative 
data.  
 
In addition, Robson (2002) prefers the fixed design versus flexible design distinction as 
opposed to the quantitative versus qualitative distinction. In agreement with his distinction, 
the exploratory/descriptive aim of this study is best approached within a flexible design 
context. 
 
A comparative case study design is used. Case studies are the preferred method when (a) a 
“how” or “why” question is being asked, (b) the investigator has little control over events, 
and (c) the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context (Yin, 2009:2). 
The comparative design allows for the identification of what is unique and what is common 
across the cases. 
 
Structure is added to the research approach by using the following four themes to guide the 
data gathering process: 
 
• How important is FVA for the banks? 
• What is disclosed under FVA by the banks? 
• Why did the banks use FVA in the way they did? 
• How do the banks manage FVA? 
 
Both primary and secondary data are utilised. Primary data has been gathered using key 
informant interviews, feedback at presentations and email exchanges with the investor 
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relations departments of the banks. Secondary data was sourced primarily from the annual 
reports of the banks and this comprises the bulk of the evidence presented. 
 
Only the primary data obtained from the key informant interview is deemed to have potential 
ethical implications. These concerns were mitigated as follows. Written clearance was 
obtained from the relevant university’s Ethics in Research Committee, written informed 
consent was obtained from the interviewee and the identity of the interviewee will not be 
disclosed.   
  
5.2 Units of analysis 
The units of analysis are two banks. The first of these is the largest South African bank: The 
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited (SBoSA). The second is a South African bank on the 
border between systemic or not: Investec Bank Limited (IBL). It is expected that a too-big-to-
fail bank will be less inclined to use FVA as a profit and capital management tool. 
 
IBL is the South African banking licence holder entity in the Investec Group. IBL describes 
itself as an “international, specialist bank and asset manager that provides a diverse range of 
financial products and services to a select client base” (IBL, 2011: 2). Investec was founded 
as a leasing company in Johannesburg in 1974. It acquired a banking licence in 1980 and in 
1986 it was listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.  
 
In July 2002, a dual listed companies structure was implemented with linked companies listed 
in London and Johannesburg. The effect of this structure is that shareholders in Investec 
Limited (listed in Johannesburg) and shareholders in Investec Plc. (listed in London) have 
rights as if the two companies were a single entity whilst creditors, including depositors, are 
ring-fenced in their exposure to one of the two companies with no cross guarantees between 
the two companies. This asymmetrical treatment of shareholders and creditors speaks to a 
focal area of this study; how a bank must balance the interests of its shareholders and 
depositors in a different manner when compared to a normal company. 
 
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) is the lead regulator of the group according to a 
memorandum of understanding signed between the SARB and the United Kingdom Financial 
Services Authority; this situation will continue until 70% or more of on- and off-balance 
sheet assets of the group are held by Investec Plc. (Investec Limited, 2003:83). The SARB is 
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the regulator of Investec Limited and the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority is the 
regulator of Investec Plc. Figure 4.1, which follows, shows the Investec group structure and 
highlights the entity that holds the South African banking licence. 
 
Figure 4.1 Graphical representation of the Investec group structure with the subject entity emphasised (source is 
Investec Bank Limited, 2011:3). 
 
In IBL’s annual financial statements for 2011 it is stated that Investec group operates as if it 
is a single economic enterprise. An implication of this statement is that intragroup transfers 
for accounting convenience are likely. 
 
IBL was South Africa’s fifth largest bank in 2011. Measured by total assets the bank 
represented 7% of the South African banking system in August 2011 (data was obtained from 
the BA900 returns published by the SARB). IBL represented 71.4% of the total asset base 
and 73% of the profit attributable to ordinary shareholders of Investec Limited in 2010.  
 
IBL consists of three principal business units: Private Banking, Investment Banking and 
Capital Markets. In 2011 Private Banking contributed 13% to profit before taxation, 
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Investment Banking contributed 21% and Capital Markets 33%.6 Private Banking offers 
credit and investment services to ultra-high net worth individuals, active wealthy 
entrepreneurs, high income professionals, self-employed entrepreneurs, owner managers in 
mid-market companies and sophisticated investors. Investment banking activities such as 
corporate finance and principal investments are offered to listed and unlisted companies, fund 
managers, government and parastatals. Capital Markets provides treasury services to 
corporate clients, public sector bodies and institutions and this is the business unit in which 
market trading activities take place. 
 
SBoSA is the South African banking licence holder entity in the Standard Bank Group. 
Figure 4.2, which follows, shows how SBoSA fits into the larger Standard Bank Group. The 
Standard Bank Group describes itself as the “the largest African bank by assets and earnings” 
that “offers a range of banking and related financial services” (Standard Bank Group,  2011). 
The Standard Bank Group was started in 1857 as the Standard Bank of Port Elizabeth. Its 
holding company was Standard Bank Limited in the United Kingdom that later became 
Standard Chartered Bank Plc. Standard Chartered Bank Plc disinvested in 1987. Standard 
Bank Investment Corporation (the Group) was listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 
1970. In October 2007, a deal was announced in which a 20% stake in the group was sold to 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China; R15.9 billion of new capital flowed into the 
group from the “supportive, non-controlling shareholder”. 
 
                                                 
6
 The balance of 32% was attributable to Group Services and Other Activities. 
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Figure 4.2 Graphical representation of the Standard Bank Group structure with the subject entity emphasised 
(source is Standard Bank Group, 2010b). 
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SBoSA was South Africa’s largest bank in 2011. Measured by total assets the bank 
represented 25% of the South African banking system in August 2011 (data was obtained 
from the BA900 returns published by the SARB). SBoSA represented 62.8% of the total asset 
base and 73.6% of the profit attributable to ordinary shareholders of the Standard Bank 
Group Limited in 2010.  
 
SBoSA consists of three principal business units: Personal and Business Banking, Corporate 
and Investment Banking and Other Services. In 2010 Personal and Business Banking 
contributed 53% to profit attributable to ordinary shareholders, Corporate and Investment 
Banking contributed 54% and Other Services contributed a loss of 7%. The Personal and 
Business Banking business unit offers banking and other financial services to individual 
customers and to small-to-medium-sized enterprises as well as municipalities. The Corporate 
and Investment Banking business unit offers corporate and investment banking services to 
government, parastatals, larger corporates, financial institutions and international 
counterparties. SBoSA’s Other Services unit offers support functions to business units and 
advisory services, activities and taxes that are not allocated to business segments, inter-
segment eliminations and restructuring costs. 
 
Both IBL and SBoSA are the South African banking entities (registered as banks with the 
SARB) within their respective groups and are of a similar size relative to their respective 
South African holding company. Both have numerous fellow subsidiaries and therefore 
transfers out of the regulated bank entity to other group companies are very possible. Any 
numbers from the financial statements of the two banks used or presented below are thus 
from the group figures of the respective bank and not from the individual company figures. 
This is in accordance with the way in which the banks report to the supervisor. The banks are 
both universal banks that participate in many kinds of banking activities and combine a 
commercial bank and investment bank. The obvious difference between the two banks is size.  
 
6. Descriptive work, evidence and discussion 
 
6.1 How important is FVA for the banks? 
The purpose of this first part of the descriptive work is to establish the importance of FVA for 
the two banks on a high level. What portion of profits and what portion of shareholder equity 
is due to FVA?  
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It is difficult to find the information needed to answer this question. The Banking Project 
Group is a forum that brings together representatives of the large South African banks, their 
auditors and bank supervisors at the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Johannesburg with the objectives of participating proactively in accounting standard setting 
and of examining legislative issues that impact on the banking industry. At a meeting of that 
Group on 21 July 2010, where the author presented preliminary findings, bank 
representatives expressed the opinion that it was not possible to split the net income of a bank 
into an unrealised and a realised portion by using the annual financial statements. It should be 
noted that IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosure (IASB, 2005) does not require 
disclosure of the realised and unrealised portions of items of income, expense, gains, and 
losses related to financial instruments; only the combined total is required. 
 
Fair value profits or losses that realise within a particular period do not differ much from 
realised profits under a historical cost regime. It is the unrealised profits and resultant 
unrealised equity capital that is of much greater interest.  
 
The deferred tax7 notes to the financial statements of both IBL and SBoSA contain 
information that makes it possible to derive the portion of net profit attributable to unrealised 
fair value adjustments on financial instruments. IBL discloses the following as part of its 
deferred taxation note: “Deferred taxation liability due to unrealised fair value adjustments on 
financial assets”. SBoSA discloses the following as part of its deferred taxation note: 
“Movement on deferred tax due to fair value adjustments on derivatives” and “Movement on 
deferred tax due to fair value adjustments on financial instruments”. The annual after-tax 
profit or loss attributable to unrealised fair value adjustments on financial instruments can 
then be derived with the following formula: 
 
After-tax profit/loss due to fair value adjustments on financial instruments = 
(movement in deferred taxation liability / tax rate) * (1 – tax rate) – (movement on 
AFS reserve & cash flow hedge reserve due to fair value adjustments)              (1) 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Deferred tax arises when a difference exists between accounting net profit and taxable income. Accounting net 
profit contains realised and unrealised items whereas current South African taxable income mostly contains  
only realised items.  
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This amount can then be expressed as a ratio of the net profit of the bank: 
 
Unrealised portion as % of net profit = after-tax profit/loss due to fair value 
adjustments on financial instruments / net profit attributable to ordinary shareholders
             (2) 
 
The 12% unrealised percentage of net profit for SBoSA in 2011 in Table 4.2 below will now 
be calculated from source to illustrate the application of formulas (1) and (2).8  
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 The following section up until the last paragraph on the following page does not form part of the published 
article. 
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Figure 4.3 Excerpts from the deferred tax disclosure of the SBoSA (source is SBoSA (2011:139&140)). 
 
By combining the movement in derivatives and fair value adjustments on financial 
instruments in 2011 a total credit increase in deferred tax due to those two items of 514 is 
obtained. This movement of 514 minus the increase in deferred tax on AFS instruments 
during the year of 63 gives a total of 514-63=451 tax on unrealised fair value gains through 
profit and loss. The income tax rate is 28% and thus 451/28%*(1-28%)=the after tax 
unrealised component of earnings for 2011 of 1160. Total earnings after tax for 2011 is 9510 
thus 1160/9510=12% of earnings as indicated in Table 4.2 in 2011 for SBoSA. 
 
The portion of the deferred taxation liability due to fair value adjustments on financial 
instruments can be used to derive the cumulative unrealised profits contained in shareholders’ 
equity with the following formula:9 
                                                 
9
 The results obtained using formulas 1 and 2 showed that the available-for-sale and cash flow hedge entries did 
not materially affect the portion of annual after-tax profits that are due to unrealised fair value adjustments on 
financial instruments and so the available-for-sale reserves and cash flow hedge reserves were not taken into 
account when calculating the unrealised portion of shareholders’ equity. 
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Unrealised portion of shareholders’ equity = (deferred taxation liability due to fair 
value adjustments on financial instruments / tax rate * (1 – tax rate)) / total 
shareholders’ equity                     (3) 
 
The 9% unrealised portion of shareholders’ equity for SBoSA in 2011 in Table 4.2 below will 
now be calculated from source to illustrate the application of formula (3). Thus, for 2011 the 
total stock of deferred tax due to derivatives and fair value adjustments on financial 
instruments is 1592+215=1807. The total of shareholders’ equity for 2011 was 54847 and the 
tax rate was 28%. Thus the FVA caused unrealised portion of shareholders’ equity is 
(1807/28%*(1-28%)/54847=8.5% rounded to 9%.10 
 
 
Table 4.2 Unrealised percentage of net profit and shareholders’ equity. IBL has the grey background and SBoSA has 
clear background. 
 
The unrealised portion of net profit attributable to ordinary shareholders is significant for 
both banks. The unrealised profit portion for IBL builds up and peaks in the 2010 financial 
year, with the next highest peak in 2009. Thereafter, in 2011, the unrealised portion of net 
profit attributable to ordinary shareholders of IBL starts to unwind. SBoSA similarly builds 
up to a peak in 2008 with a subsequent rapid unwinding. When comparing the two banks it is 
important to remember that the IBL financial yearend is in March whilst SBoSA’s yearend is 
in December; thus the 2011 IBL percentage is more comparable with the 2010 percentage for 
SBoSA. On this basis the 2009 calendar year for IBL and the 2008 calendar year for SBoSA 
are similar; thus, the unrealised percentages of net profits are similar and the years represent 
relative maxima. These yearends are relatively close to the peak of the global economic crisis 
which was in September 2008 and marked by the collapse of Lehman Brothers: a subsequent 
decline in financial instrument valuations is to be expected. It is in 2010 for IBL and in 2009 
for SBoSA that the two banks sharply diverge; thus, in 2010, IBL posts a new maximum 
unrealised portion of net profit attributable to ordinary shareholders whilst SBoSA posts a 
                                                 
10
 This paragraph does not form part of the published article. 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Unrealised % of net profit attributable 
to ordinary shareholders - IBL 18% 27% -8% 22% 4% 32% 54% -10% -39%
Unrealised % of net profit attributable 
to ordinary shareholders - SBoSA 5% 16% 21% 23% 27% -55% -54% 12%
Unrealised portion of shareholders' 
equity - IBL 1% 4% 4% 7% 6% 10% 15% 12% 8%
Unrealised portion of shareholders' 
equity - SBoSA 22% 24% 29% 28% 31% 18% 7% 9%
83 
 
large unrealised loss.11 In 2011 IBL posts an unrealised loss that is still significantly less than 
the unrealised loss posted by SBoSA in 2009 and 2010. In 2012 the unrealised loss for IBL is 
approaching the same level as SBoSA’s unwinding in 2009 and 2010. 
 
The unrealised portions of shareholders’ equity for both banks build up monotonically and 
for IBL peaks in 2010, while SBoSA Limited peaks in 2008. SBoSA’s peak is substantially 
more than that of IBL. For reasons similar to those given in the previous paragraph, the 
unwinding of the unrealised profit build-up starts a year earlier in SBoSA compared to IBL 
and the unwinding is not as rapid for IBL. 
 
6.2 What is disclosed under FVA by the banks? 
In the previous section the importance of FVA for the banks was investigated and it was 
found that unrealised FVA profits are significant for the two banks being analysed in this 
report, in terms of total profits and shareholders’ equity. The purpose of this section is to 
investigate, in more detail, where the FVA effects come from. 
 
IBL adopted AC 133, the South African GAAP version of IAS 39, in the 2004 financial year 
(IBL, 2004:23). IBL’s 2004 financial statements refer to the main impact of the new FVA 
standard being stricter requirements for hedge accounting related to derivatives. A downward 
adjustment of R 123 million to retained earnings resulted from “Fair value adjustments to 
derivatives and other financial instruments” (IBL, 2004:43).  
 
IBL adopted IFRS in the 2006 financial year (IBL, 2006:10). A R347 million reduction in 
Equity was necessary to adjust the opening balance sheet for “refinements to the 
requirements under AC 133” (IBL, 2006:77) which include: 
 
• Revised interpretation relating to the recognition of certain fees as part of the effective 
yield of a financial instrument, and 
• designation of financial instruments as at fair value through profit and loss. This was 
adopted early and resulted in more stringent rules being applied to such designations. 
                                                 
11
 It is possible that declines in the deferred tax liabilities are not due to unrealised profits turning into unrealised 
losses but rather due to the underlying assets and liabilities being realised; a distinct possibility in a world where 
banks are deleveraging. This possibility cannot be eliminated but is not the whole story as often the movement 
in deferred tax was in an opposite direction to the movement in assets and liabilities at fair value (i.e. fair value 
assets and liabilities were increasing when the deferred tax liability was decreasing).  
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The Standard Bank Group12 adopted AC 133, the South African GAAP version of IAS 39, in 
the 2003 financial year. According to the Group’s accounting policies for 2002 (Standard 
Bank Group, 2002:83) the principal difference resulting from the change in accounting 
standards will be “that the new statement prescribes FVA and exceptions to this rule are 
tightly controlled while the previous practice permitted selective use of fair value 
accounting”; the new regime was thought to be less flexible. Investment securities were 
identified as the category that would be most affected and the change to AC 133 led to a 
R285 million reduction in retained earnings due to the new classification and valuation of 
financial instruments (Standard Bank Group, 2003:174). 
 
SBoSA adopted IFRS in the 2005 financial year. A R6 million reduction in equity was 
necessary to adjust the opening balance sheet because “following the adoption of IFRS 
certain financial assets were reclassified with a small impact on equity.” (SBoSA, 2006:80). 
 
The accounting policy notes of the annual financial statements of IBL and SBoSA were 
studied to compile the following summary (Table 4.3) of the accounting policy movements 
regarding the fair valuation of financial instruments over the period of study. 
 
                                                 
12
 Standard Bank Group is used here and not SBoSA as SBoSA did not provide consolidated financial 
statements until the adoption of IFRS in 2005. Thus, Group financial statements are used for completeness of 
financial instrument coverage. 
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Table 4.3 Summary of the financial instrument accounting policies of IBL and SBoSA. AC 133 was the base case with 
changes indicated in the notes. 
 
The following Table 4.4 provides a summary of IBL’s total assets and liabilities carried at 
fair value over the period of study. The table was compiled by working backwards in time 
from the latest financial reports. The best data was obtained from 2006 onwards (IFRS 
adoption) in the note on “Analysis of financial assets and liabilities by measurement basis”. 
Before 2006 the total for fair value assets and liabilities was calculated by the summation of 
the items found at fair value in the notes to the financial statements.13 
 
                                                 
13
 Figures given in total pre-2006 as the item level disclosure was materially different from the item level 
disclosure post-2006. 
Category Subcategory Cost/FV Reclassification allowed 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Trading FV No information 6
Derivatives FV No information
Designated1 FV Not allowed 2 & 4 6
Held-to-maturity Cost On tainting moved to AFS
Originated loans and receivables Cost No information 3
Available-for-sale FV (equity) No information 5 & 6 6
Trading FV No information 6
Derivatives FV No information
Designated1 FV Not allowed
Non trading Cost No information
4 - From 2007 SBoSA gives more information on the fair value option. It is to be used to reduce measurement inconsistencies, for portfolios managed at fair 
value and for embedded derivatives. This is similar to the IBL disclosure
5 - IBL category now includes strategic equity investments and designated loans and advances on that trade on active markets
6 - From 2008 post the financial crisis amendments SBoSA allows reclassifications from trading assets to loans and receivables where the intention has 
changed, reclassifications from trading assets to AFS in rare circumstances and reclassifications from AFS to loans where the intention has changed. Trading 
liabilities cannot be reclassified. In 2009 IBL allows reclassification out of the trading category to cost when intention changes or rare circumstances. In 2011 
IBL also allows AFS reclassification to cost 
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2 - IBL now classifies in certain instances debt instruments which contain equity features as designated as "held at fair value through profit and loss"
3 - IBL stopped using the word "originated" in 2006. From 2007 SBoSA includes purchased loans and receivables in this category
Held for trading
1 - SBoSA designates to "fair value through profit and loss". IBL designates to "held for trading" until adoption of IFRS in 2006 when designated to "fair value 
through profit and loss"
ASSETS
Held for trading
LIABILITIES
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Table 4.4 Summary of IBL’s assets and liabilities carried at fair value. 
 
In terms of the portion of the asset base carried at fair value, IBL is in line with the 31% of 
assets at fair value, on average,  in the US banking industry during the first quarter of 2008 
(United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008:47). On a line item level, the 
slight decline from 2007 to 2008 in “Securitised assets“ shown in Table 4.4 is surprising as a 
news service reported on 20 November 2007 (I-Net Bridge,  2007) that Investec had placed 
another R1.6 billion of residential mortgage-backed securities (the assets were sold higher up 
in the Investec group – see section 4.4).  
 
An early peak followed by a decline in the percentage of assets held at fair value is evident 
until 2008, after which the percentage of assets carried at fair value starts increasing. This 
declining and then increasing trend is less noticeable in the percentage of liabilities measured 
at fair value. When the difference between the percentages of assets and liabilities at fair 
value is calculated, the results show that the gap is large and volatile: it peaked and then 
declined until 2008, and thereafter sharply increased.  This gap is not due to derivative 
positions as its general movement, excluding derivatives, is similar. The increase in assets 
Category/description 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Loans and advances to banks 1930 474 301 216 759
Repurchase agreements 1224 2343 1821 2620 3671 8155 5098
Trading securities 12208 13472 17913 19938 36375 41332 45039
Derivatives 9032 5693 9668 9950 7829 11487 10595
Investment securities 31 29 70 27 6 5766 6036
Loans and advances to customers 13671 13422 14423 14478 15146 13072 14820
Securitised assets 1929 1624 1514 1120 1085 335
Other assets 46 70 5 157 125 149 140
Group loans 979 738 1471 -40
21775 35577 36903 38142 36958 45524 50137 65311 82733 82782
% of total assets 30% 43% 42% 34% 26% 27% 28% 33% 37% 32%
Derivatives 7138 5576 10152 10482 7144 10495 8570
Other trading liabilities 266 255 266 701 454 389 172
Repurchase agreements 919 2164 1497 2281 3281 5732 3817
Deposits 3934 13021 16015 13664 15274 9871 6748
Securitisation 11304 4611 3097 1514 1514 1087 492
Other liabilities 520 63 213 164 459 307
6794 10204 12085 24081 25690 31027 28855 27831 28033 20106
% of total liabilities 11% 15% 16% 23% 19% 20% 17% 15% 14% 9%
% total assets less % total liabilities 19% 29% 26% 11% 7% 7% 10% 18% 24% 24%
Above excluding derivatives 19% 29% 26% 10% 7% 8% 11% 18% 24% 23%
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held at fair value, as well as the gap after 2008, seem to be driven largely by the “Trading 
securities” line item.  
 
 
Table 4.5 Trading securities disclosure. 
 
This presumption is supported by the data in Table 4.5 above. This indicates that much of the 
growth in the gap is probably attributable to the outcome of a transfer of trading securities 
from Investec Limited to IBL. As shown in Table 4.5, the percentage of trading assets of  the 
larger group held in IBL rose monotonically from 73% in 2008 to 91% in 2011. The next line 
in Table 4.5 indicates that the assets being transferred are possibly cherry picked to protect 
the capital of IBL as the accumulated fair value profits on these assets inside IBL are 
substantially more than the accumulated fair value profits inside the larger group.  
 
Other line items that, when combined, are material and volatile enough to be behind the gap 
between assets and liabilities at fair value are “Loans and advances to customers” (including 
Securitised assets) and “Deposits” (including Securitisation). It is important to examine these 
line items as well, as they are usually part of any explanation of why banks need to be able to 
designate items at fair value.  
 
 
Table 4.6 (Loans granted + Securitised assets) – (Deposits + Securitisation) expressed as a percentage of total assets at 
fair value. 
 
The observed volatility of this measure is surprising. In an interview with a senior Investec 
financial manager with a reporting mandate on 17 March 2010 he used portfolios of assets at 
fixed interest rates paired with portfolios of liabilities at fixed interest rates as the example of 
items they designate at fair value; a more stable relationship was thus expected. What can be 
observed is that the trend in percentages in Table 4.6 correlates closely with the trend in the 
assets and liabilities at fair value gap identified in Table 4.4. 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Trading securities in IBL as % of 
trading securities in IL 81% 74% 65% 73% 74% 84% 91% 97%
Accumulated fair value profits on 
trading securities in IBL as % of 
accumulated fair value profits in 
trading securities in IL 172% 97% 121% 70% 224% 404% 122% NA
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Loans granted versus deposits @ fair value gap NA -4% -6% -7% 2% -1% 4% 10%
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The following Table 4.7 provides a summary of SBoSA’s total assets and liabilities carried at 
fair value over the period of study. The table was compiled by working backwards in time 
from the latest financial reports. Accounting adjustments, identified when comparative 
figures differ from the figures disclosed in the previous financial year, are highlighted and 
explained in the following paragraphs. The best data was obtained from 2006 onwards (one 
year after IFRS adoption) in the note on “Classification of assets and liabilities”. Before 2006 
the total for fair value assets and liabilities was calculated by the summation of the items 
found at fair value in the notes to the financial statement. For 2003 and 2004, consolidated 
financial statements were not prepared for SBoSA and the figures shown for 2003 and 2004 
are all company-only figures. 
 
 
Table 4.7 Summary of SBoSA’s assets and liabilities carried at fair value. 
 
Significant accounting restatements, where comparative figures were different from those in 
the annual report for the financial year to which they refer, were evident in the following 
cases: 2011 (2010 figures were adjusted), 2008 (2007 figures were adjusted) and 2007 (2006 
figures were adjusted).  The financial statements provided more details of these restatements 
in an annexure to those statements. The annexure provided the restatement of each line item 
on a net basis, combining the movement on that part of a line item carried at cost with the 
movement on that part of a line item carried at fair value; what happens is that transfers 
between cost and fair value are obscured.  
 
Category/description 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Derivatives 77347 93463 70742 67058 69090 164542 76501 105221 93422
Trading assets 9068 6625 11492 6397 29456 24019 22644 13825 24626
Pledged assets 2914 1750 2243 1057 2035 3737
Investments 23298 27694 37265 41092 40205 59995 59857 68282 70694
Loans and advances to banks 28 4022 1194 1304 1588
Loans and advances to customers 37234 34745 3777 1396 2982 2028
Interest in goup companies 5142 8206 24418 26392 23906 17000
109713 127782 119499 159837 183480 283016 189041 217555 213095
% of total assets 30% 33% 26% 28% 26% 31% 24% 26% 23%
Derivatives 72880 87538 70252 69069 71489 172744 75196 102476 98730
Trading liabilities 4989 12938 6147 29912 23524 16707 9031 13581
Deposits from banks 1845 5120 6134 1775 2352
Deposits from customers 65029 84891 40754 49040 82170 81235
Group companies 2670 2861 10004 12754 7017 3027
72880 92527 83190 144760 189153 252146 159831 202469 198925
24% 25% 19% 27% 28% 29% 21% 26% 23%
% total assets less % total liabilities 6% 8% 7% 1% -2% 2% 3% 0% 0%
Above excluding derivatives 9% 7% 8% 2% -1% 4% 3% 1% 1%
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The most material of such transfers for 2006 was from “Loans and advances to customers at 
cost” to “Loans and advances to customers at fair value”. The quantum was R37 234 million 
of which R32 274 million was into the designated category. A second material transfer in 
2006 was from “Deposits from customers at cost” to “Deposits from customers at fair value”. 
Here the quantum was R65 029 million of which R58 771 million was into the designated 
category.  
 
Moving on to 2007, the most material of those transfers was from “Loans and advances to 
customers at fair value” to “Loans and advances to customers at cost” and the quantum was 
R14 750 million. A second material transfer in 2007 was from “Deposits to customers at fair 
value” to “Trading liabilities at fair value”; here, the quantum was R26 036 million, of which 
R8 085 million was out of the designated category. The impact of the restatements is put into 
context when referring to the two oval figures in Table 4.7: these highlight, firstly, the drop in 
“Loans and advances to customers” between 2007 and 2008 and secondly, the drop in 
“Deposits from customers”, also between 2007 and 2008. Without the restatements these 
drops would have been even more dramatic. 
 
The restatement of the 2010 comparatives in the 2011 annual report similarly transferred an 
amount of R26 992 million from “Deposits from customers at cost” to “Deposits from 
customers at fair value” of which all was transferred into the designated category; the 
difference was that in this instance the bank specifically highlighted the transfer and it was 
not obscured in a net movement. Unfortunately the transfer was mistakenly reported in the 
annexure as being from fair value to cost and not from cost to fair value. When this was 
pointed out, the bank acknowledged the mistake and undertook to correct the electronic copy 
of their 2011 financial report available on their website according to an email received from 
the investor relations department on 2 May 2012. 
 
In all three instances, 2007, 2008 and 2010, the restatement must have been made on the last 
day of the comparative period as no adjustments were needed in respect of the equity 
attributable to the ordinary shareholders or profit for the period. This adjustment would have 
been required if the transfers from cost to fair value were made on any other day. 
 
In terms of the portion of the asset base carried at fair value, SBoSA is in line with the 31% 
of assets at fair value in the US banking industry, on average, in the first quarter of 2008 
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(United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008:47). The percentage is also in line 
with that of IBL, shown in Table 4.4. No general trend in assets held at fair value is 
discernible with SBoSA, which is in contrast to Investec. Relative to assets at fair value, 
liabilities at fair value were found to have declined substantially in 2009 and 2010. Financial 
instruments carried at fair value by SBoSA contain a significantly higher proportion of 
derivative securities than in the case of IBL. Excluding derivatives, the gap between assets 
and liabilities at fair value is significantly lower than that of IBL and more stable. The gap 
did reach a minimum point in December 2007 and has monotonically increased from that 
date. On a line item level, the 2007 to 2008 drop in “Loans and advances to customers” and 
the 2007 to 2008 drop in “Deposits from customers” stand out and these are explored in the 
following paragraph. 
 
The drop in “Loans and advances to customers” from R34 745 million in 2007 to R3 777 
million in 2008 together with the drop in “Deposits from customers” from R84 891 million in 
2007 to R40 754 million in 2008,  combined to cause a net decrease of R13 169 million in 
liabilities at fair value. Between 2007 and 2008 the amount owed to SBoSA by fellow 
banking subsidiaries increased by R13 851 million and the amount owed by SBoSA to fellow 
banking subsidiaries also increased by R26 083 million. The result was a net increase in 
liabilities amounting to R12 232 million; this amount is fairly close to the net decrease in 
liabilities at fair value as indicated earlier in the paragraph. Further evidence to support the 
notion that SBoSA transferred selected financial instruments to fellow subsidiaries in the 
Standard Bank Group can be obtained from the data in Table 4.8. Until 2007 the annual fair 
value profits disclosed as ascribable to “Loans and advances from customers” and “Deposits 
from customers” were exactly the same for SBoSA and for its holding company Standard 
Bank Group; however, from 2008 onwards the figures are not the same. The following Table 
4.8 shows that from 2008 to 2010 the transfer of fair valued financial instruments between 
group companies meant that less profit was made inside SBoSA than in the Standard Bank 
Group. In 2011 the transfer of fair valued financial instruments between group companies 
meant that more profit was made inside SBoSA than in the Standard Bank Group. 
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Table 4.8 Summary of annual disclosed fair value profits generated by “Loans and advances to customers” and 
“Deposits from customers”. Figures obtained from SBoSA and the Standard Bank Group annual financial 
statements. 
 
The following Table 4.9 provides a summary of the valuation methods applied by the two 
banks. The time series is short for SBoSA as the 2008 Amendment to IFRS 7 that mandated 
this disclosure gave the option not to provide comparative figures for years before 2009. The 
IBL information shows that IBL values relatively more assets and liabilities at level 1 than 
SBoSA. IBL moved a significant portion of fair value assets from level 1 to level 2 during 
2008 and thereafter started moving the assets back to level 1. A similar trend is not apparent 
in “Liabilities at fair value” where in 2009, IBL moved more liabilities to level 1 and 
increased liabilities at level 1 from that point onwards.  
 
 
Table 4.9 Percentage of fair value assets/liabilities at levels 1 or 2 classifications. IBL has the grey background and 
The Standard Bank Group has no coloured background. 
 
6.3 Why did the banks use FVA in the way they did? 
The purpose of this section is to use market data to show that during the height of the 
financial crisis, significant pressure was placed on the two banks chosen for this study. Those 
changes made by the two selected banks after the pressured periods are likely to be their 
response to the stress. It is difficult to observe directly the pressure that the financial crisis 
placed on a bank. Writers such as Berger & Davies (1998) and Krainer & Lopez (2004) 
indicate that abnormal bank share returns are associated with bank fragility and thus the 
following method will be used: An expected daily return will be calculated for each bank and 
then that expected daily return will be deducted from the actual daily return realised by each 
Description 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year's fair value profit on Loans and advances - SBoSA 1077 409 -35 1821 -635 723 -157
Year's fair value profit on Deposits from customers - SBoSA -436 -250 1275 -2067 -214 -804 -293
641 159 1240 -246 -849 -81 -450
Year's fair value profit on Loans and advances - SB Group 1077 409 -35 2374 -227 795 -467
Year's fair value profit on Deposits from customers- SB Group -436 -250 1275 -1971 245 804 -354
641 159 1240 403 18 1599 -821
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
IBL 39% 38% 27% 36% 45% 41%
SBoSA 15% 17% 17%
IBL 60% 62% 72% 64% 55% 59%
SBoSA 83% 82% 81%
IBL 10% 6% 16% 13% 22% 21%
SBoSA 3% 5% 4%
IBL 90% 94% 84% 87% 78% 79%
SBoSA 97% 95% 95%
Assets at level 1 fair value
Liabilities at level 1 fair value
Liabilities at level 2 fair value
Assets at level 2 fair value
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bank. The expected daily return was calculated in accordance with the model suggested for 
event studies in Benninga (2008:371) and is explained below. 
 
The closing share price data for the period January 2007 to December 2008, for Investec 
Group Limited14 and Standard Bank Group Limited, was obtained from the South African 
data provider McGregor BFA. Daily returns were calculated and the effects of the two shares 
going ex-dividend were taken into account. 
  
The starting point in calculating an expected return for each bank was to obtain the total 
return value of the Financial and Industrial 30 Index (FNDI) for January 2007 to December 
2008 and to calculate a daily return. This index was chosen as the base for an expected return 
calculation, because the Johannesburg Stock Exchange All Share Index would have contained 
information not directly applicable to the banks; for example, commodities etc. The FNDI 
was preferred to the Financial 15 Index (FINI) as individual banks, such as Standard Bank 
Group Limited, make up a material component of the FINI and this can potentially skew an 
expected return calculation. The FNDI is a broader measure in which it is unlikely that the 
measure’s value is materially influenced by only one bank. 
 
Daily bank returns were then regressed on daily FNDI returns (with an estimation window of 
the immediate six months’ prior daily observations) to forecast the expected bank return 
based on the realised FNDI return. The difference between the realised return per bank and 
the expected return is the abnormal return measure. Abnormal return results were obtained 
for two specific time-periods; the four months in 2007 when liquidity problems first started to 
appear in the world economy (starting June 2007) and the four months starting September 
2008, just before the Lehman Brothers failure. Table 4.10 below highlights significant 
information events during those two selected periods and shows how the two selected banks 
reacted; daily abnormal returns are provided. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Please note that these listed entities are not IBL and SBoSA; the units of analysis. They are the South African 
holding companies of those companies. The units of analysis companies make up most of these holding 
companies as elucidated in the section introducing the units of analysis. 
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Date Description Inv. 
(%) 
Sta. 
(%) 
LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS 
June 7, 2007 
 
Bear Stearns informs investors that it is suspending redemptions from its 
High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund. 
  
July 31, 2007 Bear Stearns liquidates two hedge funds that invested in various types of 
mortgage-backed securities. 
1.5 -0.9 
August 6, 
2007 
American Home Mortgage Investment Corporation files for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection. 
-0.7 1.6 
August 9, 
2007 
BNP Paribas, France’s largest bank, halts redemptions on three investment 
funds. 
-6.3* -1.6 
August 16, 
2007 
Fitch Ratings downgrades Countrywide Financial Corporation to BBB+, its 
third lowest investment-grade rating, and Countrywide borrows the entire 
$11.5 billion available in its credit lines with other banks. 
0.5 0.6 
September 14, 
2007 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer authorizes the Bank of England to provide 
liquidity support for Northern Rock, the United Kingdom’s fifth-largest 
mortgage lender. 
-3.2* -0.4 
LEHMANS FAILURE 
September 7, 
2008 
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) places Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac in government conservatorship. 
 0.5 
September 15, 
2008 
Bank of America announces its intent to purchase Merrill Lynch & Co. for 
$50 billion. 
-4.7* -1.1 
September 15, 
2008 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Incorporated files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection. 
-4.7* -1.1 
September 16, 
2008 
The Federal Reserve Board authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York to lend up to $85 billion to the American International Group (AIG) 
under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. 
1.6 1.0 
September 19, 
2008 
The Federal Reserve Board announces the creation of the Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) 
to extend non-recourse loans at the primary credit rate to U.S. depository 
institutions and bank holding companies to finance their purchase of high-
quality asset-backed commercial paper from money market mutual funds. 
2.2 0.5 
September 21, 
2008 
The Federal Reserve Board approves applications of investment banking 
companies Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to become bank holding 
companies. 
2.1 4.3* 
September 25, 
2008 
The Office of Thrift Supervision closes Washington Mutual Bank. 
JPMorgan Chase acquires the banking operations of Washington Mutual in 
a transaction facilitated by the FDIC. 
-1.3 0.4 
September 29, 
2008 
The FDIC announces that Citigroup will purchase the banking operations of 
Wachovia Corporation. 
-0.5 1.9 
October 3, 
2008 
Congress passes and President Bush signs into law the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP). 
2.9 - 
October 14, 
2008 
U.S. Treasury Department announces the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) that will purchase capital in financial institutions under the 
authority of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. 
5.1* 1.34 
October 29, 
2008 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announces the creation of a short-
term liquidity facility for market-access countries. 
-6.2* -2.2 
November 18, 
2008 
Executives of Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler testify before Congress, 
requesting access to the TARP for federal loans. 
2.9 0.6 
November 23, 
2008 
The U.S. Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board, and FDIC jointly 
announce an agreement with Citigroup to provide a package of guarantees, 
liquidity access, and capital.  
-5.6* -1.0 
Table 4.10 Significant events during July – October 2007 (start of the financial crisis) and September – December 
2008 (peak of the crisis) that influenced bank share prices. The description field is from the financial crisis timeline 
maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
* - statistically significant at 5% 
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Table 4.10 shows that the market was more pessimistic about Investec Group Limited during 
the crisis than Standard Bank Group Limited. A possible explanation is the size difference 
between the two banks with investors fleeing to quality during the liquidity crisis. Quality in 
this context would be the larger of the two banks, which is perceived to be too-big-to-fail. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Cumulative daily abnormal returns for the period July to October 2007. 
 
A similar, but clearer picture is obtained when the daily abnormal returns are cumulated for 
the two periods. As shown in Figure 4.4, in July to October 2007 the market is clearly 
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worried about Investec Group Limited in comparison to Standard Bank Group Limited. 
 
Figure 4.5 Cumulative daily abnormal returns for the period September to December 2008. 
 
Figure 4.5 above shows the cumulative abnormal returns of the two banks for the period 
September 2008 – December 2008; this period was the height of the global financial crisis. 
During this time, the difference between the two banks is not as stark. At first the market 
again punished Investec Group Limited relative to Standard Bank Group. However, the graph 
indicates that on 21 October 2008 the gap between the two banks closed. What happened? 
According to the financial statements of Investec Group Limited they were able to secure a 
syndicated loan rollover of USD 450 million towards the end of October to bolster liquidity 
(IBL, 2009:63). Unfortunately that was not enough to regain the trust of the market and the 
gap re-appeared towards the end of 2008. 
 
The message that this share price information gives us is that, even in the midst of the 
financial crisis, the market was not worried about Standard Bank Group. But it was worried 
about Investec Group. The best way for a bank to signal health to the market during a 
liquidity crisis, which the global financial crisis initially was, is to obtain additional liquidity; 
this is difficult and almost impossible to do in the midst of the crisis. Alternatively, the bank 
can signal health to the market by showing a healthy capital ratio. The following Figure 4.6 
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provides the monthly capital ratios of the two subject banks as reported to the SARB. The 
capital ratio shown is calculated as follows: 
 
Capital ratio (%) = (Total shareholders’ equity / total assets) * 100                         (4) 
 
This ratio is not in the Basel Capital Accord format where Total shareholder’s equity is 
divided by Risk-weighted assets. The rationale is that this paper focuses on accounting effects 
and not on measurement issues around risk-weighted assets. The four months in 2007 and the 
four months in 2008 for which daily abnormal returns were calculated, are highlighted in the 
Figure 5.5 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Monthly capital ratio % per bank (Sourced from the SARB). 
 
Figure 4.6 shows that IBL reacted to the pressure imposed on it by the financial crisis in 2007 
by substantially increasing its capital ratio. In this way it could signal its health to the market. 
The lack of reaction to the pressure in 2008 can be explained by the already higher capital 
ratio level and international governmental intervention at that time during the crisis. In 
contrast, SBoSA’s capital ratio hardly moved in 2007. In 2008, after the pressure period, the 
SBoSA capital ratio started trending upwards. Note that this was a trend and therefore was 
gradual and not as sudden as the increase in IBL’s capital ratio. 
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How did IBL adjust its capital ratio so rapidly? According to the presenter of a Basel III 
seminar organised by the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants in Glenhove, 
Johannesburg on 14 May 2012, the probable mechanism was the issuance of shares by IBL to 
Investec Limited. That immediately improved capital at bank level but did not help with 
capital at holding company level. The holding company only has to report capital levels on a 
six-monthly basis to investors. So, in the medium term, the pressure remains to use 
accounting profit generating techniques to improve capital levels. 
  
6.4 How do the banks manage FVA? 
The purpose of this section is to combine the evidence found so far (related to FVA and 
reclassifications, transfers and remeasurements) with further evidence available from the 
financial statements. Table 4.11 provides a summary: 
  
 
Table 4.11 Summary of evidence on the use of reclassifications, transfers and remeasurements to influence FVA 
outcomes. IBL has the grey background and SBoSA has no coloured background. 
 
The minimum point in gap calculations in the above Table 4.11 worked as follows. The 
difference between the average assets and liabilities at fair value gap (2003 – 2011) and the 
minimum gap (for both banks this was in 2007) multiplied by total assets during the 
Bank Description 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Reclassification between IAS 39 
categories
Assets: AFS to 
cost - R251 m 
based on change 
of intention
Transfer between IAS 39 
measurement levels (1-3)
Assets from 
levels 1 to 2 - R6 
bn                                  
Liabilities from 
levels 2 to level 1 
- R 3 bn
Intergroup transfers
Minimum point 
in gap between 
assets and 
liabilities @ FV - 
R14 bn out of 
assets
Sale of 
securitisation 
SPVs - R8 bn
Reclassification between IAS 39 
categories
Assets: Listed 
group FV to cost 
- R5 bn based on 
change of 
intention
Assets: FV to 
cost - R3 bn 
based on change 
of intention
Intergroup transfers
Minimum point 
in gap between 
assets and 
liabilities @ FV - 
R27 bn out of 
assets
Liabilities @ FV 
transferred - R15 
bn
Adjustments to comparatives
Assets: Cost to 
FV - R37 bn          
Liabilities: Cost 
to FV - R65 bn
Assets: FV to 
cost - R15 bn
Assets: R4 bn 
from FV to cost 
Liabilities: Cost 
to FV - R27 bn                          
SBoSA
IBL
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minimum year. Some of the evidence presented in Table 4.11 has not been discussed up to 
this point. The following paragraphs in this section expand on those items. 
 
During 2008 IBL reclassified a portfolio of loans of R251 million from “Carried at fair 
value” (available-for-sale) to “Carried at cost” due to a change in intent (IBL, 2008:104). In 
the same year it sold the first loss positions held in securitisation special purpose vehicles 
(SPVs) higher up in the Investec group. R7.6 billion of assets and R7.4 billion of liabilities 
were transferred (IBL, 2008:123). This is shown as R8 billion rounded in the table. In this 
way the SPVs were no longer consolidated into the IBL financial statements.  
 
In the 2008 financial year the Standard Bank Group used the amendments to IAS 39 and 
IFRS 7 Reclassification of Financial Assets to reclassify foreign denominated trading assets 
to “Loans and receivables” due to a change in intent. A fair value loss of R547 million after 
tax was thus avoided (Standard Bank Group, 2009:261). SBoSA did not reclassify anything 
in 2008.  
 
In 2009 SBoSA reclassified assets from “Held-for-trading” to “Loans and receivables” due to 
a change in intent and avoided a fair value loss of R17 million after tax (SBoSA, 2010:143). 
The Standard Bank Group did not reclassify anything else in addition to the changes 
mentioned in the previous paragraph and according to its financial statements (Standard Bank 
Group,  2010a:290) had avoided fair value losses of R252 million after tax which would have 
been incurred if all these reclassifications not been done. 
 
In 2010 neither SBoSA nor Standard Bank Group reclassified any assets (Standard Bank 
Group, 2011:284; SBoSA, 2011:164). Cumulative fair value losses avoided at that point on 
remaining reclassified assets were a gain of R72 million after tax for SBoSA and a loss of 
R38 million after tax for the Standard Bank Group. 
 
Table 4.11 shows how the banks only used reclassifications, transfers and remeasurements 
related to FVA during and after the global financial crisis. 
 
6.5 Discussion 
The use of FVA in the South African banking system has grown over the years (Bank 
Supervision Department of the SARB, 2009:10) but the actual level of profits and capital 
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derived from FVA was found to be surprisingly high. In the case of IBL, there was a peak of 
54% of after-tax profit in 2010 and 15% of total equity capital in 2010 derived from FVA. 
SBoSA peaked at 27% of after-tax profit in 2008 and 31% of total equity capital in 2008 
derived from FVA. The percentage of assets and liabilities at fair value was found to be 
comparable to American banks (United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2008:47).  
 
The findings in Table 4.2 concur with the view that FVA is procyclical. During the business 
cycle upswing, FVA increased the level of profits and capital only to turn negative during the 
post crisis downturn when FVA decreased profits and capital. The results for SBoSA follow 
the business cycle almost exactly with IBL only following 1.25 years later. A possible reason 
for the lag is that IBL could not afford to signal ill health via its capital ratio during the global 
financial crisis and used the discretion available to it under FVA to avoid losses (see Tables 
4.9 and 4.11). 
 
This procyclicality in unrealised profits and equity as well as the use of the flexibility allowed 
in the FVA framework, provide evidence of the asymmetry in the use of FVA when it 
generates profits compared with its use when it generates losses. This asymmetry is not in 
compliance with the neutrality goal of accounting (IASB, 2008). In addition to its influence 
on bank capital ratios, the procyclicality of FVA can have real economic consequences. It 
can, for example, be used to justify higher levels of remuneration. Before 2009: “Annual 
bonuses are closely linked to business performance, based on target business unit 
performance goals determined in the main by Economic Value Added (EVA) profit 
performance against pre-determined targets” (Investec, 2008:170). Compare this with after 
2009: “Annual bonuses are closely linked to business performance, based on target business 
unit performance goals determined in the main by realised Economic Value Added (EVA) 
profit performance against pre-determined targets” (author’s emphasis) (Investec,  2009:193). 
The implication is that bonuses before the financial crisis were based on profits that were 
inflated by procyclical FVA profits15 and that bonuses after the crisis were not reduced by the 
procyclical FVA losses. At least Investec avoided paying proportionally larger bonuses 
during the two years (2009 and 2010) when FVA increased profits the most. 
                                                 
15
 At the 2012 Annual General Meeting of Investec Group Limited the CEO of the bank replied that the 
insertion of the word “realised” was simply a refinement of the wording used and did not imply a change in 
behaviour. 
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Both banks were found to use intergroup transfers to maximise the benefits from FVA and to 
manage the costs of FVA. The discussion following Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 shows how IBL 
altered the gap between assets at fair value and liabilities at fair value by the transfer of 
“Trading securities” and “Loans and advances” between group companies. The result of 
changing the gap between total assets at fair value and total liabilities at fair value is a change 
in the group entity where overall FVA profits and losses manifest. According to the interview 
with the Investec financial manager with a reporting mandate on 17 March 2010, group 
transfers are done for the purposes of regulatory capital and income tax management. In a 
similar fashion, SBoSA used this combination of group transfers and FVA to transfer FVA 
profits between entities as seen in the discussion following Table 4.8. 
 
A reason often given for the designation of assets or liabilities at fair value is that it reduces 
measurement inconsistencies; for example if a portfolio of fixed interest rate loans is funded 
by a portfolio of fixed interest rate deposits then under the measurement inconsistency 
criterion, both portfolios can be designated as at fair value through profit and loss. In this way 
the effect is similar to hedging; however, hedge accounting is strict in terms of determining 
whether a hedge is effective or not, but FVA is not strict in terms of what qualifies or not to 
reduce “inconsistent measurement”.  
 
The discussion following Table 4.7 highlighted how SBoSA restated comparative figures in 
2007, 2008 and 2011 by providing a reconciliation on an item level where transfers between 
the portion of an item at fair value and the portion of an item at cost were netted out. This 
practice obscures transfers between cost and fair value, warrants better disclosure and is 
contrary to the IAS 39 prohibition on transfers into and out of the “designated at fair value” 
category. According to an email explanation received from SBoSA’s investor relations 
department on 11 June 2012, the 2011 restatement is allowed in terms of IAS 8 Accounting 
Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors and was done “to reflect the original 
intentions of management”. The fact that any restatement is always done on the last day of 
the comparative year gives the bank a “look back” option. At the end of the current year a 
calculation can be made to determine whether carrying an item at cost or fair value is more 
advantageous. The implementation of that position on the last day of the comparative period 
is simple as it avoids the onerous disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 in the case of an IAS 39 
reclassification. 
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The evidence presented above is consistent with the application of FVA not being neutral.  
When profits are increased by FVA the results are accepted by management but when profits 
are decreased by FVA the results are not accepted and actions are taken to avoid the losses. It 
can be argued that this is less of an issue following the replacement of IAS 39 with a less 
complex standard on financial instruments, IFRS 9 Financial Instruments. Nevertheless, the 
tools used to increase profits using FVA and to avoid losses using FVA remain. Intergroup 
transfers take place without the requirement to disclose the details of what was sold at what 
cost and to whom. Also, management flexibility in the choice of the disclosure level of FVA 
remains, as well as the fair value option. 
 
6.6 Generalising to theory 
Case study research is often criticised on the basis that findings cannot be generalised beyond 
the actual cases. Statistical generalisation is not possible in this study because the two cases 
do not form a sample that can be generalised to a population. It is important to note that the 
correct context for generalising beyond immediate case findings is that of theory 
development and generalisation to theory (Yin, 2009). Case study findings, like classic 
scientific experiments, are generalised to a theoretical base according to the degree of support 
the findings provide for the original propositions. Multiple case studies can be used to 
increase confidence. 
 
In both cases studied, the findings were consistent with the theoretical expectation that FVA 
results are accepted when they increase profits and bank capital and actively avoided when 
they cause losses. The clearest evidence was found in Table 4.9 when in 2009, IBL 
transferred assets from fair value level 1 to level 2 but at the same time transferred liabilities 
from level 2 to level 1; a move consistent with using the flexibility in IAS 39 to preserve 
profits. With the one case being the largest too-big-to-fail bank and the other case being a 
smaller bank, an understandable difference was observed in the results. The reversal of IBL’s 
unrealised fair value profits was much slower than that of SBoSA. IBL could not rely on 
liquidity support from the central bank and thus could not afford to signal ill health to the 
market via a reduced capital ratio; management aggressively protected profits. This 
aggression can be observed in the much more volatile gap between assets at fair value and 
liabilities at fair value for IBL.  
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The finding that the too-big-to-fail bank used its accounting flexibility less aggressively 
should be tempered by the finding that SBoSA did make use of an accounting technique that 
is certainly not in the spirit of the regulations, in order to avoid the prohibition on transfers 
into and out of “Designated at fair value”. 
 
It can be argued that the finding that managers accept profits and want to avoid losses is to be 
expected and is not limited only to banks. This argument ignores important differences 
between banks and non-banks. One difference is that non-banks cannot rely on liquidity 
support from a central bank and thus cannot reduce capital levels to near the low levels of 
banks; non-banks need to keep a safety buffer during the good times whilst banks do not. A 
second difference is that non-banks do not have a binding capital level at which regulatory 
intervention is guaranteed. Thus, during the upswing banks can reduce their capital levels 
more than non-banks, sometimes to the minimum level allowed; during the downturn banks 
are forced to use more aggressive accounting than non-banks as they cannot afford to fall 
under the regulatory capital level. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Modern accounting standards require the presentation of neutral information. But, is 
neutrality achievable when the proper adherence to complex accounting standards, such as 
those standards concerning FVA, depends on management’s discretion? Studies that 
investigated the claim that FVA caused excessive write-downs during the global financial 
crisis found evidence that in fact, bank assets were overvalued during the crisis. Do bank 
managers accept the results of FVA when it boosts profits and not when it negatively impacts 
profits? 
 
Moral hazard theory combined with a minimum bank capital regime (Basel) explains why. 
During the business cycle upswing FVA will probably increase bank profits. These increased 
profits can be used to justify further remuneration, dividends and asset growth that will lead 
to further future profits, remuneration and dividends. Capital is not in a short supply and 
managers will be incentivised to reduce the relative capital held by the bank by taking on 
more debt. During the business cycle downturn capital is scarce or even unobtainable. 
Internally generated capital becomes important as losses realise and the minimum capital 
level becomes binding. Thus, during the upturn the results of FVA are accepted as they open 
103 
 
up further opportunities but during the downturn the results of FVA are not accepted as they 
reduce the opportunities available. 
 
The aim of this article was to investigate how FVA is practically applied by banks and to do 
this, a comparative-case case study research design was used with a mixed methods research 
strategy. The units of analysis were two banks: the largest South African bank and and the 
other is on the crossover between systemic and not systemic. It was expected that a too-big-
to-fail bank would be less inclined than a smaller bank to use FVA as a profit and capital 
management tool, and this was found to be true. 
 
The results of the study indicate that FVA is not neutral in application by banks. During 
downturns, effort is expended to avoid losses generated by FVA. The study found that the 
techniques used by the banks to avoid losses in downturns included intergroup transfers, FVA 
levels 1 to levels 2 and 3 transfers, reclassifications and adjustments to comparative figures. 
IFRS 9 Financial Instruments is unlikely to restore the neutrality of FVA in banks as the 
techniques described above will continue to be available under the new standard.  
 
An option that should be considered is to prescribe conservative accounting for systemically 
important institutions; bank supervisors would agree with this. Also, conservative accounting 
for banks would create a “buffer” against opportunistic behaviour by management. 
 
8. Additional work and link to next chapter 
 
Additional work on this chapter, that is not part of the published paper, will now follow. The 
relationship between unrealised profits (and capital) and the increase in assets of the banks 
will be briefly considered. The relationship between unrealised profits and remuneration will 
also be briefly considered. 
 
Table 4.2 shows how bank profits and thus capital was materially increased by FVA gains 
during the period 2005 until 2008. After 2008 FVA losses briefly impacted profits and 
capital. For SBoSA for the period 2005 until 2012 the average growth rate in assets was 13%. 
For the period 2005 until 2008 the average growth rate in assets was 25%, substantially 
higher. For IBL for the period 2005 until 2012 the average growth rate in assets was 15%. 
For the period 2005 until 2008 the average growth rate in assets was 24%, substantially 
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higher. Thus, for the period during which FVA mainly positively impacted profits and peaked 
as a component of retained income, assets increased the most.  
 
The following Figure 4.7 illustrates the evolution of staff remuneration relative to the 
evolution of net profit attributable to ordinary shareholders and net profit attributable to 
ordinary shareholders excluding the unrealised FVA portion. All series have been 
benchmarked to 2004. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Annual staff costs, net profit and net profit excluding FVA gains benchmarked to 2004. 
 
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
IBL
80
120
160
200
240
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
PROFIT PROFITEX Staff costs
SBoSA
Percentage
Percentage
105 
 
Staff costs for IBL significantly outpaced the growth in net profit and net profit excluding 
FVA gains until 2010. This process accelerated until 2010 where staff costs were at 307% of 
the 2004 level, net profit was at 226% of the 2004 level and net profit excluding FVA gains 
was at 127% of the 2004 level. In the case of SBoSA, staff costs grew faster than net profit 
excluding FVA gains but slower than net profit, before 2008 (the financial crisis). In 2008 
staff costs were at 156% of the 2004 level and net profit at 157% of the 2004 level; this 
suggests that inflated net profit was driving remuneration higher as net profit excluding FVA 
gains was only at 120% of the 2004 level. Thereafter the patterns change and SBoSA’s net 
profit is hit by significant negative FVA losses for 2009 and 2010 with the two net profit 
series almost converging in 2011 and staff costs still higher. The patterns for both banks 
indicate an overpayment of remuneration before (and even during in the case of IBL) the 
financial crisis; this was probably justified on the basis of net profit inflated by risky FVA 
gains. After the crisis the convergence of the different variables confirms the overpayment 
before the crisis.  
 
The next chapter of this study forms the second part of the South African case study. In the 
next chapter, use will be made of bank sector level data, obtained from the South African 
bank regulator, to quantify the profit increase that results from FVA and to see whether South 
African banks pay dividends from FVA profits. The payment of unrealised profits as a 
dividend can weaken the South African system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
9. References 
 
Badertscher, B.A., Burks, J.J. & Easton, P.D. 2012. A convenient scapegoat: Fair value 
accounting by commercial banks during the financial crisis. The accounting review. 
87(1):59-90. 
 
Bank for International Settlements. 2008. Note for the FSF Working Group on Market and 
Institutional Resilience, Addressing financial system procyclicality: A possible 
framework, Available: http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904e.pdf 
[2013, April 14]. 
 
Bank for International Settlements. 2012. 82nd Annual Report. Available: 
http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2012e.pdf [2013, April 14]. 
 
Bank Supervision Department of the South African Reserve Bank. 2009. Annual Report 
2008. Available: 
http://www.resbank.co.za/Publications/Reports/Pages/BankSupervisionAnnualReports.as
px  [2013, April 14]. 
 
Bank of England. 2009. Financial Stability Report. Available: 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2009/fsrfull0906.pdf [2103, April 14]. 
 
Benninga, S. 2008. Financial modelling using Excel. London: The MIT Press.  
 
Berger, A.N. & Davies, S.M. 1998. The information content of bank examinations. Journal 
of financial services research. 14(2):117-144.  
 
Berger, A.N., Herring, R.J. & Szego, G.P. 1995. The role of capital in financial institutions. 
Journal of banking & finance. 19(3-4):393-430.  
 
Briloff, A. 1997. Accounting research in the groves of academe: A personal retrospective. 
Asia-Pacific journal of accounting. 4(1):3-35. 
 
Coetsee, D. 2010. The role of accounting theory in the development of accounting principles. 
Meditari accountancy research. 18(1):1-16.  
 
Cassidy, J. 2009. How markets fail: The logic of economic calamities. London: Penguin  
Group. 
 
Gaffikin, M. 2006. The critique of accounting theory. Accounting and finance working paper 
06/25, School of accounting and finance, University of Wollongong. Available: 
http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=accfinwp [2013, April 
14].  
 
I-Net Bridge. 2007. Investec successfully places a further R1.6bn RMBS. Available: 
http://www.eprop.co.za/component/k2/item/9045-Investec-successfully-places-a-further-
R1-6bn-RMBS.html  [2013, August 13]. 
 
International Accounting Standards Board. 2005. International financial reporting standard 
(IFRS) 7 financial instruments: Disclosure. London: IASB.  
107 
 
International Accounting Standards Board. 2008. An improved conceptual framework for 
financial reporting. Exposure draft. London: IASB.  
 
Investec 2008. Annual Report 2008. Available: 
http://www.investec.co.za/content/dam/investec/investec-
international/documents/Investor%20Relations/Financial%20Results/Financial%20Resul
ts%202008/The%20Investec%202008%20Annual%20Report%20.pdf [2013, April 14]. 
 
Investec. 2009. Annual Report 2009. Available: 
http://www.investec.co.za/content/dam/investec/investec-
international/documents/Investor%20Relations/Financial%20Results/Financial%20Resul
ts%202009/Investec%20Annual%20Report%202009.pdf  [2013, April 14]. 
 
Investec Bank Limited. 2004. Investec Bank Limited Group and Company Financial 
Statements 2004. Available: http://www.investec.co.za/content/dam/investec/investec-
international/documents/Investor%20Relations/Financial%20Results/Financial%20Resul
ts%202004/Investec_Bank_Limited_(a_subsidiary_of_Investec_Limited)_Annual_Finan
cial_Statements_for_the_year_ended_31_March_2004.pdf [2013, April 15].  
 
Investec Bank Limited. 2006. Investec Bank Limited Group and Company Financial 
Statements 2006. Available: http://www.investec.co.za/content/dam/investec/investec-
international/documents/Investor%20Relations/Financial%20Results/Financial%20Resul
ts%202006/Investec_Bank_Limited_(a_subsidiary_of_Investec_Limited)_Annual_Finan
cial_Statements_for_the_year_ended_31_March_2006.pdf [2013, April 15]. 
 
Investec Bank Limited. 2008. Investec Bank Limited Group and Company Financial 
Statements 2008. Available: http://www.investec.co.za/content/dam/investec/investec-
international/documents/Investor%20Relations/Financial%20Results/Financial%20Resul
ts%202008/Investec_Bank_Limited_(a_subsidiary_of_Investec_Limited)_Financial_Stat
ements_for_the_year_ended_31_March_2008.pdf [2013, April 15]. 
 
Investec Bank Limited. 2009. Investec Bank Limited Group and Company Financial 
Statements 2009. Available: http://www.investec.co.za/content/dam/investec/investec-
international/documents/Investor%20Relations/Financial%20Results/Financial%20Resul
ts%202009/Annual_Silo_IBL_2009.pdf [2013, April 15]. 
 
Investec Bank Limited. 2011. Annual Financial Statements 2011. Available: 
http://www.investec.co.za/content/dam/investec/investec-
international/documents/Investor%20Relations/Financial%20Results/financialresults201
1/IBL_annual_report2011.pdf [2013, April 15]. 
 
Investec Limited 2003. Annual Financial Statements 2003. Available: 
http://www.investec.co.za/content/dam/investec/investec-
international/documents/Investor%20Relations/Financial%20Results/Financial%20Resul
ts%202003/Investec_Limited_(silo_entity_excluding_the_results_of_Investec_plc)_Ann
ual_Financial_Statements_for_the_year_ended_31_March_2003.pdf [2013, April 15]. 
 
Krainer, J. & Lopez, J.A. 2004. Incorporating equity market information into supervisory 
monitoring models. Journal of money, credit and banking.   36(6):1043-1067.  
 
108 
 
Kusano, M. 2011. Fair Value Accounting and procyclicality: Accounting for securitization. 
Available: www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~chousa/WP/120.pdf  [2012, February 22]. 
 
Laux, C. & Leuz, C. 2009. The crisis of fair-value accounting: Making sense of the recent 
debate. Accounting, organizations and society. 34(6-7):826-834.  
 
Lifschutz, S. 2002. The effect of SFAS 115 on earnings management in the banking industry. 
The journal of applied business research, 18(4):1-12. 
 
Lunawat, R., Pronin, K., Stecher, J. & Zhang, G. 2012. Fair market value could have 
contributed to the crash. Available: 
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=fair%20market%20value%20could%20have 
%20contributed%20to%20the%20crash&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCEQFjAA&url=h
ttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.tepper.cmu.edu%2Ffaculty-
research%2Fconferences%2Faccounting-mini-
conference%2Fdownload.aspx%3Fid%3D15340&ei=hbePUKeADMeyhAe9sYCADA&
usg=AFQjCNFsfUljJkSRFqXE6CBcfLy-jgdjyg [2012, October 30]. 
 
Magnan, M.L. 2009. Fair value accounting and the financial crisis: Messenger or contributor? 
Accounting perspectives. 8(3):189-213.  
 
McMahon, G. 2011. Mark-to-market's real role in the crisis. The CPA Journal. 81(2):46-55. 
 
Merton, R.C. 1977. An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan 
guarantees: An application of modern option pricing theory. Journal of banking and 
finance. 1(1):3-11.  
 
Pozen, R.C. 2009. Is it fair to blame fair value accounting for the financial crisis? Harvard 
business review. 87(11):84-92.  
 
Robson, C. 2002. Real world research: A resource for social scientists and practitioner-
researchers. West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.  
 
Shaffer, S. 2010. Fair value accounting: Villain or innocent victim?: Exploring the links 
between fair value accounting, bank regulatory capital and the recent financial crisis. 
Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Quantitative Analysis Unit. Available: 
http://www.bos.frb.org/bankinfo/qau/wp/2010/qau1001.pdf [2013, April 12].  
 
Soros, G. 2012. Only three months to save the Euro. Available: 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-economic-trends/george-soros-on-the-euro-
crisis?sn=2009+Detail [2012, October 30]. 
 
Standard Bank Group 2003. Annual financial statements 2002. Available: 
http://reporting.standardbank.com/downloads/archive/2002/annual_report2002.pdf 
[2013, April 15]. 
 
Standard Bank Group 2009. Annual report 2008. Available: 
http://reporting.standardbank.com/downloads/archive/2008/standardbank_ar_2008.pdf 
[2013, April 15]. 
109 
 
Standard Bank Group 2010a. Annual financial statements 2009. Available: 
http://reporting.standardbank.com/downloads/archive/2009/standardbank_ar_2009.pdf 
[2013, April 15]. 
 
Standard Bank Group 2010b. Representation of subsidiaries. Available: 
http://www.standardbank.com/Subsidiaries.aspx [2012, February 8].  
 
Standard Bank Group 2011. Annual integrated report 2010. 
http://reporting.standardbank.com/downloads/archive/2010/standardbank_ar_2010.pdf  
[2013, April 15]. 
 
Taylor, M. 2009. Innumerate bankers were ripe for a reckoning. The Financial Times 
(London). 15 December. Letter to the editor.  
 
The Standard Bank of South Africa Limited. 2006. Annual financial statements 2005. 
Available: 
http://reporting.standardbank.com/downloads/archive/2005/2005_sbsa_annual_report.pd
f [2013, August 13]. 
 
The Standard Bank of South Africa Limited. 2010. Annual financial statements 2009. 
Available: 
http://reporting.standardbank.com/downloads/archive/2009/SBSA_AR_2009.pdf [2013, 
April 15]. 
 
The Standard Bank of South Africa Limited. 2011. Annual financial statements 2010. 
Available: 
http://reporting.standardbank.com/downloads/archive/2010/SBSA_AR_Final.pdf [2013, 
April 15]. 
 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission. 2008. Report and recommendations 
pursuant to Section 133 of the Emergency Economic Stabilisation Act of 2008: Study on 
mark-to market accounting. Available: 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/marktomarket123008.pdf [2013, April 15]. 
 
Vyas, D. 2011. The timeliness of accounting write‐downs by US financial institutions during 
the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Journal of accounting research. 49(3):823-860.  
 
Yin, R.K. 2009. Case study research: Design and methods. United States of America: Sage 
Publications, Inc.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: FOR BANKS FAIR VALUE ADJUSTMENTS DO INFLUENCE 
DIVIDEND POLICY1 
 
1. Synopsis 2 
 
The overall objective of the larger study is to investigate the role of FVA in the global 
financial crisis by gathering empirical evidence on the use of FVA by South African banks 
(with the focus on the time period before the crisis) and then to develop a theoretical 
perspective on the problem. Chapter two reviewed the global financial crisis and the role of 
FVA in that crisis. Chapter three contextualised the empirical work, which is a South African 
case study. The objective of the South African case study is to inform and enrich the model in 
chapter six. Chapter four investigated how FVA was used in practice by two large South 
African banks. The aim of this chapter is to continue the South African case study, but to use 
different data and a different approach.  
 
An objective of the thesis is to determine the use of FVA by banks in practice. This is 
possible in the South African case. In this paper total bank sector data could be linked back to 
individual bank data due to the concentrated nature of South African banking. Also, it was 
possible to meet with the Banking Project Group that brings together bankers, bank 
supervisors and their auditors. The results show that South African banks paid increased 
dividends due to unrealised FVA gains in profit and loss. If those unrealised FVA gains are 
risky then this would have left the South African banks more fragile prior to the crisis. 
Results also show that FVA entries from the banking book add volatility to the net profit of 
South African banks and materially lift the average profit level. Financial yearend dummy 
variables show results consistent with the view that bankers use mark-to-market/fair value 
entries to facilitate hitting the “right” profit level at yearend. 
 
FVA adjustments can be posted directly to capital reserves or through profit and loss. A 
common assumption is to only focus on the adjustments related to available-for-sale assets. 
                                                 
1
 This paper was titled in response to the article by Gonharov and van Triest (2011) “Do fair value adjustments 
influence dividend policy”. The paper was presented at the ECCE & USB Conference on Financial 
Globalisation and Sustainable Finance, Cape Town, 29-31 May 2013. 
2
 The three main chapters are papers that have been published and are included in the thesis verbatim and are 
thus standalone papers. The Guidelines for the inclusion of publications in a doctoral thesis of the University of 
Cape Town require that each paper is prefaced by a synopsis of how the paper contributes to the thesis aims and 
objectives.  
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An objective of this thesis is to rather focus attention on FVA adjustments through profit and 
loss. This focus is justified by the results in this paper (especially Table 5.6) which show how 
FVA adjustments from the banking book materially impact profit and loss in a procyclical 
way (the effect was strongest immediately before the crisis). The financial statement excerpt 
from the post crisis period indicated that FVA adjustments through profit and loss are risky. 
 
The paper follows. 
 
2. Abstract 
 
Most researchers who investigate the interplay between fair value accounting (FVA) and the 
financial crisis look at the time period during the crisis. This paper investigates a potential 
role for FVA prior to the crisis: If FVA led to increased accounting profits with the 
recognition of transitory gains through profit and loss during the boom, and if those increased 
profits provided the rationale for increased dividends, then bank capital became riskier prior 
to the crisis; this would have made the system more prone to failure. A study by Gonharov 
and van Triest (2011) found no empirical support that dividends increase in response to 
unrealised positive fair value adjustments to income. In contrast, when the setting is limited 
to only South African banks, this paper finds that South African banks did pay dividends 
from unrealised transitory gains. This finding is based on a combination of three strands of 
evidence: a Panel regression of the annual dividends declared by the large South African 
universal banks that showed that those banks probably ignored the unrealised nature of FVA 
profits when dividends were determined; monthly data from the total South African bank 
system in a co-integrated regression that showed that unrealised fair value profits from the 
banking book raised the average level of bank profits materially; and simple descriptive 
statistics on distributions that showed that South African banks distributed a greater 
proportion of profits during the critical period of 2004 – 2008 when unrealised fair value 
profits from the banking book raised the level of bank profits. The finding that South African 
banks did pay dividends from unrealised transitory gains was also confirmed by bank 
representatives and the post financial crisis disclosure of one of the South African banks.    
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3. Introduction 
 
The on-going financial crisis is the worst global economic downturn since the Great 
Depression. Understanding its causes and preventing a reoccurrence is of immense social and 
economic importance.  
 
Excessive write-down of asset values under FVA, which depletes bank capital, has been 
suggested as a possible cause of the crisis (Veron, 2008; Pozen, 2009:85). The question about 
the role of FVA in the crisis was taken so seriously by American politicians that two official 
investigations following the crisis have already reported on it. The office of the Chief 
Accountant in the United States Securities and Exchange Commission found that FVA did 
not appear to have played a significant role in the 2008 bank failures (United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2008). The National Commission on the Causes of the Financial 
and Economic Crisis (NCCFEC) in the United States’ statutory instructions included an 
inquiry into “accounting practices, including mark-to-market and fair value rules, and 
treatment of off-balance sheet vehicles”. Their final report does not include accounting as a 
major role player in the crisis, but the dissenting Wallison report does (The National 
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, 2011). 
Academic accounting researchers have also started to investigate the role of FVA during the 
crisis and mostly find that FVA had an insignificant effect (Badertscher, Burks & Easton, 
2012; Barth & Landsman, 2010; Laux & Leuz, 2009;  Shaffer, 2010;). 
 
The previous mentioned studies looked for FVA’s role during the crisis and not before the 
crisis, except for Laux & Leuz (2009:9) who provides arguments “that FVA and asset write-
ups allow banks to increase their leverage in booms, which in turn makes the financial system 
more vulnerable and financial crises more severe”. Pinnuck (2012), in his review of the 
evidence of the role of financial reporting in the global financial crisis, argues numerous 
times that more attention on the years preceding the crisis is needed. In the popular press it 
seems to be common knowledge that FVA allowed the payment of remuneration and 
dividends from imaginary3 profits during the boom (Haldane,  2011;  Kay,  2009;  Kay,  
2012;  Mundy,  2012;  Taylor,  2009;  Wood,  2010). It is the concern that dividends were 
paid from transitory FVA gains investigated in this paper.  
                                                 
3
 Terms used include “imaginary profits”, “spurious profits” and “unreliable gains”.  
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Goncharov and van Triest (2011) used a Russian setting to investigate this question and they 
found that unrealised positive fair value adjustments were not paid out as dividends by firms. 
Their finding is in accord with the Lintner model (Lintner, 1956) where only permanent 
increases in earnings are dividend relevant. Their sample contained most Russian public 
companies and was not restricted only to banks. By investigating whether unrealised positive 
fair value adjustments are paid out as dividends in a different setting, of large South African 
banks, this paper aims to provide a counterexample to the Russian example. This setting is at 
the same time different yet similar to theirs. By focusing solely on banks those firms most 
impacted by FVA are investigated with the concurrent disadvantage of a limited number of 
observations. South African banks are rated third best in the world for “soundness of banks” 
by the World Economic forum (2013:347). The South African country setting is similar to 
Russia in being another BRICS country and a commodity producer.  
 
A behavioural perspective can explain why banks might be more inclined to pay dividends 
from transitory FVA gains in profits than firms in general. Bank regulators regard a bank 
with more capital as a safer bank whilst bank management wants to reduce bank capital to the 
minimum allowed in order to maximise returns for shareholders and thus remuneration for 
themselves. During the business cycle upswing that preceded the financial crisis, banks were 
making record profits, possibly boosted by transitory FVA gains; those profits increased 
capital. Management needed to do something with that additional capital as it reduced the 
gearing effect available and thus future profitability. The increase in capital could have been 
used to fund further loan book expansion as argued by Pinnuck (2012:5), perhaps beyond 
what the market required, and thus turning banks into aggressive sellers of debt; alternatively 
or probably concurrently, the increase in capital could have been partly reduced by paying 
higher levels of remuneration and dividends. 
 
The aim of this study is thus not to investigate dividend policy per se, but to repeat as far as 
possible the investigation of Goncharov and van Triest (2011) in a different setting with the 
implication that the literature review will not be so focused on dividend policy as it is will be 
on their paper and FVA.  
 
The South African banks context does not allow for a direct test of the dividend relevance of 
positive FVA gains, unlike the Goncharov and van Triest (2011) paper, and the investigation 
thus relies on three different strands of evidence: First, a panel regression of the annual 
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dividends of the five large South African universal banks, that make up 90% of the South 
African banking system, is used in a manner similar to Goncharov and van Triest (2011) to 
show that the banks probably ignored unrealised transitory FVA gains when dividends were 
determined. The same assumption was made as in Goncharov and van Triest (2011:54) that 
these fair value adjustments are transitory. Second, a co-integrated regression of monthly 
total bank profits is used to show that unrealised fair value entries from the banking book 
raised bank profits materially, especially in the critical period before the financial crisis (2004 
– 2008). Third, simple descriptive statistics on distributions is used to show that the banks did 
not reduce the proportion of profits paid out as dividends when profits were inflated by FVA 
gains from the banking book (2004 – 2008).   
 
Interview and financial statement evidence provide a final confirmation of the findings. In 
South African banks positive FVA gains are not ignored when dividends are determined; in 
contrast to the Goncharov and van Triest (2011) finding. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant literature focusing on the 
Goncharov and van Triest (2011) paper. Section 3 describes the data and the methods that 
will be used to address the research question. Section 4 presents, discusses and interprets the 
results and Section 5 draws conclusions. 
 
4. Theoretical background 
 
4.1 Earnings persistence and dividends 
Lintner (1956) proposed a partial adjustment model linking reported earnings with dividends. 
Companies aim to pay out a certain percentage of permanent or core earnings as dividends. 
The implication is that dividends can be modelled as a function of past dividends and current 
earnings. Fama and Babiak (1968) confirmed the model empirically. Similar links between 
earnings and dividends have been found by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1992) in the 
United States and by Goergen, Renneboog and Correia da Silva (2005) in Germany. Skinner 
(2008) found that dividends and share buybacks are complementary in their relationship to 
earnings. 
 
The Lintner model proposes that managers are reluctant to increase the level of dividend 
payments unless earnings have increased in a sustainable manner. If fair value gains and 
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losses are transitory then the Lintner model would suggest that the fair value gains and losses 
have no distributional consequences.  
 
4.2 Fair value accounting 
FVA entered into accounting regulations in the 1990s first in the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 115 (FASB, 1993) in the United States of America and 
later in International Accounting Standard (IAS) 32 (IASB, 1998) which mandated that some 
securities be accounted for at their fair value. This was followed by SFAS No. 157 (FASB, 
2006) and IAS 39 (IASB, 1998); these both formally defined fair value and the measurement 
and disclosure of financial instruments. South African accounting standards closely followed 
the IASB developments and from 1 January 2005, IFRS formally replaced South African 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP). 
 
Fair value can be broadly defined as “the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid 
to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the 
measurement date” (IASB, 2011). Assets and liabilities are categorised into three categories 
according to the level of subjectivity associated with the inputs to measure their fair values. 
Level 1 or mark-to-market represents unadjusted prices in active markets for identical assets 
or liabilities. Level 2 represents an in-between category where a direct market price is not 
used and instead, inputs, observable on markets, are used to determine a price suitable for that 
particular asset or liability. Level 3 or mark-to-model represents the situation where 
unobservable inputs are used to derive a fair value; this process usually entails the use of 
some form of discounted cash flow model.  
 
Not all value changes in financial instruments held at fair value impact profit and loss. Only 
value changes in financial instruments that form part of the trading book (including 
derivatives) as well as value changes in financial instruments designated at fair value impact 
profit and loss. Fair value changes in available-for-sale financial instruments are posted 
directly to reserves. This investigation, similar to Goncharov and van Triest’s (2011) study,   
focuses exclusively on the changes that are posted through profit and loss. An implication of 
FVA changes posted through profit and loss is that once those entries form part of retained 
income it is impossible to separately identify which part of retained income is realised and 
which part is unrealised, even though the unrealised part might be riskier. Bank management, 
operating in a regulatory regime which does not require the specific tracking of those items 
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(for example Russia and Japan requires companies to disclose items through profit and loss 
that are unrealised; this is not required in most Western countries such as South Africa), 
might treat those reserves as similar to realised reserves and pay them out as dividends. 
 
Prior studies indicate five ways in which FVA can introduce transitory components into 
earnings. FVA brings the present value of future cash flows into current earnings (Dechow, 
Myers & Shakespeare, 2010) even though those cash flows might be subject to operational 
risk. The best example of this practice, often referred to as frontloading of profits, is Enron’s 
recognition of future contract income the moment the contract was signed (Benston, 2006). In 
the case of securitisation, where the accounting treatment of the transaction is that of secured 
borrowing, FVA will frontload the interest margin that would have been earned over time 
(Dechow, Myers & Shakespeare, 2010). In addition, FVA might merely pick up a transitory 
change in the underlying economics of an asset/liability and thus bring transitory effects into 
profit. Also, not all assets or liabilities are measured at fair value and this failure to match all 
the fair value changes in the mixed measurement model of accounting can lead to volatility in 
earnings (Penman, 2007; Plantin, Sapra & Shin, 2008). Furthermore, bubble prices can be 
incorporated into accounting via mark-to-market accounting (Penman, 2003). Finally, 
evidence is emerging that FVA can be used as an earnings management tool, especially when 
combined with securitisation (Dechow, Myers & Shakespeare, 2010).  
 
Goncharov and van Triest (2011:54) assume that fair value adjustments are transitory based 
on previous studies that “suggest managers exhibit over-optimism and tend to overestimate 
implications of current earnings for future earnings”. This study makes the same assumption 
based on the reasons given above as well as the acknowledgement by the CEO of one of the 
five large banks in South Africa that FVA gains in earnings are “of lower quality and more 
difficult to forecast” (Tarrant, 2013). 
 
4.3 Goncharov and van Triest (2011) 
Their paper examined the impact of positive fair value adjustments on dividend policy and 
they found no empirical support for the concern that dividends increase in response to 
positive fair value adjustments. Their sample period spanned 2003 – 2006 and their final 
sample consisted of 4424 firm-year observations from 1179 unique firms listed in Russia. 
Their core model shows that a change in dividends is a function of profitability before the 
gain through profit and loss from FVA and that the FVA gain actually reduced the dividend 
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paid. Al variables were scaled by average total assets. They made use of controls for size, 
financial leverage, cash holdings and growth.  
 
Important and unique to their study was that “Russian accounting standards mandate mark-to-
market accounting for financial investments with changes in fair value reported in net 
income” (Goncharov and van Triest, 2011:54). In their regression model they could thus 
directly test for the relationship between fair value gains in net income and changes in 
dividends.  
 
A few areas can be identified for improvement in a replicate study. There is no indication in 
their paper that they controlled for heterogeneity between firms in their regression models. 
The low R2 values indicated collaborate this. The use of fixed effects would have had the 
advantage of better model fit as well as compensating for time invariant omitted variables per 
firm. It can be argued that the use of a differenced dividend model compensates for firm 
specific omitted variables that are constant between following years but this technique does 
not control for all firm specific omitted variables. The validity of firm fixed effects in the 
differenced dividend models of this paper demonstrates. It has already been mentioned that 
their sample covered most listed Russian firms and thus was not exclusively focused on 
banks; banks are the firms most impacted by FVA and thus arguably of greater interest in the 
context of the research question. And finally, they used the average total assets of each firm 
to deflate variables used for size, whilst the usual deflator is rather to use market 
capitalisation (Easton and Summers, 2001). In a later paper by Gonahrov (Goncharov and 
Veenman, 2013) an argument is made that confirms this point on how to improve the original 
study: “…we show that market value deflation is essential in market-based tests of dividend 
displacement and signalling because it controls for ‘stale’ information in addition to scale 
(size) differences across firms”. 
 
A few papers have taken the Goncharov and van Triest (2011) study further. In a review 
paper on the consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption Brüggemann, Hitz and Sellhorn 
(2013:) argues that IFRS adoption, that increases reliance on FVA, may cause changes in 
dividend policies. Kochiyama (2013) utilised a unique Japanese setting to investigate whether 
Japanese firms pay out dividends from revaluation profits on the fair valuation of trading 
securities. From 2001, with the adoption of IFRS, FVA revaluation profits and losses from 
trading securities were included as part of net profit in Japan. For the period 2001 until 2006 
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the Japanese Commerce Law implemented the deduction of revaluation profits from 
distributable profits and the study found revaluation reserves for this period not relevant for 
dividends. But, from 2006 the Japanese Company Act allowed the revaluation profits as part 
of distributable reserves and the study found that from 2006 the revaluation reserves were 
dividend relevant. 
 
This study will repeat as far as possible the Goncharov and van Triest (2011) study in a 
different setting. The Japanese example above already shows that the Goncharov and van 
Triest (2011) results did not hold in a different setting when the law allowed payments from 
unrealised FVA gains. For South African banks there is nothing that prohibits them from 
making distributions from unrealised FVA gains that ended up in profit and loss. 
 
4.4 Why bank managers might pay dividends from transitory FVA gains 
3.4.1. Declining return on assets (ROA) 
Bank managers operate in an environment where earnings are under pressure due to the 
entrance of non-banks into the banks’ competitive space. At the same time, shareholder 
activism is increasing and one way in which bank managers can maintain or achieve the 
expected return on equity (ROE), even when ROA is decreasing, is to increase leverage. 
Transitory gains from FVA will increase bank capital and reduce leverage, all else being 
equal. Paying those gains out as dividends or remuneration will reduce the decrease in 
leverage. 
 
3.4.2. Agency theory/moral hazard 
Another reason for the behaviour of bank managers can be found in agency theory, but not in 
the normal management versus shareholders sense. The capital provided by shareholders in 
the average bank forms only a minor part of the total capital utilised in that bank; for 
example, the average for the five banks included in this study over 17 years was 6.23% of the 
total. Shareholders have little skin in the game and they face an asymmetric payoff. If the 
bank performs really well then the shareholders have an unlimited potential share of the 
profits and if the bank fails, then the shareholders can walk away from their small investment 
in the capital of the bank. More so than at more conservatively financed firms, bank 
shareholders are incentivised to work together with management to implement strategies that 
will be detrimental to the creditors of the bank. Strategies that reduce the value of a bank’s 
debt without reducing the bank’s total value increase the bank’s share price.  
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The most obvious strategy is for the bank to take on excessive risk. If the risk pays off, then 
the reward goes to shareholders and management; if the risk does not pay off then the 
depositors are left with the result (for example see Galai & Masulis, 1976; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Hillier, Grinblatt and Titman (2008) summarise another three categories of 
conflict of interest between shareholders and debt holders. Firstly, firms might pass up 
profitable investments because the firm’s debt holders capture most of the benefits of the 
projects. Secondly, shareholders are incentivised to accept short-term projects rather than 
long-term projects, even if the long-term projects might be more profitable. Thirdly, 
shareholders may want to keep a firm operating when the liquidation value of the firm 
exceeds its operating value. 
 
It can be argued that in reasonably efficient capital markets, debt providers will be aware of 
these self-interested incentives of shareholders and price their loans appropriately. This raises 
another agency conflict; management/shareholders/depositors versus the government. If 
government insures the deposits of a bank directly or indirectly by treating a bank as too-big-
to-fail then depositors have no incentive to monitor the banks actively. Depositors would 
scramble to provide capital at any return greater than the risk-free interest rate. Hillier, 
Grinblatt and Titman (2008: 581) refer to the Savings and Loans crisis of the 1980s as an 
example. Those managers, shareholders and depositors can effectively take on risk with 
government money and would want to pay profits out as soon as possible. 
 
The theoretical overview has shown that according to ordinary dividend theory transitory fair 
value gains through profit and loss should have no effect on dividends paid. FVA accounting 
was also introduced and briefly explained and five possible ways presented how FVA can 
introduce transitory components into earnings. The paper by Goncharov and van Triest 
(2011) was then discussed as this paper is strongly related to it. Suggestions were made for 
improvement in a replicate study in a different setting. Finally, some motivations why bank 
managers might pay dividends from transitory FVA gains were presented. This leads to the 
following research question: Did South African banks pay out dividends from FVA increased 
profits? 
 
The next section will discuss the data used and the tests that will be performed. 
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5. Research approach 
 
Banks do not normally disclose what portion of their net profit is unrealised. The study by 
Goncharov and van Triest (2011) was able to directly test whether unrealised FVA gains in 
profit and loss were relevant to dividend decisions due to a unique disclosure requirement in 
the Russian setting. A direct test is not possible in the South African setting as no special 
disclosure requirement exists in South Africa; thus, IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: 
Disclosure (IASB, 2005) does not require disclosure of the realised and unrealised portions of 
items of income, expense, gains, and losses related to financial instruments. Only the 
combined total is required. 
 
Three proxies for FVA gains in profit will be considered in this paper in the stead of a direct 
measurement. The first proxy will be the difference between net profit after tax and broad 
cash flow from operations (after tax and working capital adjustments), the second proxy will 
be the difference between net profit after tax and narrow cash flow from operations (before 
tax and working capital adjustments). All else equal, an unrealised gain component of net 
profit after tax should imply a cash flow from operations that is less than net profit. A 
negative aspect of these two proxies is that they will contain noise from sources other than 
just FVA adjustments. The third proxy will be the total of extra-ordinary items in income 
identified by fundamental data provider McGreggor BFA, including some observations of 
mark-to-market entries. The mark-to-market observations included in proxy three were few 
and thus this proxy also seems to be a noisy measure of FVA gains included in profit. 
 
The first step in the investigation will be to perform a regression analysis, explaining changes 
in dividend, similar to that done by Goncharov and van Triest (2011) – this will be called 
“dividend analysis” in the rest of the paper. Unfortunately, due to the noisiness of the three 
proxies for FVA gains, the results will not be as trustworthy as in the Goncharov and van 
Triest (2011) study. To reinforce the argument that FVA led to the recognition of additional 
gains during the economic upswing a regression analysis, with the dependant variable being 
the monthly net profit after tax of the total South African banking system (2001 – 2010), will 
be performed - called “profit analysis” in the rest of the paper. To reinforce the argument that 
banks ignored the transitory components of net income simple descriptive statistics of the 
portion of distributable net profit distributed as a dividend for all five banks combined, over 
the period 1994 – 2010 will be shown with the period immediately preceding the global 
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financial crisis emphasised. Finally, interview and financial statement evidence will be 
considered. 
 
Next the data for the dividend analysis will be presented including statistical considerations. 
Thereafter the data for the profit analysis will be presented including some statistical 
considerations. 
 
5.1 Data and some statistical considerations – dividend analysis 
Annual financial statement data pertaining to the five largest listed4 South African banks 
were obtained. These data were obtained in a standardised format from the fundamental data 
provider McGregor BFA and covered the period 1994 to 2010. This period started in 1994 
with the democratisation of South Africa and ended in 2010. These five banks were chosen as 
they dominate South African banking, all have time-series available for the period under 
discussion and all have securitised assets in the immediate past. Survivorship bias is not 
expected to be a problem because this group of banks has been stable throughout the period 
studied. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction this part of the study will attempt to duplicate as closely as 
possible the key model used by Goncharov and van Triest (2011:60). The dependant variable 
in this study similarly will be the change in dividend declared by bank
 
i in year
 
t (ΔDIVit). 
DIVit-1 is the first explanatory variable and is the previous year’s dividend for that bank.  The 
next two independent variables are net profit after tax of bank
 
i in year
 
t before the proxies for 
FVA adjustments (NPBPROXY?it) and net profit after tax of bank i in year t-1 before the 
proxies for FVA adjustments (NPBPROXY?it-1). The independent variable of interest in the 
Goncharov and van Triest (2011) study is not available for this study and instead three 
proxies will be considered: PROXY1it is the difference between NPit and broad cash generated 
by operations (after tax and working capital changes) by bank
 
i in year
 
t; PROXY2it is the 
difference between NPit and narrow cash generated by operations (before tax and working 
capital changes) by bank
 
i in year
 
t; and PROXY3it is the total of extra-ordinary items 
identified by fundamental data provider McGreggor BFA, including some (incomplete) 
                                                 
4
 The data used in the dividend analysis and the profit analysis relate to different entities within the same 
banking group. The profit regressions use data from the registered banking entities in each banking group whilst 
the dividend regressions use data from the listed entities in each banking group. In all instances the banking 
entity in each group represents most of the activity within each listed entity. In 2010, the percentage of the listed 
banking group made up of the banking entity in that group ranged from 64% to 96% when measured by total 
shareholders’ equity.  
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observations of mark-to-market entries. All of these variables have been deflated for size by 
using average market capitalisation. All of the same control variables in Goncharov and van 
Triest (2011) will be used, except for the cash balance variable as liquidity is not normally a 
constraint on a bank and in the Goncharov and van Triest (2011:60) results this was the only 
control variable that was not statistically significant. SIZEit is the natural logarithm of total 
assets of bank
 
i 
 
in year
 
t. LEVit is financial leverage defined as the ratio of total debt to total 
assets of bank
 
i in year
 
t. GROWTHit is the growth in total assets of bank i in year t. The 
changes are summarised in Table 5.1 that follows. 
 
  
Table 5.1 List of variables used in the main regression of the Goncharov and van Triest (2001:60) study compared to 
the list of the variables that will be used in this study. 
 
Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics for selected income and balance sheet variables that 
will be used in the panel data regression. All of the variables, except for the control variables, 
are deflated by the average market capitalisation of the bank for that financial year. 
Category Goncharov and van Triest This study
Dependent ∆ DIV it  - change in dividends in year t  for company i ∆ DIV it  - change in dividends in year t  for bank i
Independent DIV it-1  is the dividend in year t-1  for company i DIV it-1  is the dividend in year t-1  for bank i 
NIBREV it  - is  net income year t  for company i 
before fair value adjustments
NPBPROXY? it  - is  net profit  after tax in year t  for 
bank i before the proxies for FVA adjustments
NIBREV it-1  - is  net income year t-1  for company i 
before fair value adjustments
NPBPROXY? it-1  - is  net profit  after tax in year t-1 
for bank i before the proxies for FVA adjustments
PROXY1 it  - difference between net profit  after tax 
and a broad measure of cash generated in year t  for 
bank i
PROXY2 it  - difference between net profit  after tax 
and a narrow measure of cash generated in year t  for 
bank i
PROXY3 it  - Data provider total of extraordinary 
items including mark-to-market values in year t  for 
bank i
Controls
SIZE i t - is the natuaral logarithm of total assets in 
year t  for company i
SIZE i t - is the natuaral logarithm of total assets in 
year t  for bank i
LEV it  - is financial leverage defined as a ratio of total 
debt to total assets in year t  for company i
LEV it  - is financial leverage defined as a ratio of total 
debt to total assets in year t  for bank i
GROWTH it  - is percentage change in sales in year t 
for company i
GROWTH it  - is percentage change in total assets in 
year t  for bank i
CASH it  - is cash balance defined as cash scaled by 
average total assets in year t  for company i
REV it  -  is positive fair value adjustments due to 
revaluations of short-term and long-term financial 
assets in year t  for company i
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Table 5.2 Pooled descriptive statistics of the variables included in the dividend analysis. 
 
Data sample represent 17 annual observations from 1994 until 2010 for the five largest South African banks. 
Fundamental data supplier BFA McGreggor was the source of the data. DIVit is dividends in year t for bank i. 
NPBFPROXY1it is net profit after tax in year t for bank i before PROXY1it. NPBFPROXY2it is net profit after tax in 
year t for bank i before PROXY2it. NPBFPROXY3it is net profit after tax in year t for bank i before PROXY3it. 
PROXY1it is the difference between net profit after tax and a broad measure of cash generated from operations in 
year t for bank i. PROXY2it is the difference between net profit after tax and a narrow measure of cash generated 
from operations in year t for bank i. PROXY3it is the total of extraordinary items including mark-to-market values 
identified by BFA McGreggor in year t for bank i. All of these preceding variables have been deflated for size by 
using average market capitalisation. SIZEit is the natuaral logarithm of total assets in year t for bank i. LEVit is 
financial leverage defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets in year t for bank i. GROWTHit is the percentage 
change in total assets in year t for bank i. In the bottom half of the table a winsorisation5 of 95% has been applied to 
all the variables. 
 
As the data above are from five different banks and not collated it is to be expected that there 
will be some individual bank heterogeneity in the relationships and that some form of panel 
regression might be called for. 
 
5.2 Panel regression – dividend analysis 
Panel data regressions first and foremost allow one to formally model the heterogeneity 
across groups that are typically present in panel data (Green, 2008:334; Baltagi, 2005:4). In 
addition, panel data regressions provide more robust information, more variability, less 
collinearity among variables and more degrees of freedom (Baltagi, 2005). A first step to 
                                                 
5
 Winsorising is the transformation of statistics by limiting extreme values in the statistical data to reduce the 
effect of possibly spurious outliers. 
Unadjusted for outliers
Variable Mean Median Std. deviation Minimum Maximum
DIVit 0.03322 0.03387 0.01181 0.00126 0.05528
NPBFPROXY1it 0.18386 0.16322 0.19495 -0.39186 1.21019
NPBFPROXY2it 0.11527 0.09302 0.16567 -0.24734 0.45633
NPBFPROXY3it 0.08921 0.09169 0.10129 -0.45913 0.28667
PROXY1 it -0.08687 -0.05351 0.20336 -1.11592 0.38752
PROXY2 it -0.01827 -0.00788 0.16535 -0.43862 0.32822
PROXY3 it 0.00778 0.00088 0.11155 -0.30420 0.57559
SIZE it 19.26953 19.39181 1.07155 16.18955 21.12349
LEV it 0.94199 0.94462 0.01938 0.88975 0.98512
GROWTH it 0.27925 0.17125 0.66510 -0.32430 5.52809
95% Winsorised
Variable Mean Median Std. deviation Minimum Maximum
DIVit 0.03323 0.03387 0.01175 0.00228 0.05486
NPBFPROXY1it 0.17963 0.16322 0.14958 -0.22168 0.57842
NPBFPROXY2it 0.11600 0.09302 0.16192 -0.17327 0.45633
NPBFPROXY3it 0.09526 0.09097 0.08263 -0.15126 0.28667
PROXY1 it -0.08035 -0.05351 0.15913 -0.48415 0.23118
PROXY2 it -0.01672 -0.00788 0.15648 -0.29939 0.25415
PROXY3 it 0.00402 0.00088 0.08708 -0.20247 0.24897
SIZE it 19.26897 19.39181 1.06655 16.26456 21.00414
LEV it 0.94211 0.94462 0.01873 0.90467 0.98113
GROWTH it 0.20626 0.17125 0.08708 -0.20247 0.24897
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using panel data regression would be to test the errors that results from a normal regression 
(where the data consists of observations from cross-sections over time) for heteroskedasticity. 
If heteroskedasticity is found one should test for the appropriateness or not of fixed or 
random effects. Not controlling, where appropriate, for individual fixed effects or random 
effects in a data panel can lead to an omitted variable bias problem and inconsistent estimates 
of the regression parameters. 
 
In choosing between fixed effects or random effects Baltagi (2005:19) advises researchers to 
not simply interpret a rejection of the Hausman (1978) test as an adoption of the fixed effects 
model. That is why it is appropriate to consider what each model is for: According to Baltagi 
(2005:12) the fixed effects model is an appropriate specification when focusing on a specific 
set of firms and inference is restricted to that set of firms and the random effects model is 
appropriate if one is drawing individuals randomly from a large population (Baltagi, 
2005:14). As the dividend analysis regression is only concerned with the specific five banks 
in the study and not about a larger population the fixed effects model is more appropriate. 
This line of argument is used in a number of recent accounting panel data studies (for 
example: Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2010:246; Setia-Atmaja, Haman and Tanewski, 
2011:238).  
 
5.3 Data and some statistical considerations – profit analysis 
The Bank Supervision Department of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) collects 
certain data on a monthly basis from all banks registered or licensed with the Department. In 
2010 there were 17 banks, two mutual banks, 13 branches of international banks and 41 
representative offices registered or licensed with the Department (Bank Supervision 
Department of the SARB, 2011:82). Monthly income statement data, collated for all banks, 
are available on their website. From 1994 to December 2007 the income statement was 
known as the DI 200 return and from January 2008 it was known as the BA 120 return. This 
date coincided with the introduction of the Basel II Capital Accord in South Africa. 
 
The content of the DI 200 return and the BA 120 return are not identical, but the item “net 
profit after tax” (NPt) appears in both these reports and, after consideration of the sequence 
and the content of the reports, the meaning of this term is considered to be reasonably 
equivalent in both reports.  
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The augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey & Fuller, 1979) indicates that the NPt time-series 
is not stationary, but possibly trend stationary. A simple time trend and exponential time 
trend were fitted to the data and it was found that an exponential time trend fitted NPt better. 
An even better data fit (as measured by R2 and the information criteria indicators) was 
obtained by replacing the time trend with nominal gross domestic product (GDPt), also a non-
stationary time-series that was obtained from the SARB. Econometric literature (Brooks, 
2008) indicates that non-stationary data should not be used in a regression, unless a linear 
combination of the variables is stationary. The implication of co-integration is that the two 
variables are bound by some relationship in the long run (Brooks, 2008:336). The Engle-
Granger and Phillips-Ouliaris residual-based tests for co-integration both indicate co-
integration; NPt and GDPt  move together. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Stationary residuals obtained by regressing NPt  on GDPt. 
 
Data sample represents monthly observations from January 1994 until December 2010. NPt  is net profit after tax 
combined for all banks in the South African system. GDPt  is nominal gross domestic product for South Africa.  
 
A stationary series was obtained by combining NPt  and GDPt . The residual series shown in 
Figure 5.1 above reveals that for the period immediately before the financial crisis, NPt  was, 
on average, above the level predicted by its relationship with GDPt  (first large oval in Figure 
5.1). 6 For the period following the start of the financial crisis, NPt  was, on average, slightly 
                                                 
6
 The use of dummies to capture the overshooting and undershooting of profits ignores the possibility that GDPt 
itself was inflated prior to the global financial crisis as can be seen in this quote from the Financial Times: 
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lower than the level predicted by its relationship with GDPt  (second large oval in Figure 
5.1). The points indicated by small ovals are all December data points. The ovals in Figure 
5.1 represent where dummy variables will be utilised in the final regressions. The up spike in 
2001 is due to mark-to-market adjustments from the banking book entering profit in January 
2001. This is possibly due to the adoption of the local equivalent of IAS 39 on that date. 
Harder to explain is the down spike in June 2001 which was of a similar absolute size as the 
up spike; this was due to negative mark-to-market adjustments from the banking book 
entering profit. The possibility that these extreme movements might have influenced, unduly, 
the results of the profit analysis, was tested in the robustness checks done on the profit 
analysis.  
 
In addition to NPt  and GDPt, a time-series for mark-to-market gains or losses, included in 
NPt, was obtained from the DI 200 returns before January 2008. From 1994 to December 
2000 the mark-to-market entry was the total for the banking book and the trading book 
combined. From January 2001 until December 2007 it was possible to split the mark-to-
market entry between a banking book portion and a trading book portion. From January 2008 
only a FVA gain or loss on the banking book was available. At that time all FVA gains or 
losses on the trading book were combined with realised gains or losses on the trading book as 
the bank regulator assumed these to be closely equivalent (Bakoro, de Jager & Parsons, 
2013). The following two mark-to-market time-series (M2M1t and M2M2t) were built. The 
first of these, M2M1t, is the combination of the following: (a) 1994 – 2000, the total mark-to-
market entries; (b) 2001 – 2007, the banking book mark-to-market entries and (c) for 2008 
onwards, the fair value entries from the banking book. The second of these, M2M2t, is the 
combination of the following: (d) 1994 – 2000, the total mark-to-market entries; (e) 2001 – 
2007, the combined banking and trading book mark-to-market entries and (f) for 2008 
onwards, the fair value entries from the banking book. The only difference is thus in 2001 – 
2007.  Both M2M1t and M2M2t were found to be stationary. 
 
The regression explaining NPt (Table 5.6) are based only on the observations from January 
2001 to December 2010 due to the unavailability of mark-to-market/fair value entries from 
the banking book as explained above, and the frequent changes in South African accounting 
standards during the late 1990s with the South African version of IAS 39 being implemented 
                                                                                                                                                        
“…GDP in 2007 was an illusion, wildly inflated by the debt bubble” (Melville, 2012). A plausible implication is 
that the dummies will underestimate the relationship. 
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with effect from January 2001. Descriptive statistics for the profit analysis follows in Table 
5.3 
 
 
Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the profit analysis. 
 
Data sample represent 120 months of observations from January 2001 until December 2010. NPt  is the monthly net 
profit after tax of all the banks in South Africa combined. GDPt  is the monthly nominal GDP figure of South Africa. 
M2M1t  is the monthly mark-to-market/FVA entries through profit and loss from the banking book. M2M2t  is  
M2M1t + the monthly mark-to-market entries through profit and loss from the trading book for the period January 
2001 - December 2007. NPt  and the M2Mt’s have been winsorised at 95% in the bottom half of the table due to the 
presence of large outliers. 
 
5.4 Single equation co-integrating regression – profit analysis 
The co-integrating relationship between NP and GDP implies that a long-running relationship 
exists between these two variables. The interaction between the financial and the real sectors 
of the economy is often procyclical (positive feedback mechanisms) (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2008). Because of this, it is expected that NP will overshoot its long-running 
relationship with GDP during the economic upswing and will undershoot during the 
downturn due to the natural procyclical nature of bank lending (Kusano, 2011:6); no role is 
required from FVA for this overshooting or undershooting to occur. This total overshooting 
or undershooting will be quantified by using three period dummies. A dummy variable 
(DUMMY1) will be used for the period January 2001 to June 2004 and will be useful to help 
understand the base case in which the economy is not in a strong upswing. The next dummy 
variable (DUMMY2) will be for the period July 2004 to September 2008 to signify a period 
when the economy was in a strong upswing, with FVA under IFRS fully implemented and 
the South African banks actively securitising assets. The final period dummy variable 
(DUMMY3) will be for the period that started in September 2008 with the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers and the world economy entering a state of shock. 
 
Unadjusted for outliers
Variable Mean Median Std. deviation Minimum Maximum
NP t 1727461 1774856 1115036 -2424046 4610448
GDP t 146400 137522 45007 80841 234498
M2M1 t 103705 144582 623516 -2094497 3842738
M2M2 t 138491 116278 1050894 -2569457 4453024
95% Winsorised
Variable Mean Median Std. deviation Minimum Maximum
NP t 1728438 1774856 1033362 -707186 3718659
M2M1 t 80612 144582 436714 -1229786 882181
M2M2 t 120295 116278 937604 -1817987 2735176
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In order to examine the effect of mark-to-market/FVA on the overshooting/undershooting of 
NP, the coefficients of the period dummies, before M2M is added to the regression, can be 
compared to the coefficients of the period dummies after M2M was added to the regression. If 
the coefficients of the overshooting/undershooting dummies are found to change materially, 
then the effect of M2M was to influence the average level of the overshooting/undershooting. 
A major advantage of this test is that it allows for derivative profits/losses in the trading book 
to hedge movements in other parts of the banks as NP is the final profit figure after any losses 
or profits have been cancelled out by counter derivative movements. M2M can only have 
explanatory power for NP if no cancelation took place. 
 
Next the results for the dividend analysis will be presented including a discussion thereof. 
Thereafter the results for the profit analysis will be presented including a discussion thereof. 
 
6. Results and discussion 
 
6.1 Dividend analysis 
The following initial model was fitted to the data. 
 
ΔDIVit = α0 + α1DIVit-1 + α2PROFITBFPROXY?it + α3PROFITBFPROXY?it-1 + 
α4PROXY?it + α5CONTROLSit + εit,                                                     (1) 
 
where i and t represent banks and years. ΔDIVit is the change in dividends. α1DIVit-1 is the 
dividend in the previous year. PROFITBFPROXY?it and PROFITBFPROXY?it-1 is the current 
year and the previous year net profit after tax before the proxy variables. PROXY?it represents 
one of three possible proxies for the Goncharov and Van Triest (2011) FVA gain in profits 
presented in Table 5.1. When presenting the results for model (1) only the results for the 
model with the best fitting proxy variable (of the three possible proxies) will be presented 
(based on R-squared). CONTROLSit represents the Goncharov and Van Triest control 
variables in Table 5.1.  This initial model is a pooled model without fixed effects. 
 
Cross-sectional and period fixed effects were tested for and found to be valid for model (2). 
These test results are available in the appendix. Fixed effects were implemented in model (2) 
to (7).  
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ΔDIVit = α0 + α1DIVit-1 + α2PROFITBFPROXY1it + α3PROFITBFPROXY1it-1 + 
α4PROXY1it + α5CONTROLSit  + µ i + λt + εit,                              (2) 
 
Changing to PROXY2it from PROXY1it gives the following model. 
ΔDIVit = α0 + α1DIVit-1 + α2PROFITBFPROXY2it + α3PROFITBFPROXY2it-1 + 
α4PROXY2it + α5CONTROLSit  + µ i + λt + εit,                             (3) 
 
Changing to PROXY3it from PROXY2it gives the following model. 
 
ΔDIVit = α0 + α1DIVit-1 + α2PROFITBFPROXY3it + α3PROFITBFPROXY3it-1 + 
α4PROXY3it + α5CONTROLSit  + µ i + λt + εit,                   (4) 
 
According to Table 5.2 outliers seems not to be a major issue for the dividend analysis. 
Nevertheless model (5) is model (2) with trimmed observations, model (6) is model (3) with 
trimmed observations and model (7) is model (4) with trimmed observations. Results are 
presented in Table 5.4. 
 
 
Table 5.4 Regression results of bank dividend models (1) to (7). 
 
Change in dividends (ΔDIVit) is the regressand. Data sample consists of 16 annual observations from 1994 until 2010 
for the five largest South African banks. Fundamental data supplier BFA McGreggor was the source of the data. 
DIVit-1 is dividends in year t-1 for bank i. NPBFPROXY1it is net profit after tax in year t for bank i before PROXY1it. 
NPBFPROXY1it-1 is net profit after tax in year t-1 for bank i before PROXY1it-1. NPBFPROXY2it is net profit after tax 
in year t for bank i before PROXY2it. NPBFPROXY2it-1 is net profit after tax in year t-1 for bank i before PROXY2it-1. 
NPBFPROXY3it is net profit after tax in year t for bank i before PROXY3it. NPBFPROXY3it-1 is net profit after tax in 
year t-1 for bank i before PROXY3it-1. PROXY1it is the difference between net profit after tax and a broad measure of 
cash generated from operations in year t for bank i. PROXY2it is the difference between net profit after tax and a 
narrow measure of cash generated from operations in year t for bank i. PROXY3it is the total of extraordinary items 
including mark-to-market values identified by BFA McGreggor in year t for bank i. All of these preceding variables 
have been deflated for size by using the average market capitalisation. SIZEit is the natural logarithm of total assets 
in year t for bank i. LEVit is financial leverage defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets in year t for bank i. 
GROWTHit is the percentage change in total assets in year t for bank i. In the second half of the table a winsorisation 
of 95% has been applied to all the variables.  
*,**,***, significant at the threshold of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (t-test). T-values are shown in parentheses.  
Regressor Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7)
DIV it-1 -0.6078*** (-4.64) -0.7342*** (-6.15) -0.7900*** (-5.98) -0.7904*** (-6.19) -0.8276*** (-6.68) -0.8332*** (-6.57) -0.8388*** (-6.94)
NPBFPROXY? it 0.0496* (1.92) 0.0477** (2.06) 0.0465* (1.83) 0.0478* (1.77) 0.06322** (2.13) 0.0634** (2.10) 0.0747** (2.25)
NPBFPROXY? it-1 -0.0174** (-2.51) -0.0091* (-1.70) -0.0179** (-2.04) 0.0086 (1.17) -0.0130 (-1.32) -0.0196** (-2.08) -0.0011 (-0.08)
PROXY1 it NA 0.0413* (1.69) NA NA 0.0596* (1.93) NA NA
PROXY2 it 0.0272 (1.09) NA 0.0340 (1.31) NA NA 0.0519* (1.71) NA
PROXY3 it NA NA NA 0.0354 (1.42) NA NA 0.0515* (1.69)
SIZE it 0.0046*** (3.24) 0.0037 (-1.23) -0.0021 (-0.83) -0.0034 (-1.32) 0.0044 (-1.65) -0.0020 (-0.87) -0.0032 (-1.35)
LEV it 0.0436 (0.73) -0.0430 (-0.70) -0.0838 (-1.20) -0.0410 (-0.63) -0.0435 (-0.67) -0.0847 (-1.17) -0.0471 (-0.67)
GROWTH it 0.0006 (0.96) 0.0017* (1.88) 0.0009* (1.72) 0.0013 (1.47) 0.0064 (1.13) 0.0051 (0.91 0.0071 (1.21)
c -0.1125* (-1.92) 0.1324* (1.72) 0.1428* (1.73) 0.1248 (1.54) 0.1493** (2.10) 0.1421* (1.75) 0.1251 (1.52)
Fixed effects No
Yes (cross-sectional 
and period)
Yes (cross-sectional 
and period)
Yes (cross-sectional 
and period)
Yes (cross-sect ional 
and period)
Yes (cross-sect ional 
and period)
Yes (cross-sect ional 
and period)
N 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
R-sq 0.4579 0.6686 0.6804 0.6617 0.6852 0.7024 0.6830
adj. R-sq 0.4051 0.5060 0.5236 0.4958 0.5308 0.5565 0.5274
White diagonal standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected)
Not winsorised observations 95% winsorised observations 
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Consistent with the Lintner framework and the findings of the Goncharov and Van Triest 
(2011:60) study the results consistently indicate a negative coefficient on lagged dividends 
and positive coefficients on income with statistical significance. Lagged income is mostly 
negative and not significant, unlike what was found in Goncharov and Van Triest (2011:60). 
In contrast to the findings of Goncharov and Van Triest (2011:59), who found a negative 
association between fair value adjustments and the change in dividends, no significant 
negative relationships between the proxy variables and the change in dividends were found. 
For models (2) to (7) in four out of six times slightly significant positive coefficients for the 
dummy variables were found. The control variables were mostly insignificant, especially in 
the models with fixed effects. Statistical tests indicated that model (1) suffers from 
heteroskedasticity and that period and cross-sectional fixed effects are more appropriate. 
Coefficient estimates from (1) are thus not reliable.  
 
The results from models (2) to (7) indicate that the change in dividend of a specific large 
bank can be explained by five factors: firstly, the bank declaring the dividend, secondly, the 
immediate preceding dividend and thirdly, the current and previous profitability of the bank. 
The fourth factor is the specific year in which the dividend was declared and this can be 
interpreted as arising from competitive pressure; after all, if the bank peer group was 
declaring large dividends then the individual banks will tend to conform. The final factor, in 
some cases, is the proxy for transitory FVA adjustments of the bank; FVA adjustments 
increase the change in dividends. 
 
Model (3) for the untrimmed models and model (6) for the trimmed models had the best 
model fit as measured by R-squared. As representatives of models (2) to (7) the residuals of 
these two models were tested for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity within each cross-
section; neither of these was found to be present. The LM test for serial correlation given 
fixed effects has a value of 0.83 for model (3) and a value of 0.95 for model (6); the 95% 
critical value is 1.96. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected. The LM 
statistic of the test for heteroskedasticity has a value of 19.614 for model (3) and a value of 
19.337 for model (6), less than the 5% critical value of 106.395 (Chi-square(N-1) distributed) 
and the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity cannot be rejected. Robust standard errors and 
covariance clustered across the cross-sections are thus not strictly necessary (Thompson, 
2011:6).   
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Thompson (2011) wrote a paper that describes a method for computing standard errors that 
are robust to correlation along two dimensions, as is often found in corporate finance data. 
Thomson (2011:4) reminds readers that double-clustering comes at a cost of wrong statistical 
inference if the error structure does not support the double-clustering choice. He shows that if 
a panel is unbalanced (in this case it is with 16 years and only 5 firms) it is more important to 
cluster along the dimension with fewer observations and double-clustering is not necessary. 
But, in this case the errors showed no serial correlation and heteroskedasticity within each 
cross-section and clustering across cross-sections is also not necessary. To maintain 
comparability and to make conclusions more conservative we thus used White diagonal 
standard errors and covariance across all the panel data models as it is robust to observation 
specific heteroskedasticity in the disturbances. The residuals of models (3) and (6) are 
available in the appendix. 
  
It is of course possible that behaviour changed over the course of the 16 years in the panel. 
The following robustness check was performed. Significant changes took place over the 
period 1994 – 2010 in accounting and banking regulations and so the dividend analysis 
results were tested for stability by splitting the sample in two and testing for the period 2001 
to 2010 for models (3) and (6) (the best fitting models). In the case of model (3)  fit improved 
from adjusted R-squared of 0.5236 to 0.5412. The significant regressors remained the same 
as well as the signs on their coefficients, except for the growth control variable that was no 
longer significant. What did not change was that the proxy variable remained insignificant 
with a positive coefficient. In the case of model (6)  fit improved from adjusted R-squared of 
0.5595 to 0.5986. The significant regressors remained the same as well as the signs on their 
coefficients, except for the proxy variable that was no longer significant. It seems as if the 
mixed result across the panel for the proxy variables is not valid for the period 2001 – 2010.   
Our findings up to this point only served to illustrate a contrast with the results of Goncharov 
and Van Triest (2011); the FVA adjustment items in this paper do not have statistically 
significant negative coefficients. This evidence does not imply that the South African banks 
were paying dividends from FVA profits as the profit measures used in models (1) to (7) 
excluded the proxies for FVA gains and the proxies for the FVA gains were not statistically 
significant; thus there was nothing in the results of the regression models to indicate that 
FVA gains are increasing dividend payments. If the South African banks were using total 
profit, including FVA gains, when they determined their annual dividends then the models 
above can be improved by replacing profit before FVA gains with profit after FVA gains. By 
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replacing the NPBFPROXY?it and NPBFPROXY?it-1 variables with NPit and NPit-1 in all the 
models the following results are obtained where ΔDIVit could be influenced by profit after tax 
inclusive of FVA gains. 
  
 
Table 5.5 Regression results of bank dividend models (1) to (7) with the NPBFPROXY?it and NPBFPROXY?it-1 
variables replaced by NPit and NPit-1. 
 
Change in dividends (ΔDIVit) is the regressand. Data sample consists of 16 annual observations from 1994 until 2010 
for the five largest South African banks. Fundamental data supplier BFA McGreggor was the source of the data. 
DIVit-1 is dividends in year t-1 for bank i. NPit is net profit after tax in year t for bank iit. NPit-1 is net profit after tax in 
year t-1 for bank i. PROXY1it is the difference between net profit after tax and a broad measure of cash generated 
from operations in year t for bank i. PROXY2it is the difference between net profit after tax and a narrow measure of 
cash generated from operations in year t for bank i. PROXY3it is the total of extraordinary items including mark-to-
market values identified by BFA McGreggor in year t for bank i. All of these preceding variables have been deflated 
for size by using the average market capitalisation. SIZEit is the natural logarithm of total assets in year t for bank i. 
LEVit is financial leverage defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets in year t for bank i. GROWTHit is the 
percentage change in total assets in year t for bank i. In the second half of the table a winsorisation of 95% has been 
applied to all the variables.  
 
*,**,***, significant at the threshold of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (t-test). T-values are shown in parentheses.  
 
Model fit has improved in all the models and the most for the untrimmed models compared to 
Table 5.4. The average improvement in adjusted R-squared for these three models was 
11.03%. The untrimmed models now fit the data better than the trimmed models. When 
comparing the coefficients of the untrimmed models above with the coefficients of the 
untrimmed models in Table 5.4 the following is noticed. In all three models the coefficient on 
the current year profit variable has increased and has become more statistically significant. 
Readers are reminded that the profit variables are now larger than what they were in Table 
5.4, yet the coefficients have increased. All else equal, if profit excluding FVA gains were 
used to justify dividend changes then the coefficients should have decreased. The coefficients 
of the lagged profit variables are now all positive and significant as in Goncharov and Van 
Triest (2011:60). The coefficients of all three proxy variables are now rounded equal to zero 
and statistically insignificant. The change in dividends is much better explained by total profit 
Regressor Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7)
DIV it-1 -0.6400*** (-5.02) -0.9327*** (-7.49) -0.9282*** (-7.12) -0.9187*** (-7.04) -0.9929*** (-6.34) -0.9667*** (-6.16) -0.9504*** (-6.35)
NP it 0.0442** (2.20) 0.0467**(2.62) 0.0498** (2.65) 0.0568*** (2.90) 0.0535** (2.01) 0.0561** (2.09) 0.0691** (2.37)
NP it-1 0.00448* (1.93) 0.0687***(4.26) 0.0684*** (4.03) 0.06626*** (3.83) 0.0607** (2.38) 0.0601** (2.61) 0.0463** (1.99)
PROXY1 it -0.0107** (-2.28) 0.0000 (1.05) NA NA 0.0071 (0.92) NA NA
PROXY2 it NA NA 0.0000 (0.22) NA NA 0.0059 (0.96) NA
PROXY3 it NA NA NA -0.0072 (-0.79) NA NA -0.0151 (-1.00)
SIZE it 0.0043*** (3.03) -0.0059** (-2.38) -0.0063** (-2.46) -0.0062** (2.56) -0.0064** (-2.31) -0.0055** (-2.33) -0.0047* (-1.97)
LEV it 0.1194** (2.28) -0.0075 (-0.12) -0057 (-0.09) 0.0013 (0.02) -0.0253 (-0.39) 0.0172 (-0.24) -0.0280 (-0.39)
GROWTH it 0.0007 (1.43) 0.0018** (2.34) 0.0019** (2.52) 0.0020** (2.56) 0.0078 (1.38) 0.0089 (1.54) 0.0095 (1.63)
c -0.1847*** (-3.14) 0.1411* (1.70) 0.1467* (1.78) 0.1381 (1.60) 0.1691** (2.04) 0.1435* (1.73) 0.1368 (1.53)
Fixed effects No
Yes (cross-sectional 
and period)
Yes (cross-sectional 
and period)
Yes (cross-sectional 
and period)
Yes (cross-sect ional 
and period)
Yes (cross-sect ional 
and period)
Yes (cross-sect ional 
and period)
N 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
R-sq 0.4935 0.7468 0.7419 0.7441 0.7055 0.7044 0.7067
adj. R-sq 0.4443 0.6226 0.6152 0.6186 0.5610 0.5595 0.5629
Not winsorised observations 95% winsorised observations 
White diagonal standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected)
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levels rather than profit levels before the proxy variables, one of which was the total of 
extraordinary gains included in profit. Thus, South African banks are using profit levels 
inclusive of FVA gains to justify increased dividend pay-outs. 
  
The dividend results were presented to representatives of the banks involved in the study, 
their auditors and bank supervisors at a meeting of the Banking Project Group at the South 
African Institute of Chartered Accountants in Johannesburg on 21 July 2010. In reaction to 
the conclusion that banks ignore the unrealised and possibly transitory nature of some of their 
profits when they determine their dividend pay-outs, the bank representatives responded by 
agreeing with that conclusion but with the proviso that they believe the effect to be 
immaterial. The question whether FVA impacts bank profits materially is the topic of the 
profit analysis that follows. 
  
6.2 Profit analysis 
The following model was fitted to the data. 
 
NPt = α0GDPt + α1DUMMY1t + α2DUMMY2t + α3DUMMY3t + REPORTINGt + εt,  
(8)  
where t represents months and REPORTINGt represents a dummy variable indicating 
financial yearend months.7 In the next model M2M1t  was added. 
 
NPt = α0GDPt + α1DUMMY1t + α2DUMMY2t + α3DUMMY3t + REPORTINGt +  
M2M1t + εt,           (9)  
 
                                                 
7
 Three of the four largest banks, representing more than 80% of the industry, have December yearends with the 
remaining “big four” bank having a December interim reporting date. With the advent of the financial crisis and 
the downturn it is to be expected that banks will try and report as positive a result as possible. For the period 
before the advent of the financial crisis it can be argued that for remuneration and bonus considerations banks 
also wanted to report as positive a result as possible. This dummy was symmetrically applied around September 
2008 for two periods before and two periods after. 
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Table 5.6 Reports the regression results for the total bank profits (NPt) models (8) to (11). 
 
Data sample represents 120 months of observations from January 2001 until December 2010. The regressand is NPt - 
the monthly net profit after tax of all the banks in South Africa combined. GDPt  is the monthly nominal GDP figure 
of South Africa. DUMMY1t is a dummy variable for the period January 2001 until June 2004. DUMMY2t is a dummy 
variable for the period July 2004 until September 2008.  DUMMY3t is a dummy variable for the period October 2008 
until December 2010. REPORTINGt represents a dummy variable indicating financial yearend months. M2M1t is the 
monthly mark-to-market/FVA entries through profit and loss from the banking book. Model (3) is model (1) with 
trimmed outliers. Model (4) is model (2) with trimmed outliers. Trimmed samples pulled in observations beyond the 
2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The percentage increase on the DUMMYt variables is the increase in the coefficient on the 
DUMMYt variables divided by the coefficient on the DUMMYt variables before M2M1t was added to model (1) or 
model (3). 
 
*,**,***, significant at the threshold of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (t-test). T-values are shown in parentheses.  
 
The results from model (8) indicates that the dummy variables introduced in equation (8) for 
the period of overshooting/undershooting and for the upward adjustment of financial yearend 
profits around the financial crisis, were successful in capturing some of the variation in the 
relationship between bank sector net profit and nominal GDP. Results that relate to the first 
of the two research questions posed in the introduction (about profits) are obtained when 
M2M1t is added to the equation. Model fit improves materially and the coefficient on M2M1t 
is highly significant with the interpretation that M2M1t especially helps to explain the 
volatility evident in the NPt series. 
 
The introduction of mark-to-market/fair value entries from the banking book helps to explain 
the level of bank profit earned during the period; note that the coefficient is less than one as 
not all of the before tax M2M1t series ends up in the after tax NPt series. The introduction of 
M2M1t also reduces the coefficient on GDPt slightly and changes the dummy coefficients by 
various amounts. The percentage changes to the dummy coefficients are presented at the 
Regressor
Model (8) - 
excluding M2M1t
Model (9) - 
including M2M1t
Model (10) - 
excluding M2M1t
Model (11) - 
including M2M1t
GDP t 21.6578*** (6.07) 19.9274*** (6.14) 20.6331*** (6.76) 18.9418*** (6.12)
DUMMY1 t -1391651*** (-3.78) -1270649*** (-3.53) -1244439*** (-3.59) -1104219*** (-3.22)
DUMMY2 t -1222375** (-2.21) -1005551** (-2.09) -1075174**(-2.30) -871963* (-1.88)
DUMMY3 t -2184408*** (-2.89) -1838761*** (-2.71) -1988642*** (-3.08) -1650989** (-2.55)
REPORTING t 1645599*** (4.62) 1514520*** (9.60) 1431475*** (9.81) 1311466*** (12.61)
M2M1 t NA 0.4413** (2.05) NA 0.4984*** (2.98)
N 120 120 120 120
R-sq 0.628 0.6867 0.6521 0.6948
adj. R-sq 0.6151 0.6729 0.6400 0.6815
% increase in DUMMY1 t 9% 11%
% increase in DUMMY2 t 18% 19%
% increase in DUMMY3 t 16% 17%
% decrease in REPORTING t 8% 8%
95% winsorised observationsNot winsorised observations
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bottom of Table 5.7 and can be interpreted as follows. Thus, the introduction of mark-to-
market/fair value entries from the banking book to the model leads to an increase in average 
profit levels across all periods and the increase during the overshooting period just before the 
financial crisis (DUMMY2t) is materially more than the increase during the preceding period. 
The impact on the undershooting period (DUMMY3t) is to make the extent of the 
undershooting less extreme8 and the impact on the financial yearend dummy variable 
(REPORTINGt) is to lessen the need to increase profits at yearend by other means. These 
results are consistent with the view that bankers use mark-to-market/fair value entries to 
increase average profit levels where possible and resist decreases in average profit levels 
where possible (this is similar to how Enron managers used mark-to-market (Gwilliam & 
Jackson, 2008:265)) Moreover, it is consistent with the view that bankers use mark-to-
market/fair value entries to facilitate hitting the “right” profit level at yearend. 
 
Winsorised samples were used in models (10) and (11) due to the presence of outliers in the 
data. The results were slightly stronger (better fit) and proved robust. The residuals from 
equation (11) were analysed for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The Breusch-
Godfrey serial correlation LM test returned probabilities (0.4145; 0.3921) that implied the 
residuals were not serially correlated. The White heteroskedasticity test returned probabilities 
(0.0003; 0.0011; 0.0000) that implied the residuals were heteroskedastic. White 
heteroskedastic-consistant standard errors and covariance were thus used for all models in 
Table 5.7 as suggested in econometrics texts (Brooks, 2008:152; Gujarati, 2003: 418). The 
residuals of model (11) are available in the appendix. 
 
A robustness check was done by using the alternative M2Mt time-series, M2M2t. As noted in 
section 4.3 above, the difference is that M2M2t, for the period January 2001 to December 
2007, contained the sum of mark-to-market entries from the trading book and mark-to-market 
entries from the banking book whereas during this period M2M1t only contained mark-to-
market entries from the banking book. Model fit declined from model (11)’s adjusted R-
squared of 0.6815 to 0.6483 and the coefficient on M2M2t was not significant (p-value of 
0.1924). An interpretation is that the mark-to-market entries from the trading book add little 
to the volatility of total bank profit as these mostly hedge volatility found elsewhere in the 
                                                 
8
 Less extreme undershooting might seem counterintuitive. Empirical evidence shows that banks overvalued 
their financial assets during the crisis (Laux & Leuz, 2009:32; Huizinga & Laeven, 2009). Also see the 
discussion section to follow. 
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bank. Mark-to-market/fair value entries from the banking book add volatility to net profit and 
are not hedged away. 
 
The findings indicate that mark-to-market/FVA entries from the banking book influence net 
profit of the South African banking sector materially. The resultant estimate of the transitory 
component of net profit after tax for the five largest South African banks for the years 2004 - 
2008 is 0.19/0.99=0.21. 
 
Figure 5.2 shows that the large South African banks have been paying out increasing portions 
of profit after tax as dividends over the period 1994 to 2010. All else being equal, one might 
expect that during the boom years (2004 - 2008) a lesser portion of profits would be paid out 
as some of those profits were shown to be transitory in the profit analysis (21%).  
 
 
Figure 5.2 The percentage of total bank profit available for distribution paid out as a dividend (combined totals for 
the sample of 5 banks). 
 
The period emphasised is the period covered by DUMMY2t in the profit regression that indicated that FVA entries 
from the banking book increased bank profit levels by 21%; all else being equal, a decreasing percentage of profit 
available for distribution paid out as a dividend would have been more appropriate. 
 
6.3 General discussion 
The dividend analysis showed that South African banks ignore transitory FVA gains when 
determining dividends but those gains might be immaterial. The profit analysis showed that 
FVA gains from the banking book, especially for the period 2004 to 2008 with an estimated 
                                                 
9
 The five largest South African banks represent about 90% of the South African bank market by assets and are 
the main users of FVA amongst the South African banks. 
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increase of 21%, materially raised profit levels. If the South African banks ignored these 
transitory elements of earnings when determining dividends then, all else equal, the 
proportion of profit paid out in the period 2004 until 2008 would have decreased. Figure 5.2 
shows an increase.  
 
An issue in the profit analysis that warrants discussion, the finding that FVA led to less 
extreme undershooting, (the impact on DUMMY3t) is initially counterintuitive in the sense 
that FVA might be expected to amplify, more-or-less equally, both the upside and the 
downside of the cycle (procyclicality). Thus, these results warrant an explanation. First, the 
impact on the undershooting dummy is smaller than that on the overshooting dummy. 
Second, banks have “shock absorbers” available to them in the FVA rules to avoid these 
write-downs; they can argue that market prices are not correct and move to mark-to-model 
values and/or reclassify items held at ”fair value” to ”held at cost”: this process was 
facilitated from October 2008, when accounting standards were changed to allow for the 
reclassification of financial instruments from “carried at fair value” to “carried at cost”.  
Bischof, Brüggemann and Daske (2010) as well as Fiechter and Meyer (2011) found that 
banks made ample use of these opportunities. Third, realised FVA losses that would have 
materialised when banks sold FVA assets would not have been captured in the FVA income 
statement line. 
 
Final models for both the profit analysis and the dividend analysis fitted the data well as 
indicated by high R2 values and statistical significance. Results also proved robust during 
robustness tests. The reader is reminded of the link between the profit analysis and the 
dividend analysis. Thus, even though the profit analysis used total South African banking 
system data and not individual bank data, the link with bank specific dividend policy is that 
90% of the South African banking system consists of the five banks covered by the dividend 
analysis. The finding that profit levels are increased by FVA during the business cycle 
upswing is thus directly relevant for the five banks in the dividend analysis where it was 
found that those banks did not seem to take into consideration, when setting their dividends, 
that FVA gains might possibly just be transitory.   
 
Possible caveats include the fact that the banks in the study are all large universal banks. It is 
conceivable that the effects noted were due to the systemically important nature of these 
banks and that smaller banks might be less inclined to distribute unrealised profits. In 
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addition, most large South African firms have set up black empowerment schemes in which 
restricted shares were issued to previously disadvantaged individuals. The schemes usually 
involved payment over time for these shares, with payment made from the dividends earned. 
Thus the decision to pay a large dividend can be influenced by the need to ensure that black 
economic empowerment shareholders are adequately funded. 
 
These caveats do fade slightly when the following changes in the annual financial report of 
one of the banks in the study are considered. The change confirms the conclusion that South 
African banks ignore transitory FVA gains in profit when determining dividends. The 
following paragraph first appeared in the 2010 financial statements of the particular bank and 
should be seen in the context of the drive for sustainability following the financial crisis. 
“The total capital plan includes a dividend policy, which is set in order to ensure sustainable 
dividend cover based on sustainable normalised earnings. This also takes into account 
volatile earnings brought on by FVA …” (Firstrand Limited, 2012:134). Whereas  Goncharov 
and van Triest (2011:63) found that “… in all likelihood fair value adjustments lead to lower 
dividend pay-outs” the results in this paper indicate that in all likelihood fair value 
adjustments for banks lead to higher dividend pay-outs. 
 
The payment of dividends from unrealised FVA profits during the upswing would have 
weakened the actual capital position of the South African banks. Capital represented by liquid 
assets left the system as dividends to be replaced by risky capital gains on less liquid assets; 
effectively reducing the quality of capital. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Previous researchers have attempted to establish a link between FVA and the financial crisis 
by looking at the crisis period itself but found little indication of a link. This paper argues that 
the link is rather to be found by looking at the period before the crisis.  
 
What if transitory FVA gains increased profits during the boom and distributions were made 
from those transitory effects? That would imply a weaker financial system entering the crisis. 
A Russian study that investigated this question could test directly for the distributionary 
consequences of unrealised FVA gains because of a unique Russian disclosure requirement. 
This paper could not test directly whether unrealised FVA gains are relevant when setting 
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dividends because IFRS 7 does not require the disclosure of realised versus unrealised 
income statement items. As a result the conclusions of this study depend on three strands of 
evidence taken together.  
 
A panel data regression of the change in dividends of the five largest South African banks 
shows that unrealised FVA gains were probably ignored when these banks made dividend 
decisions. This was also confirmed at a meeting of the Banking Project Group and from the 
financial statements of the banks following the crisis. The materiality of transitory FVA gains 
in profit was shown with a co-integrated regression of the monthly net profit of the total 
South African banking system; FVA entries from the banking book increased profits 
materially. The proportion of profits paid out as dividends showed that the banks did not 
decrease their dividends in response. 
 
This example shows that when unrealised FVA gains are posted through profit and loss and 
end up in retained income, absent a specific regulatory requirement to track those risky gains, 
managers treat the new capital as risk free.  
 
8. Link to next chapter 
 
The next chapter of this study will develop a theoretical model through which to understand 
the role that banks, bank capital and as part of bank capital, FVA, play in the economy. The 
model provides an alternative perspective to the view that FVA only brings additional 
information into the accounting records. The argument that FVA is procyclical is shown 
within a formal model and nuanced with the argument that the role of FVA during a 
downturn is likely to be blunted by the flexibility allowed in FVA regulations. The chapter 
will start by reviewing the role of FVA in previous crises. Then it will suggest the use of a 
stock-flow consistent accounting model of the economy as the engine of the new model; this 
suggestion is made because of the inability of the standard economic models to capture the 
defining characteristics of the global financial crisis. Thereafter, the model will be developed 
and its implications considered. An empirical example will be given. The chapter will 
conclude with a consideration of the reasonableness and benefits of the new model. 
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10. Appendix 
 
10.1 Additional evidence of statistical work done: 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 1.870575 (4,53) 0.1293 
Cross-section Chi-square 10.564708 4 0.0319 
Period F 1.945666 (15,53) 0.0388 
Period Chi-square 35.094454 15 0.0024 
Cross-Section/Period F 1.834715 (19,53) 0.0427 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 40.435844 19 0.0029 
     
     Figure 5.3 Validity of fixed effects tests for model (2) of the dividend analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 The residuals of model (3) of the dividend analysis. 
 
Apart from the Investec (2004) outlier the residuals seems to be reasonably well behaved with no obvious patterns 
visible. 
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Figure 5.5 The residuals of model (6) of the dividend analysis. 
 
Apart from a few outliers the residuals seems to be reasonably well behaved with no obvious patterns visible. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 The residuals of model (11) of the profit analysis. 
 
Apart from a few outliers the residuals seems to be reasonably well behaved with no obvious patterns visible.
-.020
-.016
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
Ab
sa
 -
 
95
Ab
sa
 -
 
98
Ab
sa
 -
 
01
Ab
sa
 -
 
04
Ab
sa
 -
 
07
Ab
sa
 -
 
10
Fn
b 
-
 
97
Fn
b 
-
 
00
Fn
b 
-
 
03
Fn
b 
-
 
06
Fn
b 
-
 
09
In
ve
st
ec
 
-
 
96
In
ve
st
ec
 
-
 
99
In
ve
st
ec
 
-
 
02
In
ve
st
ec
 
-
 
05
In
ve
st
ec
 
-
 
08
Ne
db
an
k 
-
 
95
Ne
db
an
k 
-
 
98
Ne
db
an
k 
-
 
01
Ne
db
an
k 
-
 
04
Ne
db
an
k 
-
 
07
Ne
db
an
k 
-
 
10
St
an
da
rd
 
-
 
97
St
an
da
rd
 
-
 
00
St
an
da
rd
 
-
 
03
St
an
da
rd
 
-
 
06
St
an
da
rd
 
-
 
09
D(DDIV) Residuals
-2,000,000
-1,000,000
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
NPt Residuals
146 
 
CHAPTER SIX: FAIR VALUE ACCOUNTING, FRAGILE BANK BALANCE 
SHEETS AND CRISIS: A MODEL1 
 
1. Synopsis2 
 
The overall objective of the larger study is to investigate the role of FVA in the global 
financial crisis by gathering empirical evidence on the use of FVA by South African banks 
(with the focus on the time period before the crisis) and then to develop a theoretical 
perspective on the problem. Chapter two reviewed the global financial crisis and the role of 
FVA in the crisis. Chapter three, chapter four and chapter five combined are the South 
African case study. The findings showed how FVA was asymmetric in its application before 
and after the financial crisis and how FVA, bank asset expansion and pay-outs are possibly 
related. The main aim of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework to understand how 
FVA (used by large banks) could have played a role in the global financial crisis with due 
consideration of the South African evidence.  
 
This chapter does not focus on the research objective to investigate how banks practically 
applied FVA. Rather, the focus is on making theoretical sense of what was observed 
previously. The model demonstrates how FVA adjustments through profit and loss can set in 
motion feedback processes that lead to bank over indebtedness with a strong increase in debt 
financed assets. This focus on FVA adjustments through profit and loss (excluding FVA 
adjustments on AFS instruments) is an objective of the thesis. The example in the paper 
(appendix) shows how the fair valuation of a smaller portion of the asset book can lead to 
significant effects and fragility; thus contributing to the objective of the thesis to show that 
not all assets need be fair valued to be dangerous.  
 
The published paper follows. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Paper has been published in the journal Accounting, organizations and society (volume 39, issue 2 of 2014). 
2
 The three main chapters are papers that have been published and are included in the thesis verbatim and are 
thus standalone papers. The Guidelines for the inclusion of publications in a doctoral thesis of the University of 
Cape Town require that each paper is prefaced by a synopsis of how the paper contributes to the thesis aims and 
objectives.  
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2. Abstract 
 
A topic of recent interest in accounting research has been the investigation of the role of fair 
value accounting (FVA) in the global financial crisis. This research focused on finding a link 
during the crisis time-period and often states that “accounting is only a messenger”. The 
model presented in this paper emphasises finding the link before the crisis and “accounting as 
money.” Use is made of an accounting model of the economy due to the inability of standard 
models of monetary transmission to incorporate global financial crisis characteristics such as 
feedback effects, systemic risk and the centrality of the financial sector in the crisis. The 
model shows FVA in banks to be an accelerator that amplifies the financial cycle upswing. 
Feedback effects noted in the model include changes in the demand for financial instruments 
and changes in demand in the real economy. Minsky-like, crisis is shown to be endogenous to 
the model, working through the fragility of balance sheets in the real sector as well as in the 
financial sector. Bank balance sheet fragility is caused by bad capital driving out good 
capital, banks reaching for yield and the inversion of the yield curve. The model shows that 
the practice of not meeting rising credit demand with increasing credit supply is an essential 
control mechanism in the financial cycle.  
 
3. Introduction 
 
In 2012, more than four years after the Lehman Brothers failure, the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis was still felt, and stable, self-sustaining growth continued to elude the world 
economy (Bank for International Settlements, 2012: ix). Ryan (2008:1606) identified the 
global financial crisis as the “signal researchable-teachable moment of my two-decade-plus 
career as an accounting academic”. Numerous authors have started to investigate the link 
between accounting (usually FVA) and the crisis (Badertscher, Burks & Easton, 2012; Ball, 
2008;  Barth & Landsman, 2010;  Laux & Leuz, 2009; Laux & Leuz, 2010; Magnan,  2009;  
Plantin, Sapra & Shin, 2008; Pozen, 2009; Shaffer, 2010; United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2008; Veron, 2008; Wallace, 2009). These studies tend to focus on 
establishing the link between FVA and the crisis during the time-period of the crisis.3 It is the 
argument of this paper that the focus should rather be on the time-period before the crisis (the 
upswing); this corresponds with one of Pinnuck’s (2012:5) conclusions in his review of the 
                                                 
3
 Readers are referred to section 3.4 in the literature review where the few arguments for FVA’s role during the 
upswing are discussed.  
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role of financial reporting in the crisis that “the existing debate has focused on the role of 
FVA during the crisis, but has ignored the possibility that the illusory FV gains on subprime 
securities before the crisis may have masked some of the underlying problems”. In addition, 
some of the studies (Ball, 2008; Wallace, 2009) argued that accounting was only a messenger 
and thus should not be linked to the crisis. A number of the remaining studies (Laux & Leuz, 
2009:826; Magnan, 2009:191; Pozen, 2009:86; United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2009:2) mention this pervasive argument; this paper argues against this view. 
 
The primary objective of this paper is to provide a reasonable alternative perspective on the 
relationship between FVA and the global financial crisis; a perspective that focuses on 
finding the link before the crisis (during the upswing) and one that reminds accountants that 
in banking, accounting is more than just a messenger: when bank deposits are created by 
accounting entries, accounting is money. To this end, a model will be developed in this paper 
that demonstrates the link between accounting and bank capital regulations and helps to aid 
understanding of the global financial crisis. The paper answers the call by Arnold (2009:806) 
to “stimulate a revival of accounting scholarship aimed at understanding the relationship 
between accounting practice and the macro political and economic environment in which it 
operates”.  
 
The nexus of the model to be developed will be the impact of FVA on the regulatory capital 
of banks. Not all FVA entries impact banks’ regulatory capital. The general principle in Basel 
II is that Tier 1 capital should be equity capital made up from permanent shareholders’ equity 
and disclosed reserves that, importantly, must have been posted through profit and loss (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2006:245). Thus, only FVA entries related to trading 
instruments or instruments designated at fair value are relevant for the model when values 
increase. FVA increases in the value of available-for-sale instruments are not covered 
because those increases would be excluded from regulatory capital. When values decrease, 
other-than-temporary-impairments of available-for-sale instruments become relevant as these 
are posted through profit and loss. Shaffer (2010) investigated the role of FVA in the global 
financial crisis by looking only at FVA for available-for-sale instruments. He argued for the 
exclusion of FVA entries emanating from the trading book because “There are few who 
would argue that fair value is inappropriate for measuring investments held for trading 
purposes where deep and active markets exist” (Shaffer, 2010:10). However, if most 
instruments held for trading purposes were traded on deep and active markets, then they 
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would have been shown at level 1 (mark-to-market) on the fair value hierarchy. The United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission (2008:62) found that in the case of banks, most 
derivatives and trading assets were at level 2 and not at level 1; this was especially true for 
investment banks where almost all derivatives and trading assets were at level 2 and not level 
1. The conclusion is thus that trading assets and derivatives were not traded on deep and 
active markets and that the exclusion of FVA adjustments on those instruments was not 
justified. In addition to the exclusion of FVA entries emanating from the trading book, 
Shaffer (2010:10) also argued for the exclusion of FVA entries emanating from “designated 
at fair value” instruments as this designation was “an explicit decision by management to 
value these assets this way and thus they are not included in the analysis”. The implicit 
assumption that management will not abuse the fair value option is questionable. An example 
of the impact of the preceding arguments will help to illustrate this. Assume, therefore, that 
Bank X buys piecemeal $1 billion of AAA rated subprime securities yielding 5% whilst 
“normal” AAA securities yield 3%4 with an assumed maturity of 10 years (monthly). The 
portfolio of securities is then designated at fair value and carried at level 2 of the fair value 
hierarchy. The financial result of the foregoing is an immediate gain of $98 million 
(payments on $1 billion at 5% interest for 10 years present valued at 3% less the cost of $1 
billion) posted to net profit. Badertscher, Burks and Easton (2012) and Barth and Landsman 
(2010) continued this exclusive focus on FVA for available-for-sale instruments as the only 
possible avenue through which FVA could have played a role in the global financial crisis. In 
contrast, for the reasons explained above, the model in this study is based on the assumption 
that FVA materially impacts profit and regulatory capital; this is one of the contributions that 
this study makes to the accounting literature. Evidence for the significance of FVA entries 
that affect profit and loss can be found in the study by the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (2008:4) which observed that “fair value measurements did 
significantly affect financial institutions’ reported income”. 
 
In addition, this study contributes to accounting literature in the following specific ways. 
Thus, several writers have argued that FVA is procyclical (Enria, Cappiello, Dierick, Grittini, 
Haralambous, Maddaloni, Molitor, Pires, & Poloni, 2004:45; Laux & Leuz, 2009:828); their 
views are repeated in this paper but this time within a formal framework and nuanced with 
                                                 
4
 Even though instruments derived from securitised subprime mortgages were often rated AAA (investment 
grade) by rating agencies prior to the crisis, those instruments continued to offer higher returns than “normal” 
AAA securities (Lo, 2012:152). 
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the argument that the role of FVA during a downturn is likely to be blunted by the flexibility 
allowed in FVA regulations. An implication of the foregoing is that the role of FVA in the 
global financial crisis should rather be sought before or after the crisis and not during the 
crisis. The model developed explains why McMahon (2011:54) is accurate when stating 
“Mark-to-market feedback loops are not exclusive to declining periods – feedback loops also 
occur during upswings, although not quite as fast” (this paper’s emphasis). The model shows 
that the seeds for the coming downturn are sown during the upswing with the purest role for 
FVA being the replacement in bank capital of liquid assets with unrealised (and thus risky) 
FVA gains; bad capital driving out good capital. The simple running example used to 
demonstrate the model that follows shows how a small change in the value of fair valued 
assets can lead to a much larger effect (a factor of 16 in the example but 30 is not uncommon) 
on a bank’s balance sheet; this contradicts the argument that the fair value measurement of 
financial instruments must be pervasive to be dangerous (Gebhardt, 2012:267&271; United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008:4).  
 
The model also makes a potential contribution to monetary economics. Hyman Minsky’s 
financial instability hypothesis benefited from the global financial crisis in the sense that 
many saw the crisis as confirming his predictions (see for example Krugman, 2009; Lahart, 
2007; Wolf, 2008).  Minsky’s “notion of the firm as a balance sheet of assets and liabilities, 
as opposed to the [traditional] notion of the firm as an entrepreneur making production 
decisions” (Toporowski, 2008:730) can be linked to the type of model developed in this 
paper; a balance sheet centred model. The argument that fragility develops in the balance 
sheets of the real economy is repeated in the model described in this paper, and is similar to 
the way the “basic Minsky cycle concerns the evolution of patterns of financing arrangements 
and it captures the phenomenon of emerging financial fragility in business and household 
balance sheets” (Palley, 2010:30). The model described in this paper is different in the way 
the focus is not on this fragility of individuals’ or businesses’ balance sheets but rather on 
how fragility develops in the balance sheets of banks. This aligns with the “complete reversal 
of the traditional monetary circuit, where the banking system is assumed to finance business 
sector activity” and “it is the dynamics of the banks/financial markets axis […] which has 
taken center stage” (Bellofiore & Passarella, 2010:10). 
 
A second area where a contribution to monetary economics is possible is in the presentation 
and exploration of the impact of FVA to an audience of economists. Godley and Lavoie 
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(2012: Preface xxxvii) write that by not understanding inflation accounting in the 1970s, 
economists underestimated “the extent to which stocks of financial assets would rise in 
nominal terms” resulting in “some bad projections”. Similarly FVA can result in a significant 
increase in the nominal values of financial assets during an upswing. The model developed in 
this paper also has important links with a recent paper by Claudio Borio, the Deputy Head of 
the Monetary and Economic Department and Director of Research and Statistics at the Bank 
for International Settlements (Borio, 2012). He calls for the study of the “financial cycle” as 
part of macroeconomics (Borio, 2012:1) and adds that a “financial boom should not just 
precede the bust but cause it” (Borio, 2012:8); this call ties in with this paper’s focus on the 
time-period before the crisis. He reminds us that “the financial system does not just allocate, 
but also generates, purchasing power” (Borio, 2012:2) which ties back to accounting as 
money. 
 
Bezemer (2010:676) referred to the need for an alternative perspective on the link between 
accounting and the global financial crisis; in doing so, he pointed out that “‘accounting’ (or 
flow-of-funds) models of the economy are the shared mindset of those analysts who worried 
about a credit-cum-debt crisis followed by recession, before the policy and academic 
establishment did. They are ‘accounting’ models in the sense that they represent households’, 
firms’ and governments’ balance sheets and their interrelations.” Accounting models are also 
used in two other streams of literature related to this paper. Macroeconomic accounting 
(national accounting) is argued to be both a measure of macroeconomic reality and a 
constituent of that reality (Suzuki, 2003). Similarly in this paper accounting both measures 
the extent of bank balance sheets and indirectly impacts those balance sheets with its effect 
on the money supply. Andersson, Lee, Theodosopoulos, Yin and Haslam (2014:79), within 
the literature on the financialization of the economy, argue that “this process of 
financialization can best be understood within an augmented accounting framework …” 
Other reasons why a stock-flow consistent accounting framework of the economy5 was 
chosen as a foundation for the model developed in this paper include the role of balance 
sheets in past crises and the need to incorporate global financial crisis characteristics such as 
feedback effects, systemic risk and the centrality of the financial sector in the model. This 
choice of model is in contrast to the more mainstream theories of the monetary transmission 
                                                 
5
 According to Bellofiore and Passarella (2010:7) these models are “dynamic, consider the effects of stock 
magnitudes on flow variables, and explicitly represent the role of the banking system”. The model developed in 
this paper can be described similarly. 
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mechanism. A difference between the typical stock-flow consistent accounting model and the 
model described in this paper is that the supply of credit is not assumed simply to be a 
response to the demand for credit; instead, this paper starts with the supply of credit and its 
influence on the demand for it. In this way it aims to be aligned better with what was 
observed during the global financial crisis; that is, an oversupply of credit before the crisis 
and an undersupply afterwards.  
 
The model developed in this paper describes and explains many of the characteristics of the 
global financial crisis as well as aspects of other past crises. It is shown how the change in 
banks’ capital ratios that result from FVA can set in motion a procyclical process with the 
initial aim being the restoration of the earlier capital ratio. A debt-financed expansion of bank 
balance sheets and/or the payment of remuneration and dividends results from increases in 
fair value. The shrinkage of bank balance sheets can result from a decrease in fair value but, 
arguably, can be blunted by management action and the flexibility in FVA. Feedback effects 
in the model maintain the momentum in the system once in motion. The feedback effects are 
the result of the additional (or decreased) demand for financial assets generated as well as the 
additional (or decreased) spending power made available to the real economy. In the instance 
where the additional spending power (or decrease in spending power, as the case may be) is 
made available solely to the banking sector the feedback effects are strongest. The model also 
highlights the role of four processes that can result in a crisis/regime change. The first of 
these is the increased fragility of real economy balance sheets during an expansion. The 
second and third relate to two sources of bank balance sheet fragility; bad capital driving out 
good capital and the reach for yield. Lastly, interbank transactions lead to a yield curve 
inversion effect, depriving banks of the easy profits available from maturity transformation; 
causing more reach for yield. The crisis attributes explained by the model include the booms 
in predatory lending and also the payment of dividends and remuneration during the upswing, 
understanding the growth in the financial sector relative to the real sector, illuminating the 
temporary impact of the reprieve obtained from FVA during the downturn and explaining the 
occurrence of the Great Moderation. In the final discussion the benefit of the perspective 
offered by the model in this paper will briefly be illustrated by using it to understand the 
results of another study by Cabral (2012) on banks and the global financial crisis. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 4 sets the scene by presenting FVA and briefly 
discussing the role of FVA in previous crises; section 5 positions the model developed within 
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the monetary economics literature; section 6 develops and discusses the model proposed; 
section 7 provides an empirical example where the model is used to interpret the information; 
section 8 discusses the implications, shortcomings and opportunities for further research 
resulting from the model and section 9 provides the conclusion. 
 
4. The historic role of FVA in crises 
  
The purpose of this section is to overview the impact of FVA during past crises. The 
information obtained will be useful to benchmark the reasonableness of the model that will be 
developed later in this paper. The crises included in this overview are the Great Depression, 
the savings and loans (S&L) crisis, the Enron crisis and the global financial crisis. But, first it 
is necessary to define FVA, to differentiate it from mark-to-market accounting and to 
consider carefully how FVA impacts bank regulatory capital.  
 
FVA is more complex than mark-to-market accounting. Fair value is the exchange value in 
an idealised market and can be determined in three ways, in order of preference6 (the 
definitions that follow are based on the annual financial statements of Investec Bank Limited 
(Investec Bank Limited, 2012:148):  
 
• Mark-to-market accounting (level 1):  Quoted (unadjusted) prices in active markets 
for identical instruments. 
• Mix of mark-to-market accounting and modelling (level 2): Model inputs other than 
quoted prices included within level 1 that are observable for the instruments, either 
directly (i.e. as prices) or indirectly (i.e. derived from prices). This paper interprets 
this to mean the modelling of inputs that are publically observable.  
• Mark-to-model (level 3):  Significant model inputs are not based on observable 
market data. 
 
FVA is thus more complicated than mark-to-market accounting, but the two are closely 
related. For brevity this paper will treat the two as equivalent. 
 
                                                 
6
 A formal order of preference only entered accounting standards under the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) in October 2008 with an amendment to International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39 which 
adopted the American tiered system of fair value determination. 
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4.1 The Great Depression 
According to Scott (2009:3) the frequent upwards revaluation of capital assets was one of the 
practices of the 1920s to receive criticism after the crisis. This advanced the case for 
historical cost accounting. Zeff (2007) concurs and writes that the United States of America 
was a bastion of predominantly historical cost accounting for inventories and fixed assets 
from 1934 to the 1970s. Pressure from the Securities and Exchange Commission was a 
driving force behind this insistence on historical cost accounting.  
 
The use of mark-to-market accounting in banks during the Great Depression can be found in 
the work of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1971: Chpt. 7, 100-102). They describe 
and provide evidence of how the fall in the market value of bond portfolios was the most 
important source of bank capital impairment during the Great Depression. They also point out 
that, paradoxically, the most liquid assets were the most serious threat to bank solvency due 
to the mark-to-market regime for liquid assets rather than bonds for “which there was no 
good market and few quotations” carried at cost. The United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (2008:34) wrote that mark-to-market accounting for banks was changed in 1938 
for reasons that included the impact of mark-to-market accounting on bank behaviour: 
“Further, prior to 1938, banking organizations were required for supervisory purposes to use 
market value accounting for their investment securities portfolios. Serious concerns on the 
part of the U.S. Treasury and the bank regulators over how this affected the banks’ financial 
performance and investment decisions led the agencies to abandon in that year the use of this 
accounting concept for supervisory purposes”. 
 
Financial economist Irving Fisher (1933) wrote that over-indebtedness and deflation were the 
two dominant factors in all the great booms and depressions. He then proceeded to describe a 
chain of consequences in a depression with numerous feedback mechanisms driving 
distressed selling of assets. 
   
The findings from the Great Depression indicate a role for mark-to-market accounting in 
banks before and during the crisis. The upward valuation of selected financial instruments 
during the upswing could have made banks appear healthier, contributing to the over 
indebtedness of banks and individuals. Moreover, the mark-to-market accounting of liquid 
bond portfolios was clearly shown by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1971) to have a 
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negative effect on bank lending during the downturn. Both of these effects involve feedback 
processes.   
 
4.2 The savings and loans crisis 
The savings and loans (S&L)  crisis of the 1980s and 1990s was caused by the failure of a 
significant proportion of the savings and loan associations in the United States of America. A 
savings and loan association or "thrift" is a financial institution that accepts deposits and 
makes mortgage, car and other personal loans to individual members. 
 
According to Black (2005:xiii) “a wave of control fraud ravaged the S&L industry”. In a later 
publication he writes: “Control fraud occurs when the executives at a seemingly legitimate 
firm use their control to loot the firm and its shareholders and creditors” (Black, 2011). 
Accounting is strongly linked by Black to control fraud: “Control frauds, using accounting 
fraud as their primary weapon and shield, typically report sensational profits, followed by 
catastrophic failure. These fictitious profits provide the means for sophisticated, fraudulent 
CEOs to use common corporate mechanisms such as stock bonuses to convert firm assets to 
their personal benefit” (Black, 2005:xiv). Akerlof and Romer (1993:2) ascribe what happened 
to looting; “to go broke for profit at society’s expense”. They continue: “Bankruptcy for 
profit will occur if poor accounting, lax regulation, or low penalties for abuse give owners an 
incentive to pay themselves more than their firms are worth and then default…” It is clear 
that accounting is important in both instances to justify high corporate pay-outs. 
 
The accounting profession focused attention on another aspect of the crisis. Most thrifts 
extended loans on a fixed cost basis and obtained capital on a variable cost basis. When 
interest rates rose in the 1980s, the industry found itself in a difficult position: assets were 
generating less return than the cost of financing them. Accountants argued that historical cost 
accounting was hiding the bankruptcy of the thrifts and that the fair valuation of the thrifts’ 
assets would have revealed these problems (Young, 1995:72-75). 
  
The findings from the S&L crisis indicate a role for accounting in thrifts before and during 
the crisis. Fictitious profits can be used to make an institution seem healthier and to justify 
unreasonable pay-outs. During the downturn FVA could have contributed towards revealing 
the bankruptcy of the thrifts. 
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4.3 The Enron crisis 
The Enron crisis was not nearly as systemic or important as the other crises. Nevertheless, it 
does deserve a mention in relation to the role of FVA in that crisis. Benston (2006:465) finds 
that FVA was “substantially responsible” for the demise of Enron. FVA in Enron was used 
“opportunistically to inflate reported net income” and rationalise excessive remuneration 
(Benston, 2006:466). FVA rarely reduced income as “contrary to the way fair-value 
accounting should be used, reductions in value rarely were recognized and recorded because 
they either were ignored or were assumed to be temporary.” (Benston, 2006:466). FVA is 
also mentioned in another American scandal during the same time period. Einhorn 
(2010:398) writes “…as the crisis unfolded (it became apparent) that Allied’s abuse of fair-
value accounting was more prevalent in corporate America than I had realized” in his telling 
of the Allied scandal that he was involved in during the 2000s. 
 
4.4 The global financial crisis 
The global financial crisis was triggered by a sharp fall in house prices in the United States of 
America (Posner, 2009:vii). It grew from the subprime crisis, into the credit crisis, then into a 
financial crisis and finally into a global financial crisis. There are opinions that accounting, 
especially FVA, played a key role in causing or at least in worsening the crisis. At the 
extreme end of this viewpoint is the opinion held by Steve Forbes, chairman of Forbes 
Media, that mark-to-market accounting was the “principal reason” that the financial system 
melted down in 2008 (Pozen, 2009:85). It was mentioned in the introduction that most 
accounting research focused on the role of FVA during the crisis and found limited evidence 
of a significant role at that time. This is to be expected as FVA contains at least two built-in 
mechanisms by which banks can avoid recognising losses; see section 5.2 for a detailed 
description.  
 
Theoretical models by Allen and Carletti (2008) and by Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2008) 
examined the impact of mark-to-market accounting on capital markets and show that mark-
to-market accounting worsens a downturn. Their studies have a shortcoming when attempting 
to explain the global financial crisis; mark-to-market accounting is not the same as FVA and 
thus managers can use the flexibility inherent in fair value accounting to not accept market 
values that they believe are incorrect. This is argued by Laux and Leuz (2009:827) who also 
acknowledge that FVA can be procyclical both during the boom and the bust and that 
behavioural issues can make implementation of FVA difficult. They argue that the increase in 
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profit and capital from asset value increases under FVA is also available as “gains trading” 
under historical cost accounting and thus that the two types of accounting are similar during 
the upswing, but this argument is not exactly correct. FVA is a much faster process than gains 
trading that is inherently lumpy. Bonuses and dividends paid from gains trading are paid from 
increased cash resources whilst bonuses and dividends from FVA gains only decrease cash 
resources. The implication is that FVA is more able than gains trading to be at the centre of a 
feedback process and that FVA during a boom can leave the banking system with reduced 
cash resources. 
 
A role for FVA during the upswing is less clear from accounting research but evidence from 
before the crisis is starting to appear. Livne, Markarian and Milne (2011) find that FVA gains 
are remuneration relevant. In the popular press it seems to be common knowledge that FVA 
allowed the payment of remuneration and dividends from imaginary7 profits during the boom 
(Haldane,  2011;  Kay,  2009;  Kay,  2012;  Mundy,  2012;  Taylor,  2009;  Wood,  2010). 
The effect of such payments would be to weaken the banking system as risk-free capital in 
the form of liquid assets left the banks to be replaced by risky capital (potentially temporary 
value increases). McMahon (2011) proposes that FVA plays an integral role in feedback 
loops behind excessive lending (and remuneration) during the boom and a lack of lending 
during the bust. Magnan (2009:207) argues that a feedback loop exists between FVA and 
market prices working through the information channel. Khan (2010:5) does not find support 
that the information channel is behind “the increased bank contagion during crises associated 
with a more fair value-oriented reporting regime”. The focus of this paper is on the money 
channel.  
 
4.5 Conclusion from review of crises 
One factor common to all of the four crises reviewed was the role of firm (including banks) 
balance sheets. The crises have indicated a role for FVA both before and after each crisis. 
Before a crisis, FVA can lead to firms or banks appearing healthier than they are (Enron is a 
prime example) and can thus facilitate further asset expansion financed by debt (a feedback 
process). Based on what happened during the S&L crisis it could be expected that FVA 
would reveal problems faster than historical cost accounting. But this revelation by FVA 
during the downturn can lead to a downward spiral with forced sales of assets and shrinking 
                                                 
7
 Terms used include “imaginary profits”, “spurious profits” and “unreliable gains”.  
158 
 
balance sheets (another feedback process); alternatively this might not happen at all, as 
argued in sections 3.4 and 5.2. 
 
5. Monetary transmission mechanism 
 
The model to be developed inter alia describes the interaction between the real and the 
financial economy. This section starts by describing the mainstream explanations for how 
money affects the real economy. Thereafter, arguments are presented for a natural 
progression to Post-Keynesian stock-flow consistent accounting models of the economy. 
Similarities and differences between the model developed in this paper and the standard 
stock-flow consistent accounting framework will round off this section. 
 
According to Mankiw (2007:83) the quantity theory of money provides the leading 
explanation of how money affects the economy in the long run. According to this theory the 
money supply has a direct, proportional relationship to the price level. In the long run 
“monetary neutrality is approximately correct” (Mankiw, 2007:109). The main difficulty with 
this approach is that central banks cannot and do not attempt directly to control the rate of 
growth of the money supply (Howelss & Bain, 2008:273). A more realistic approach should 
start with short-term interest rates as a policy instrument. Howless and Bain (2008:273) refer 
to the interest rate control approach as an example of endogenous money and explain that 
money supply, via bank actions, adjusts to credit demand. The latter approach is more 
realistic and, importantly, places commercial banks in the middle of the money supply 
process, but the neutrality of money assumption is maintained. 
 
The neutrality of money argument is difficult to sustain in the short run (Mankiw,  2007:536) 
and arguably even in the long run when one considers that both the Great Depression and the 
global financial crisis started in the financial sector and thereafter engulfed the real economy 
for several years. In addition, accounting-orientated academic papers were published, after 
the global financial crisis, which encouraged researchers to find links between accounting 
and macroeconomic outcomes (Arnold, 2009; Bezemer, 2010). The paper by Bezemer, 
amongst other things, introduced accounting (or stock-flow consistent) macroeconomic 
models.  
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Authors such as Keen (2011), and Godley and Lavoie (2012) present explicit accounting 
models of the economy where accounting identities (not the equilibrium concept) are the 
determinants of model outcomes in response to shocks in the environment or in policy 
(Bezemer,  2010:679). In addition to this obvious link to accounting, there are other reasons 
why this type of model forms a firm foundation for the development of a model of bank 
behaviour, described in this paper, that links FVA, bank capital regulation, management 
behaviour and real economic outcomes. These models are not static or based on equilibrium 
and can thus accommodate certain defining characteristics of the global financial crisis, 
feedback effects (Bank for International Settlements,  2012;  McMahon,  2011;  Soros,  2012) 
and the related concept of too-big-to-fail banks (Haldane,  2011). The models are also not 
built up from individual behaviour and summated to systemic behaviour (microfoundations); 
they can therefore incorporate, easily, emergent properties such as systemic risk. Finally, the 
models emphasise banks (and the provision of credit) (Godley & Lavoie, 2012:17; Keen, 
2011) which is the sector most impacted by FVA. 
 
Another author who emphasised the role of banks in the economy and who rapidly gained 
prominence after the global financial crisis was Hyman Minsky (Bellofiore & Passarella, 
2010; Keen, 2011). Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis is based on the idea that in 
times of financial stability the actors in the system and the system itself move towards 
financial fragility. His focus on balance sheets and the idea that the key to the downturn is to 
be found during the preceding upswing will be incorporated into the suggested model. A 
typical schematic overview of a stock-flow consistent model is shown in Figure 6.1 below: 
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Figure 6.1 Typical stock-flow consistent model of the economy. Source: Bezemer (2010:683). 
 
The model to be presented in this paper is much simpler and its advantage is that the concepts 
under investigation are emphasised. An arguably negative impact is that the model is a partial 
one in the sense that it does not describe everything about a modern economy.  However, this 
partial perspective does meet the Friedman significance level of “explain much by little” 
(Friedman, 1953:14). In the model the real economy including consumers, producers and 
government, is collapsed into one and the financial sector consists of a combination of two 
banks (see Figure 6.2). 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Schematic representation of the model developed in this paper (this is the final completed model; the 
schematic representations depicting the development of the model are included in the Appendix and numbered 
Figures A – E). 
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The model developed and described below is Post-Keynesian in the sense that the principle of 
effective demand is assumed to hold in the real markets; that is, markets do not automatically 
clear. An important difference from the typical flow-of-funds model is that credit supply is 
not assumed just to be a response to credit demand (endogenous money supply) (Godley & 
Lavoie, 2012:127-128). On the contrary, bank behaviour is assumed to influence credit 
supply. This assumption is consistent with what was found during and after the global 
financial crisis; an oversupply of credit before the crisis and an undersupply after the crisis 
(Bank of England, 2009:43;  Bank for International Settlements, 2012:ix & 1; International 
Monetary Fund, 2012:xi & 12; The Independent Commission on Banking, 2011:8 & 16). 
This primacy of credit supply is also supported by a letter from Dr John Whiteman in the 
Financial Times (Whiteman, 2012) where he states that “…borrowing is not driven by the 
price of credit (as common sense might assume), but rather by the sheer availability of credit 
in the first place”. The argument is perhaps best made with a quote from the CEO of a micro-
lender (African Bank Limited) in South Africa: “A credit cycle is always going to be driven 
from a supply dynamic, not a demand dynamic and markets overheat because suppliers push 
too much credit into the system” (Rees, 2013). 
 
6. Model Development 
 
6.1 Basic model 
The initial model is based on the work of Masaki Kusano (Kusano, 2011). The familiar 
accounting equation of Assets (A) – Liabilities (L) = Equity (E) is the starting point in the 
development of his model that links accounting capital with bank capital regulation and bank 
asset expansion. This section will then add the payment of remuneration and dividends from 
FVA gains to his model as well as consider the results of the model when FVA generates 
losses. 
 
Bank management are incentivised to minimise the capital ratio (#$ = &  ) as this will 
maximise return on equity, arguably the most popular bank performance metric as it is a 
measure of the rate of return flowing to shareholders (Rose & Hudgins, 2008:167). Of course, 
bank regulators do not allow banks to leverage to infinity and they demand that banks keep a 
minimum capital buffer to protect depositors in the case of default. The calculation of '('   
shows that the capital ratio defined above is directly related to the value of assets: 
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'(
' = &) > 0.           (1) 
 
The implication is that an increase in asset values will increase the capital ratio (which is bad 
for return on equity); management will want somehow to manage or neutralise this increase 
in the capital ratio. The capital ratios8 of the five largest South African universal banks for the 
period before the global financial crisis illustrate this point (based on data provided by the 
South African Reserve Bank). The period was one of high bank profits (by fair value 
accounting and other means) and yet capital ratios stayed steady or declined; high profits, 
ceteris paribus, should have increased the capital ratio.  
                                                 
8
 This is the capital ratio as defined immediately above (#$ = &  ) and not the Basel “risk-weighted” capital 
ratio. In effect this method risk-weights all assets at 100%. 
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Figure 6.3 Monthly capital ratio per bank January 2000 – August 2010 (shaded areas indicate post crisis time 
period). 
 
The Basel capital accords define their own version of the capital ratio, where accounting 
capital is expressed as a ratio of risk-weighted assets: 
 
# = &∑ +	+,             (2) 
 
where - =  ∑ . or the total asset value of the bank is the sum of the individual assets, L is 
the total value of the liabilities of the bank and / is the risk-weight applicable to each asset . 
according to the Basel Accords.  
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Suppose that the market value of all assets9 increases by a constant λ, where λ = λ(t) and λ > 
0.10 The total asset value A is now equal to (1 + λ)A. If assets are measured at fair value then 
during an upswing the capital ratio can be written as: 
 
# = ( 0)&( 1) ∑ +	+,            (3) 
 
where µ is the increase in the total of risk-weighted assets. As the risk-weights under the 
Basel Accords11  in general meets 0 ≤ / ≤ 1 the following can be assumed: 0 < μ ≤ λ.12  
 
Assuming that management is planning to neutralise the increase in the capital ratio by 
investing in additional assets denoted by B and fully financed by debt13 the following 
equation is obtained: 
 
# = ( 0)5(&  5)( 1) ∑ +	+ 65  = &∑ +	+ = #,        (4) 
 
where / is the risk-weight of the originated/purchased, debt-financed assets. It should be 
noted that although the B added to the asset base and the B added to liabilities are of the same 
value, the Bs are not different sides of the same financial instrument.14 The increase in 
deposits increases the money supply or the spending power available in the economy. Solving 
for B: 
                                                 
9
 All the assets of a bank are not normally fair valued but the complexity of modelling different types of assets is 
not necessary. Refer to the example in the appendix where a bank is assumed to have $30 of fair valued assets 
(through profit and loss) and $70 of historical cost assets. If the market value of the fair valued assets increases 
by 10% and the tax rate is 30% then the value of λ is (30*(10%*(1-30%)))/(30+70) = 2.1%. 
10
 It may seem as if the possibility that liabilities can also experience an increase in market value when assets 
increase in market value is ignored. Given that banks mostly own interest-rate sensitive assets of longer maturity 
than their interest-rate sensitive liabilities, it is to be expected that ∆- ≥ ∆9 when interest rates decrease. This 
state of affairs can be just as effectively modelled with ∆- and L kept constant. 
11
 Under Basel I the risk-weightings for most categories of assets were below 100%. Basel II and III moved 
away from rougher asset categories to risk-weightings for individual assets or portfolios of assets, based on 
individual bank history, that reflect the “expected unexpected” loss (not routine, high frequency events) 
(Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas, 2011:295)  on that asset or portfolio. The planned-for unexpected losses on bank 
assets should be less than 100% as banks are profit seeking organisations. 
12
 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that over time (not currently in the model) there is the tendency for µ to 
increase asymptotically to λ. This aspect is not explored further in the model. 
13
 The goal of the exercise is to bring the capital ratio down again after the increase in equity caused by the 
increase in asset values and thus an increase in debt is required. 
14
 It is often argued that the financial sector can be ignored in models as any loan is owned by somebody else 
and thus the debit and credit can be collapsed without mishap. This argument ignores the fact that bank deposits 
are money and bank loans are not. 
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: = (0  1) 1&6; .                     (5) 
 
Figure A in the Appendix provides a schematic representation followed by a narrative 
description of the model up to this point. Management neutralised the increase in the capital 
ratio by investing in additional financial assets fully financed by debt; this increases the 
demand for financial assets in the financial sector. Bank deposits created are money in the 
banking system and so this increases demand in the real economy. If time were already part 
of the model then a few comments regarding feedback processes would be possible at this 
stage. However, time will only be included in the model at a later stage of its development.  
 
The increase in the market value of financial assets contributes to = (an increase in the market 
value of all bank assets) and thus provides an impulse for the asset expansion cycle to start 
again. The additional demand for financial assets, ceteris paribus, increases the market value 
of financial assets and thus reduces the return on those assets. To keep returns constant, bank 
management is incentivised to take on more risk; for example, to invest in riskier assets or 
originate riskier loans. The other side to additional demand for financial assets is the 
provision of additional spending power (credit) to the real economy. Over the longer term, 
the extension of credit to the real economy can only be sustained if the additional capital is 
invested in productivity enhancing real assets. With increased productivity the real economy 
might be in a position to pay back the capital and interest. If not, the only way for the real 
economy to keep a constant level of demand is to receive more and more credit from the 
financial sector. In a world of decreasing marginal returns it is safe to conclude that over the 
longer term, the increased demand in the real economy due to advancement of more credit is 
likely to be followed by a period of decreased demand when loans are being repaid; in other 
words, less spending in the real economy.   
 
This simple model only allows for banks to expand their asset base and debt in reaction to an 
increase in the market values of all assets within the boundary of the original capital ratio. 
The model will now be extended to include the possibility of remuneration and dividend 
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payments from the increase in asset values.15 The new capital ratio that results after an 
increase in the market values of all assets is: 
  
#> = (Ω0)&( Ω1) ∑ +	+,            (6) 
 
where Ω is the portion of the increase in asset values retained by the bank (after appropriation 
of the increase by management and shareholders via remuneration and/or dividends) (0 < Ω 
≤ 1).  
 
Again, if one assumes that management is planning to neutralise the increase in the capital 
ratio by investing in additional assets denoted by B and fully financed by debt, then the 
following equation is obtained: 
 
#> = ( Ω0)5(&  5)(Ω1) ∑ +	+ 65  = &∑ +	+ = #.                   (7) 
 
Solving for B: 
 
 := Ω(0  1)  Ω1&6; .          (8) 
 
If all of the increase is retained (Ω = 1) the result simplifies to the previous solution :. 
 
Comparing the solution of :with that of : it is apparent that : must always smaller than 
: because the two terms in the numerator are both a portion of the numerator terms in : 
and the denominator in both instances is the same. The implication is that the need to increase 
assets and debt to restore the previous capital ratio, after an increase in the market values of 
all assets, is reduced when a portion of the value increase is paid out. 
A similar logic applies when calculating '5'Ω: 
 
'5
'Ω = (0 1) 1&6;  > 0.          (9) 
                                                 
15
 Both management and shareholders have a strong incentive to reward themselves during the business cycle 
upswing despite the possibility of future losses during the downturn as elucidated by Taylor (2009) and Haldane 
(2011). 
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As the retention ratio (Ω) increases, the need to expand the asset base and debt also increases. 
The more of the increase in asset values is paid out (smaller Ω) the less the need for an 
expansion in assets and debt. 
 
Figure B in the Appendix provides a schematic representation followed by a narrative 
description of the model up to this point. Thus, the inclusion in the model of the payment of 
remuneration and dividends (1 - Ω) (for positive =) significantly changes the effects 
previously noted. The need to increase assets and debt to restore the previous capital ratio is 
reduced when a portion of the value increase is paid out. It is implied that the additional 
demand for financial assets will be less with a smaller price effect and the increased spending 
power transferred to the real economy will be less. The money paid to the real economy as 
remuneration and dividends, ceteris paribus, does increase demand in the real economy. This 
increase in demand will be less, however, than the increase in demand that would have 
resulted if the remuneration and dividends were not paid out, with the capital ratio being 
restored solely by the debt-financed expansion of the bank balance sheet. This is due to the 
leverage that is applied to the capital on the bank’s balance sheet. Of course, not all of the 
remuneration and dividends paid to the real economy will be consumed; a portion of these 
will return to the financial sector in the form of additional demand for financial assets, which 
will increase their market values and decrease their returns. If time were already part of the 
model (note previous comment that time will only be formally included in the model at a later 
stage) then a new comment regarding feedback processes would be possible at this stage.  
 
The investment demand for financial assets increases their market values and contributes to 
an increase in the average market value of all assets. This provides an impulse for the assets 
expansion cycle to start again. Here, one should also note the replacement effect that took 
place in capital; liquid assets were paid out as remuneration and dividends and were replaced 
by unrealised and riskier capital gains on financial instruments. This is bad capital driving out 
good capital; this is explained in more detail in section 5.3 below. 
 
The described model does not allow for a general reduction in asset values (0 < μ ≤ λ was 
assumed). However, such a general reduction in asset values would almost certainly be 
experienced during a recession. If the above assumption is relaxed and negative growth is 
allowed with the only proviso that μ should always represent a portion of λ, then banks will 
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reduce their asset base and pay off debt in response to a general negative value adjustment. 
The solution for B remains: 
 
B = (0  1) 1&6; .                   (10) 
 
Figure C in the Appendix provides a schematic representation followed by a narrative 
description of the model up to this point. In the case of a general reduction in asset values, Ω 
is not added to the model as management and shareholders will not pay in any money.  
 
In summary, the solution for B: 
 
B = 
@A
B
AC
Ω(0  1)  Ω1&
6; , DE = >  0.                     0, DE = =  0.
(0  1) 1&
6; , DE = < 0.
I
 
 
6.2 Implications of the basic model 
The basic model described above shows how the interaction of FVA gains and bank capital 
regulation motivates banks to expand their asset base. In the context of that basic model this 
expansion was financed by debt. Such a feedback process can help to explain why credit 
advances in the United States grew at such a high rate (from $3 trillion total debt to $36 
trillion total debt in 2007 (NCCFEC, 2011:xvii)). The following Figure 6.4 provides data 
from the United Kingdom’s Independent Commission on Banking (2011) and illustrates how 
credit extension in the years preceding the global financial crisis exceeded GDP and typifies a 
debt-financed boom. 
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Figure 6.4 Total loans to different sectors of the economy as a percentage of GDP. Source: Vickers Report (2011:51). 
 
The basic model also illustrates how this incentive to expand the asset base is tempered by 
the payment of dividends and remuneration. These dividend and remuneration payments 
would not have been necessary if FVA did not increase accounting equity (the argument can 
be found in Kay, 2009; Taylor, 2009; Turner, 2010; Wood, 2010).  
 
The model shows that when allowance is made for a negative valuation shock to asset values 
then the asset base decrease required, to restore the capital ratio, must be greater than the 
asset base increase required for a positive valuation shock of the same size. It is here that a 
simple model that assumes all price changes are passed into bank equity by FVA is not 
descriptive of reality; at least, not over the short-term. Banks have “shock absorbers” 
available to them in the FVA rules to avoid these write-downs; they can argue that market 
prices are not correct and then move to mark-to-model values and/or reclassify items held at 
”fair value” to ”held at cost”:   in October 2008, accounting standards were changed to allow 
for the reclassification of financial instruments from “carried at fair value” to “carried at 
cost”. Bischof, Brüggemann and Daske (2010) as well as Fiechter and Meyer (2011) found 
that banks made ample use of these opportunities. In view of this, it is not surprising that 
empirical studies by Shaffer (2010) and by Badertscher, Burks and Easton (2012) found little 
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evidence of bank capital being depleted by FVA losses. The possibility of long-term FVA 
losses impacting bank capital cannot be ascertained from these writers’ evidence as they only 
considered data up to the year 2008. Over the longer term, it is unlikely that banks will be 
able to avoid recognising actual losses, permanently, because the instruments will mature and 
a fundamental loss in value will then realise. This postponement of FVA losses by banks 
possibly explains why banks have been unwilling to lend following the global financial crisis 
even though they have enough capital according to their official regulatory figures; bank 
management know that the capital on the books is not high quality (risky) and they act 
accordingly; thus, they act as if they have less capital than stated in the official numbers. 
Japanese banks in the 1990s had a similar problem where the banks officially had enough 
capital and despite the official numbers, were not writing down non-performing assets and 
neglected to advance the necessary credit to the economy.   
 
It can also be argued that the increase in bank capital that was called for under Basel III 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2011:2), in reaction to the global financial crisis, works 
to counter this benefit of the “shock absorbers” and that the net effect would be a need to 
shrink bank balance sheets. Reducing the size of bank balance sheets is a current global 
occurrence. 
 
The main shortcomings of the basic model can be summarised as follows:  firstly, it depends 
on external valuation shocks for regime change between bank balance sheet expansion and 
shrinkage;  secondly, feedback effects are implied but not expressly modelled and thirdly,  it 
does not explain the faster growth in loans to financial companies compared to loans to non-
financial companies; the latter is shown  in Figure 6.4 which indicates information provided 
by the Independent Commission on Banking. 
 
6.3 Further development of the basic model  
The increase in the general market value of bank assets (a positive λ) during the upswing that 
preceded the global financial crisis was the product of complex interconnected developments 
in the financial system. These developments included progressively lower interest rates 
globally that, all else equal, increased the value of especially fixed rate financial instruments. 
A portfolio of fixed rate loans designated at fair value through profit and loss would have 
increased in value and the increase would have increased regulatory capital. Financial 
instruments exposed to credit risk would also have increased in value during the upswing as 
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default data improved and confidence increased. Another possible source of value increase 
was the increase in financial instrument trading within the financial sector. This increase in 
trading within the financial sector resulted from a combination of financial innovation, 
deregulation and a search for yield in a low interest rate environment. Increased demand for 
financial instruments led to price rises.      
 
Given an initial increase in the general market value of bank assets, it is relatively simple to 
expand the basic model to incorporate feedback effects that will maintain bank balance sheet 
expansion once started; this is done by formally incorporating time into the model. The 
following intellectual device is useful for the discussion that follows; to see equations C as 
reflecting the capital ratio of the banking system as a whole in the one instance and as 
reflecting the capital ratio of an individual bank in the other instance. 
 
In the instance when equations C reflect the capital ratio of the banking system as a whole it 
is important to realise that the expansion of the bank sector balance sheet is only possible by 
advancing further credit to the real economy (external to banking system). The expansion of 
the balance sheet simultaneously increases the money supply with the concurrent increase in 
bank deposits. Real economic actors will spend a portion of this increased money supply on 
the purchase of financial assets, with the additional demand causing the values of those assets 
to increase.  At the same time the money paid out by the banking system as remuneration or 
dividends (1 - Ω) will not all be consumed and will, at least to some extent, be used to 
purchase financial assets, increasing their market values. 
 
In basic model mathematical terms this can be represented as follows: 
 
'0()
' = f(B(=), Ω(=), J),                  (11) 
 
where J represents exogenous factors that might impact on =. The implication is that an 
initial value shock can initiate a feedback loop; this can arise through the demand for 
financial instruments from the financial sector (B) or from the demand for financial 
instruments from the real sector (portion of : +  portion of Ω) driving continuous bank 
balance sheet expansion or shrinkage. Figure D in the Appendix provides a schematic 
representation followed by a narrative description of the model up to this point.  
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The question that arises is why input to the model will change from a positive = to a 
negative =. Events external to the model are obviously one answer, but the model up to this 
point holds three endogenous answers to this question; wealth effects, bad capital driving out 
good capital and reaching for yield. Note that the first of these answers, the “wealth effect” is 
related to the balance sheets of individuals becoming more fragile while the two latter 
answers are related to increasingly fragile bank balance sheets.  
 
Individuals in the real economy have more credit available to them during the upswing. This 
credit availability is driven by individuals becoming seemingly more credit worthy as the 
upswing advances; the market value of their security increases and default rates improve. In 
other words, as the asset side of individuals’ balance sheets increased (improved), the liability 
side of their balance sheets also increased as they took on more debt. In this manner the 
individuals’ leverage ratio might stay constant but, relative to their income, their balance 
sheets are more and more fragile as the upswing continues. 
 
The payment of remuneration and or dividends (1 - Ω) from FVA profits leads to a 
replacement effect where the most liquid asset (money) leaves the financial sector as payment 
and is replaced in bank capital by FVA-derived value increases in less liquid assets. This can 
be called a special case of Gresham’s law16 where "bad capital drives out good capital”. The 
result is a banking system much more sensitive to external disturbances (or J). 
 
The additional demand for risky assets during the balance sheet expansion process drives 
down the returns to be earned on those risky assets and thus incentivises bank managers to 
take more risk in the search for returns.17 The implication for bank balance sheets is, even just 
to show constant returns, to become riskier. The result is a banking system much more 
sensitive to external disturbances (or J). This reach for yield can explain the decline in 
underwriting standards in the U.S. (NCCFEC, 2011:4) as well as the observation that 
financial firms changed from staid to risk seeking during the boom (NCCFEC, 2011:xvii). 
Evidence of predatory lending highlighted by the Commission (NCCFEC, 2011:10) calls into 
                                                 
16
 Gresham’s law is commonly stated as: "Bad money drives out good", but is more accurately stated: "Bad 
money drives out good if their exchange rate is set by law" (Rolnick & Weber, 1986:185). 
17
 A more subtle possibility should also be noted; that this process of riskier asset accumulation is possible even 
without an actual decision to invest in higher risk assets. During the upswing default data as well as loan to 
value ratios (the market value of security tends to increase) improves and this provides the rationale for further 
credit extension. In such a process, risk increases as more credit is now backed by the same cash flows. 
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question the dissenting report’s conclusion that credit demand emanating from the U.S. 
Government’s housing policies was to blame for the overexpansion in U.S. housing. 
Predatory lending points to the role of credit supply in the process that ties back to the reach 
for yield argument from the model. 
 
A further argument for regime change is possible in the instance when equations C reflect the 
capital ratio of an individual bank rather than that of the total banking system. In addition, 
one of the shortcomings of the basic model highlighted earlier in this paper was that it did not 
explain the growth in loans between financial companies. By adding more features to the 
basic model and by seeing equations C as reflecting the capital ratio of an individual bank, 
endogenous regime change as well as the growth in loans between financial companies can 
be explained. 
 
If we recall from previous discussion that: 
 
# = ( 0)5(&  5)( 1) ∑ +	+ 65 ,                   (12) 
 
and that was used to determine the balance sheet expansion B required for a given positive 
value shock, it is now necessary to emphasise that a bank will only expand its asset base, 
financed by debt, if the following condition is met: 
 
(S	 - S	TU) > 0,                  (13) 
 
where R represents the return on the financial instrument. Bank debtors want to spend their 
newly raised debt and thus the asset side of the transaction will tend to be of longer maturity 
than the liability side of the transaction due to the required ability to spend. When the 
banking system experiences a positive value shock and banks are simultaneously expanding 
their asset bases, then two effects can be noted. First, the supply of credit can overwhelm the 
real economy’s demand for credit and lead to increased inter-bank lending that will lead to a 
stronger (compared to the additional demand emanating from the real economy described 
previously) positive feedback loop. This is because banks will invest all of the new bank 
deposits created in financial instruments, increasing =. Second, arbitrage will drive down 
(S	 - S	TU) until, at the limit and ignoring other factors, no more margin is available 
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and the positive feedback loop will come to an end. This helps to explain the “exponential 
growth” in trading activities observed by the NCCFEC (2011:xvii)) as well as the growth of 
the financial sector from 5% of gross domestic product to 8% (NCCFEC, 2011:64). Finally, 
the feedback process described in the model between the financial system and the real 
economy explains why, parallel to the rapid expansion of credit in the U.S. economy, the 
Commission observed overdone real economic activity (NCCFEC, 2011:5). 
 
The margin effect noted above should be related to the literature on the ability of an inverted 
yield curve to predict recessions (see for example Ang, Piazzesi & Wei, 2006; Wright, 2006). 
Banks, generally speaking, invest in financial instruments with longer maturity financed by 
financial instruments of shorter maturity and realise a return spread as elucidated above when 
the yield curve is normal and upward sloping. If this investment in longer maturity 
instruments financed by shorter maturity instruments became systemic, it will drive down the 
returns on longer maturity instruments: greater demand drives up prices leading to lower 
returns. At the same time it will drive up returns on shorter maturity instruments: greater 
supply drives down prices leading to higher returns. 
 
Table 6.1, below, summarises the feedback effects: 
 
Feedback process Description Relative strength 
Bank balance sheet 
expansion 
Additional demand for 
financial instruments 
impacting λ 
Medium (leverage amplifies 
effect but leakage to real 
economy) 
Real economy investment in 
financial instruments 
Additional spending power 
not all consumed 
Weak (no leverage effect) 
Intra bank lending and 
investment 
Balance sheet expansion 
creates additional demand for 
financial instruments 
impacting λ. Spending power 
created is within the banking 
system and not in the real 
economy 
Strong (additional spending 
power created within 
financial sector and subject 
to leverage) 
Table 6.1 Summary of feedback effects in the model. 
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These feedback effects, without inhibitors (designated “regime change processes” below), 
will lead to continuous expansion or continuous contraction. Table 6.2 below summarises the 
endogenous regime change processes identified in the model: 
 
Regime change process Description 
Balance sheet fragility – real economy Real economy has more assets with more 
debt but the same income 
Balance sheet fragility - banks Bad capital driving out good capital: Liquid 
assets in capital replaced by illiquid capital 
gains 
Balance sheet fragility - banks Reach for yield: Riskier assets originated to 
keep income constant; the other side of the 
fragile real economy balance sheet 
Yield curve inversion Arbitrage drives down yield on longer term 
financial instruments and drives up yield on 
shorter term instruments 
Table 6.2 Summary of endogenous regime change processes in the model. 
 
7. Empirical example 
 
It is not possible to directly observe the macro economy and thus the economic data that we 
do have are selected and made sense of by theory (Suzuki, 2003:484). Accordingly, no 
attempt will be made to demonstrate the model proposed in this paper in totality. Rather, data 
from two international and systemic universal banks will be used to demonstrate the 
following: the slow (controlled) recognition of FVA losses; the materiality of fair value 
accounting entries that impact profit and loss and the crowding out of risk-free capital with 
risky unrealised FVA gains. The model developed in this paper can then be used to make 
sense of the information.    
 
The two banks that data will be gathered from are one of the largest banks in the Netherlands, 
ING Bank N.V., and the largest bank in South Africa, the Standard Bank of South Africa 
Limited. Apart from size and systemic importance further similarities between the two banks 
are that they both report under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and are 
supervised from countries where Basel II was implemented in 2008. Both banks are large 
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(globally important) according to Shaffer’s (2010:9) definition (>$100 billion of assets) with 
ING Bank. N.V. about ten times larger than the Standard Bank of South Africa Limited in 
2012. Very important for this paper is that both banks operate in an income tax regime where 
financial instruments are taxed on realisation and not on a mark-to-market basis; this makes it 
possible to identify the unrealised portion of fair value accounting gains and losses through 
profit and loss and will be explained further below.  
 
IFRS 7 (IASB, 2005) does not require disclosure of the realised and unrealised portions of 
items of income, expense, gains, and losses related to financial instruments; only the 
combined total is required. The deferred tax notes to the financial statements of both ING 
Bank N.V and the Standard Bank of South Africa Limited contain information that makes 
possible the derivation of the portion of net profit that is due to unrealised fair value 
adjustments on financial instruments. Deferred tax arises when a difference exists between 
accounting net profit and taxable income. Accounting net profit contains realised and 
unrealised items related to financial instruments whereas current Dutch and South African 
taxable income contains only realised items. An increase in the deferred tax liability due to 
financial instruments thus reflects the tax portion of an unrealised gain on financial 
instruments. What follows are excerpts from the banks’ 2012 annual financial statements 
where the red ovals indicate the relevant movements in the deferred tax liability due to 
financial instruments for that year:  
 
 
Figure 6.5 Changes in deferred tax for ING Bank N.V. due to FVA on financial instruments through profit and loss.  
Source ING Bank N.V Annual Report (2012:64). 
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Figure 6.6 Changes in deferred tax for the Standard Bank of South Africa Limited due to FVA on financial 
instruments (including derivatives).  Source the Standard Bank of South Africa (2012:153). 
 
Table 6.3 that follows summarises the available information on deferred tax movements. To 
gain an understanding of the significance of these movements it is important to note that what 
is observed on the deferred tax line is only the income tax effect of the transactions. For 
example, the current corporate income tax rate for the Netherlands is 25% and thus 25% is 
the movement on deferred tax and 75% is the impact on profit. It is the 75% that we are 
interested in. In table three a few simplifying assumptions have been made: that the current 
corporate income tax rates in the Netherlands of 25% and in South Africa of 28% was 
constant over the whole period; that the debit entries against deferred tax for ING from 2008 
onwards reversed previous credit entries and that retained income is a suitable proxy for bank 
capital.     
 
 
Table 6.3 Summary of deferred tax movements on financial instruments (credit entries are positive and debit entries 
negative). 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Movement in deferred tax due to financial 
instruments - ING (Euro million) NA NA NA 72 -301 -325 -192 -162 -366
Movement in deferred tax due to financial 
instruments - Standard (rand million) 83 486 903 700 1132 -1837 -1747 514 9
Unrealised portion of net profit after tax - 
ING NA NA NA 6% -128% -180% -13% -12% -34%
Unrealised portion of net profit after tax - 
Standard 4% 19% 29% 19% 33% -58% -57% 14% 0%
Unrealised portion of retained income - ING NA NA NA 30% 32% 21% 11% 7% 0%
Unrealised portion of retained income - 
Standard 43% 54% 81% 88% 83% 41% 14% 17% 19%
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When looking at the movement in the deferred tax line in table one it is important to note that 
for ING Bank N.V. the reversal from credit entries to debit entries (debit entries imply 
unrealised losses on financial instruments) against deferred tax happened in 2008 as would be 
expected with a global financial crisis that reached its peak in September 2008 with the 
failure of Lehman Brothers. Strangely, the reversal for the Standard Bank of South Africa 
Limited only takes place in 2009. For ING Bank N.V. the reversal that started in 2008 
continued until 2012, whereas for the Standard Bank of South Africa Limited the reversal 
only lasted two years and then turned again. What the information shows is possibly the use 
of accounting discretion to avoid/manage FVA losses: The Standard Bank of South Africa 
Limited only shows losses for the first time in 2009 whilst the crisis started in 2008 and for 
both banks the FVA losses did not come through as one “hit” but took time. 
 
The rows that relate the movements on deferred tax to profit show just how material these 
FVA entries (that impact profit and loss and thus bank capital) are. For ING Bank N.V few 
entries are available when FVA generated unrealised gains, but unrealised losses against 
profit between -180% and -34% show how large these entries can be. The entries for the 
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited peak at an unrealised FVA gain portion of net income 
of 33% in 2008 with the largest reversal of -58% the next year.  
 
Arguably the most important part of Tier 1 bank capital is retained income. The idea is that 
this capital should always be available to absorb unexpected bank losses. Table 6.3 shows 
that the unrealised FVA gain portions of retained income are not as stable as would be 
expected. For both banks the peak is during the financial crisis with a sharp reduction 
thereafter. This is indicative of unrealised FVA gains in bank capital being risky and during 
the upturn displacing less risky bank capital as predicted by the model. Back in South Africa, 
the CEO of one of the four large banks, Nedbank Limited, admitted during an interview on 
his bank’s financial performance in 2013 that FVA gains through profit and loss are risky: 
“We did benefit during the first six months from some fair value gains, which are lower 
quality income and harder to forecast…” (Tarrant, 2013).    
 
8. Implications, shortcomings and opportunities for further research 
 
The model demonstrates the expansionary impulse generated when FVA increases bank 
regulatory capital. It can be argued that the same expansionary impulse will result from other 
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accounting entries that also increase regulatory capital.  These entries could include realised 
profits from the selective selling-off of investments (gains trading) or incurred loan loss 
provisioning that “enables banks to present higher earnings and (regulatory) equity capital, 
which allow the bank to extend more credit” (Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas, 2011:302). 
FVA’s impact differs in two important aspects. First, FVA impacts regulatory capital much 
faster and more materially than other accounting entries that need time to impact retained 
earnings. It is the speed of the feedback process that matters. The second way in which the 
capital increase from FVA differs from increases caused by other accounting entries is that 
these alternatives will not result in the replacement of liquid assets in bank capital with riskier 
FVA gains (bad capital driving out good capital); FVA profits do not provide liquidity that 
can fund dividends and remuneration payments.  
 
Another characteristic of the model is that it is incomplete. Banks do not just lend money due 
to the interaction between FVA and their capital ratios. The real economy has a need for 
credit before the supply of credit is considered. In the same way it is certainly not argued here 
that FVA is the primary or sole reason behind the cyclicality of financial capitalism. The 
business and financial cycles existed before the adoption of FVA and booms and busts were 
even evident during the heyday of historical cost accounting in the period after the Great 
Depression. The caveat is that those booms and busts were less damaging in their impact; 
they were less extreme than either the Great Depression or the global financial crisis. 
 
Toporowski (2010:224) argues that those who view the capitalist system as being prone to 
crisis have difficulty in explaining the relative stability of financial capitalism in the decades 
before the global financial crisis. This paper argues that the absence of FVA from the banking 
system during that time can explain the relative calm. A system needs control mechanisms in 
the presence of feedback loops to keep the process from running away. One such financial 
feedback loop was highlighted by Minsky and describes how stable economic periods 
improve the balance sheets of individuals by increasing the values of their assets and enabling 
them to borrow more because they now have more security; this in turn increases systemic 
fragility as more debt is now supported by the same cash flows. This situation can be 
summarised by stating that the individual’s (borrower’s) balance sheet was “fair valued” in 
the credit evaluation process. A control mechanism that will inhibit this expansionary 
impulse is not to fair value the balance sheets of banks as well; in other words do not meet 
rising credit demand with increasing credit supply.  These checks and balances prevailed in 
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the relatively stable economic period that preceded the global financial crisis; as a result, the 
feedback loop was not allowed to run away due to the presence of a control mechanism. 
However, with the introduction of formal FVA into accounting standards this control 
mechanism was removed, leading to the over-indebtedness of individuals and financial 
businesses. FVA did not cause the crisis but amplified it.  
 
The model explains the conclusion of the NCCFEC (2011:xix) that “a combination of 
excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency put the financial system on 
a collision course with crisis”. Banks and individuals borrowed excessively as explained in 
the paragraph above and risky investments were made in the process as there was a search for 
yield. The benefit of the perspective offered by the model will briefly be illustrated by using 
it to understand the results of the study by Cabral (2012). Cabral introduced a novel model of 
individual bank profitability and used the model to explain paradoxes such as high bank 
profitability immediately prior to the crisis even though intermediation margins were low (the 
return to banking activities was low). It is argued that balance sheet growth and the taking on 
of additional risk prior to the crisis explains this paradox. In addition it is argued that low 
levels of liquidity prior to the crisis played an important role in the crisis. First, bank profits 
immediately prior to the crisis were high, possibly due to the effect of FVA. Second, the 
returns to banking activities were low prior to the crisis because of the search for yield 
necessitated by the bank balance sheet expansion that simultaneously increased the money 
supply. Cabral’s (2012:114) explanation for the low returns is to argue that it is the result of 
increased competition. The model in this paper explains why there was an increase in 
competition. Cabral’s model does not explain where the additional credit demand comes from 
when banks, according to his model, expand their balance sheets to protect profitability; the 
model in this chapter does explain. Finally, Cabral uses the exogenous impact of bank 
regulations to explain the low levels of liquidity prior to the crisis. In contrast the model in 
this chapter explains the low levels of liquidity endogenously. 
 
Controls unrelated to FVA can be imagined, to counteract this amplification process. One 
such alternative control is the introduction of a countercyclical capital buffer as part of the 
changes made to the global bank regulatory infrastructure following the global financial 
crisis; thus, during the upswing, banks might be required to increase their capital ratios as 
described in the following quote from Basel III: “It will be deployed by national jurisdictions 
when excess aggregate credit growth is judged to be associated with a build-up of system-
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wide risk to ensure the banking system has a buffer of capital to protect it against future 
potential losses” (Bank for International Settlements, 2011:57). In terms of the model this 
increase in the minimum capital required, if of the exact size necessary, will eliminate the 
impulse for balance sheet expansion resulting from =, halting the feedback process. However, 
there are reasons why this might not be an ideal hedge for the expansionary impulse created 
by FVA. First, it will require central bank decision makers to get the timing and extent of any 
increase exactly right. Second, banks as a body have become effective lobbyists in some 
countries and can be expected to try and influence the setting of an increased capital ratio. 
Lastly and perhaps most important is the argument that a control mechanism implemented on 
a regulatory level cannot take into account the unique circumstances of each individual bank.  
 
Numerous opportunities for future research can be identified: 
• More and better descriptive evidence of the co-movement of FVA in banks, with the 
business cycle. 
• Do bank managers pay dividends out of unrealised FVA profits, rewarding 
shareholders as well, for managers’ excessive risk-taking and by doing so, weakening 
the financial system? 
• Augmentation of standard stock-flow consistent accounting models of the economy 
with this credit supply model. 
• Do bank management pay out remuneration from FVA gains? 
• Was the avoidance of FVA write-downs during the global financial crisis temporary 
or permanent? 
• Causality studies on the relationship between credit demand and credit supply from a 
real economic perspective and from a financial perspective;  and 
• Studies of the class struggle that determines the split of the economic pie between 
wages, profits and, in addition to the standard production view of capitalism, interest. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
The focus by accounting researchers on the role of accounting and FVA during the global 
financial crisis and not on a role before the crisis, as well as the claim that accounting is only 
a messenger are two factors that motivate the need for the development of the model 
described in this paper, that links FVA, bank regulatory capital, money supply, remuneration, 
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dividends and economic activity. The requirement to incorporate global financial crisis 
characteristics (such as feedback effects, systemic risk and the primacy of banks in the crisis) 
into that model rationalised the use of a stock-flow consistent accounting type model of the 
economy rather than standard economic models. In contrast to the usual stock-flow consistent 
accounting model of the economy, the model developed in this paper reverses the causality 
between credit demand and credit supply; in other words, the starting point is credit supply, 
not credit demand, which gives banks the centre stage in the account.  
 
The model developed in this paper describes and then links together many of the 
characteristics of the global financial crisis and previous crises. The procyclical expansion of 
bank balance sheets during the upswing followed by a contraction (over the long-term 
because during the short-term, banks can avoid some FVA write-downs) during the downturn 
is explained by the need to maintain regulatory capital ratios and/or feedback effects both 
within the financial sector and between the financial and real sectors. In accordance with the 
doctrine of Minsky, a state of crisis is shown to be endogenous to the model’s operation, 
because of systemic fragility. The focus is on bank balance sheet fragility that is caused by 
bad capital driving out good capital, banks reaching for yield and the inversion of the yield 
curve. It is argued that not having FVA profits in bank capital during booms is an essential 
control mechanism that inhibits the feedback effects emanating from the real sector. 
 
An empirical example is given where the evolution of the unrealised FVA gains through 
profit and loss of two universal and systemic banks (ING Bank N.V & the Standard Bank of 
South Africa) can be better understood using the model in this paper. 
 
In conclusion, the model offers a simple explanation of why the world, for so long after the 
height of the global financial crisis, is still mired in slow growth. During a prolonged and 
excessive boom bank profits and capital were materially increased by unrealised FVA profits. 
These profits justified the pay-out of liquid assets weakening the financial system. The 
additional capital further justified more debt financed asset expansion. With the crisis bank 
management realised that these unrealised capital items were not permanent. Management 
was able to postpone the recognition of FVA losses by using the flexibility inherent in FVA 
regulations, but lending was slowed to a point reflective of “safe” (capital excluding 
unrealised items) capital levels. Lending activity will stay subdued until all of these marked-
up items have been worked off banks’ balance sheets. 
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10. Additional work and link to next chapter 
 
Additional work on this chapter, that is not part of the published paper, will now follow. The 
next section will briefly discuss the international applicability of the empirical evidence from 
South Africa and the model. 
 
10.1  International applicability of papers 
Paper one: Liberal fair value accounting in banks: A South African case study 
In terms of the percentage of total assets at fair value (see Table 4.4 for IBL and Table 4.7 for 
SBoSA) the two South African banks are similar to American banks according to the study 
by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (2008). The American study 
looked at fair values at the end of the first quarter in 2008 and for comparability reasons the 
2008 percentages for IBL should be used (financial yearend is 31 March) and the 2007 
percentages for SBoSA should be used (financial yearend is 31 December). IBL fair valued 
26% of total assets and SBoSA fair valued 27% of total assets. This compares to 31% of total 
assets for banks and 50% of total assets for the American broker-dealers according to the 
U.S.A’s Securities and Exchange Commission study. As both South African banks are 
universal banks they can be expected to fall somewhere between the banks category and the 
broker-dealer category. Compared to American banks, the two South African banks look 
similar but compared to broker-dealers they have significantly fewer assets at fair value. This 
implies that the finding that a significant portion of the South African banks’ regulatory 
capital in 2008 was made up out of unrealised FVA gains, is likely to be even more valid in 
the U.S. Of the 31% of total assets at fair value for American banks 22% was for assets fair 
valued through profit and loss. Of the 50% of total assets at fair value for American broker-
dealers, almost all was for assets fair valued through profit and loss; this should be contrasted 
against the argument by Shaffer (2010:10) that FVA entries that impact the income statement 
from the trading book or the fair value option can be ignored. IBL fair valued 20% of total 
liabilities and SBoSA fair valued 19% of total liabilities. This compares to 11% of total 
liabilities for the American banks and 35% of total liabilities for the American broker-dealers 
according to the Securities and Exchange Commission study. In the case of liabilities the 
South African banks are more comparable to the broker-dealers as one might expect. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission study (2008:69) did note that one bank in their sample 
reported 23% of liabilities at fair value and “reported liabilities fair value similar to those of 
the broker-dealers”. In terms of the fair value hierarchy only IBL disclosed the percentages 
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for 2008 and when compared to the American banks, carried more assets at level 1 (38% 
versus 11%), fewer assets at level 2 (62% versus 82%) and fewer assets at level 3 (0% versus 
7%). IBL carried the same percentage of liabilities at level 1 (6%), more liabilities at level 2 
(94% versus 90%) and fewer liabilities at level 3 (0% versus 5%). Taking all this into 
account, the South African and American banks do not seem dissimilar. 
 
In terms of movements in FVA, especially over the global financial crisis period, the 
evidence for the South African banks clearly demonstrated that bank management accepted 
the results of FVA when profit increased but actively resisted decreases in profit emanating 
from FVA. The Securities and Exchange Commission study ended in 2008 and so it was not 
possible to observe the same effect for the American banks. Nevertheless, there are indicators 
in the study that point in the same direction. First, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
study observed that most of the increase in liabilities at fair value from 2006 to 2008 for the 
total sample (8% to 15% increase) came from the fair value option being exercised in broker-
dealers; by moving more liabilities into fair value all (else being equal) in the midst of a crisis 
profits are increased (2008:72-73). Second:, “There was a significant increase in the amount 
of deferred losses in accumulated OCI for the first three quarters of 2008” (2008:85) yet in 
contrast, for items that impact the income statement, an increase in profits was recorded. 
Thus, the Commission reports that  “The impact on equity was 3% and 4% increase (on a 
comparable nine-month basis) for the first quarter and the first three quarters of 2008, 
respectively, when the gains and losses of items reported at fair value on a recurring basis 
were netted together for all issuers in the sample” (2008:88). 
 
Table 4.2 shows the percentages of net income and the percentage of equity attributable to 
FVA gains, for IBL and the SBoSA. Those percentages are large and tend to peak around the 
financial crisis. Afterwards they fall off significantly. There was evidence in the Securities 
and Exchange Commission study (2008:89) that U.S. banks’ equity capital was also 
significantly influenced by FVA gains: “For the first three quarters of 2008, six issuers 
reported a percentage impact of recurring fair value measurements of greater than 15% of 
equity, and two issuers reported a percentage impact ranging from 5% to 15% of equity. The 
percentage impact on equity ranged from a decrease of 41% to an increase of 29%. Seventeen 
issuers reported increases in stockholders’ equity. For all except five issuers, this increase 
was less than 5% of equity. Nine issuers reported decreases in equity. For all except three 
issuers, this decrease was less than 5% of equity. Generally, for the first three quarters of 
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2008, credit institutions were impacted the least by recurring fair value measurements, 
whereas banks had the greatest impact in dollars and broker-dealers had the greatest impact 
as a percentage of overall equity.” Any decrease of 41% in equity from FVA within nine 
months is material and illustrates how FVA gains in equity constitute risky capital.  
 
In Chapter three it was noted that that South African banks are governed by international 
banking and accounting regulations and this is one reason to support the proposition that the 
behaviour of those banks can be generalised to large international banks. Another reason 
supporting generalisation is the size of the Standard Bank Group. Shaffer (2010:9) defines a 
“largest banking institution” as one with total assets of more than $100 billion. In 2009 the 
total assets of the Standard Bank Group were approximately $133 billion and thus the size of 
this South African banking Group places it within Shaffer’s criteria for “largest banking 
institutions”. 
 
One conclusion from this comparison between American banks and what was found for the 
South African banks in Paper I is that the overall result of that paper, that bankers accept 
FVA gains but resist losses, is likely to hold outside South Africa. Moreover the tools used by 
the management of South African banks, such as strategically altering the ratio between 
assets at fair value and liabilities at fair value and moving items along the fair value 
hierarchy, also seem to be used by U.S. banks and broker-dealers. 
 
Paper two: For banks fair value adjustments do influence dividend policy 
A similar argument is also being made internationally that dividend and remuneration 
payments would not have been necessary if FVA did not increase accounting equity, either 
within a United Kingdom or an American context (Kay, 2009; Taylor, 2009; Turner, 2010; 
Wood, 2010).   
 
Paper three: Fair value accounting, fragile bank balance sheets and crisis: A model 
The U.S financial sector earned record profits in 2006 and these constituted 27% of all 
corporate profits in the United States in that year versus 15% in 1980 (NCCFEC, 2011:xvii)) 
Despite  this, the level of capital held by large American investment banks prior to the crisis, 
which was similar to that of the South African banks shown in Figure 6.5 of this chapter, did 
not increase and in most cases even decreased. The implication is that the U.S. banks either 
distributed the extra profit/capital as dividends or remuneration or expanded their asset base 
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by using debt to such an extent that capital did not increase in a relative sense. This can be 
seen in the following Figure 6.7, which is the inverse of Figure 6.3. Note that Figure 6.7 
shows total assets relative to equity whilst Figure 6.3 shows equity relative to total assets; an 
increase in gearing on this figure implies a reduction in capital on Figure 6.3. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Ratio of total assets to equity for four broker-dealer holding companies from 1998. Source: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office Report GAO–09–739 (2009, Figure 6). 
 
The nexus of the model developed in this chapter is regulatory capital within a bank and 
within the banking system. A feedback process is demonstrated where rising prices can lead 
to increased credit supply which then stimulates increased credit demand, which encourages 
increased credit supply. This whole process will continue expanding until the build-up of 
systemic fragility reverses it. Such a feedback process can help to explain why credit 
advances in the United States grew at such a high rate, from $3 trillion total debt to $36 
trillion total debt in 2007 (NCCFEC, 2011:xvii). It was also shown that the feedback process 
described above was likely to overwhelm the ability of the real economy to absorb the credit 
generated; this was done by viewing the model as describing the actions of an individual 
bank. Greatly increased interbank lending was thus likely to result, according to the model. 
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This explains the “exponential growth” in trading activities (NCCFEC, 2011:xvii) as well as 
the growth of the financial sector from 5% of gross domestic product (GDP) to 8% of GDP 
(NCCFEC, 2011:64) observed by the Commission. Finally, the feedback process between the 
financial system and the real economy, as described in the model, explains why, parallel to 
the rapid expansion of credit in the economy, the Commission observed overdone real 
economic activity (NCCFEC, 2011:5). 
 
One of the sources of fragility identified in the model was the reach for yield by banks, 
induced by the feedback process. This can explain the decline in underwriting standards in 
the U.S. (NCCFEC, 2011:4) as well as the observation that the culture of financial firms 
changed from conservative to risk seeking during the boom (NCCFEC, 2011:xvii). Evidence 
of predatory lending was highlighted by the Commission (NCCFEC, 2011:10), which calls 
into question the dissenting report’s conclusion that credit demand emanating from the U.S. 
Government’s housing policies was to blame for the overexpansion in U.S. housing. 
Predatory lending rather points to the role of credit supply in the process that tie back to the 
reach for yield argument from the model. 
 
One of the predictions of the model is that FVA profits create a need for banks to distribute 
cash in the form of dividends or remuneration. Section 3.4 of this chapter cited numerous 
British commentators who are convinced of this. In the U.S.A., financial sector remuneration 
grew enormously during the boom before the global financial crisis; the Commission 
observed (NCCFEC, 2011:61) that remuneration outside the financial sector versus 
remuneration within the financial sector went from parity in 1980 to financial sector 
compensation being 80% greater in 2007. It was observed, also, that this increase was driven 
by bonus payments and not base-pay payments (NCCFEC, 2011:63). The observation that 
“formula-driven compensation allows high short-term profits to be translated into generous 
bonus payments, without regard to any longer-term risks” (NCCFEC, 2011:64) ties in 
perfectly with the model’s “bad capital driving out good capital” argument. The payment of 
remuneration and dividends by banks from unrealised profits can also explain the observation 
by Cabral that whilst banking systems in the Western world entered the crisis with apparently 
enough capital (Cabral, 2012:103) they had too little liquidity (Cabral, 2012:104). The model 
developed in this chapter shows how these two observations can be plausibly related.  
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In conclusion, the model in this chapter offers a simple explanation for why the world, long 
after the height of the global financial crisis, is still stuck in slow growth (NCCFEC, 
2011:417; BIS, 2012: ix). During a prolonged and excessive boom, bank profits and capital 
were materially increased by unrealised FVA profits. The additional capital justified more 
debt financed asset expansion and for a time, more FVA profits. These profits also justified 
the pay-out of liquid assets weakening the financial system.  
 
The iron law of earnings management predicts lower future profitability, even if the value 
increases that led to the FVA profits were permanent. The iron law of earnings management 
is based on the observation that all accruals eventually reverse; thus if earnings were high due 
to FVA gains this period then, ceteris paribus, earnings would be lower in the future when 
the value increase is realised. FVA sucked profitability from the future.  
 
Lower future profitability would result even if the value increases were permanent due to the 
reversal of the accruals. If the value increase were not permanent then future profitability 
would be even worse due to the need to recognise losses. Bank management were often able 
to postpone the recognition of FVA losses by using the flexibility inherent in FVA 
regulations, but lending was slowed to a point reflective of “safe” (capital excluding 
unrealised items) capital levels. Lending activity will stay subdued until all of these marked-
up items have been worked off the banks’ balance sheets. 
 
The next chapter is about whether the South African results are due to implementation issues 
(inexperience or earnings management) with FVA or due to FVA itself. 
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12. Appendix 
 
12.1 Derivation of mathematical results: 
 
If #$ = &  then: 
  
Let u = - − 9 and v = -; then  
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12.2 Graphical representation of the development of Figure 6.2: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
Fig. A. ]^ = (_ `)ab(c  b)(_ 1) ∑ defe dgb  
 
The following example will illustrate the main points. A bank (or the total banking system) 
has $100 of total assets (A) with 30% of those assets subject to FVA and 70% of those assets 
subject to historical cost accounting. The bank has equity capital of $6 (A–L) and deposit 
liabilities of $94 (L). The capital ratio is thus 6/100=6% and the effective tax rate is 30%. If 
the market value of the fair valued assets increase by 10% then the value of λ is 
(30*(10%*(1-30%)))/(30+70) = 2.1%. An increase in debt-financed assets of 2.1/6% = $35 is 
required. After this increase the original capital ratio is restored (&  = ((100+2.1+35)-
(94+35))/(100+2.1+35)=6%). Additional demand for financial assets is $35 and $35 of 
additional spending power is made available to the real economy.  
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Fig. B. ]h  = (_ Ω`)ab(c b )(_ Ω1) ∑ defe dgb  
 
The previous example of the bank above is developed further in this paragraph. Suppose that 
the remuneration and dividend policy of the bank is that 50% of after tax profits is paid as 
remuneration and that 25% of after tax profits is paid as dividends; in this case, the retention 
rate of the bank is 25% (Ω). If only 25% of the 2.1% increase in average assets is retained 
(100*2.1%*25%= $0.525 is left as additional capital and 100*2.1%*75%= $1.575 is paid 
out), then the debt-financed increase in financial assets required to restore the 6% capital ratio 
is (2.1*25%)/6%= $8.75. The asset expansion (:) and the remuneration and dividend 
payments to the real economy (1- Ω) increase the spending power available to the real 
economy by 1.575+8.75= $10.325; substantially less than the $35 previously when Ω was 
equal to one. The new demand for financial assets is only $8.75 versus the $35 previously. 
The reason for the differences is the gearing that takes place inside this banking system.  
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Fig. C. ` < 0 
 
The previous example of the bank now continues. Given λ=-2.1% the reduction in financial 
assets and deposits required to restore the 6% original capital ratio is equal to $-35. This 
reduces the demand for financial assets as well as the spending power available to the real 
economy. In our example a 2.1% increase led to a $10.325 increase in spending power for the 
real economy and increased demand for financial assets of $8.75. A decrease of 2.1% leads to 
a reduction in spending power available to the real economy of $35 and a reduction in the 
demand for financial instruments of $35. The reason for this difference between the increase 
in balance sheet required and the decrease in balance sheet required to restore the original 
capital ratio is because no contribution towards alleviating the capital shortage can be 
expected from employees and shareholders (Ω = 1) with the 2.1% decrease. 
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Fig. D. i`(j)ij = f(B(`), Ω(`), k) 
 
The previous example is now continued: thus, it has already been shown that with λ=2.1% 
and Ω=25%, the increase in financial assets and deposits required to restore the 6% original 
capital ratio is equal to $8.75 and the increase in spending power available to the real 
economy is $10.325. Let us now suppose that that the real economy spends 50% of any 
additional spending power on the purchase of financial assets and that the demand function 
for financial assets is a simple linear function of the form Q=10+90P. The additional demand 
for financial assets is 10.325/2+8.75= $13.9125. Using the demand equation the initial price 
was 1 as the total of financial assets available then equated $100. The total level of demand is 
now 100+13.9125= $113.9125 and solving the demand equation the new price equals 1.16. 
As 30% of the assets are subject to fair value accounting then 30% of that 16% increase will 
enter capital via FVA and set the whole process in motion again.  
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Fig. E. (lfmmnj - loefpeoejq) > 0 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SEPARATING FAIR VALUE ACCOUNTING FROM ITS USE 
 
1. Introduction 
 
An argument for investigating the use of FVA, made in the introduction to this thesis, is that 
the implementation of a perfectly good accounting standard can have unintended 
consequences. Empirical evidence on the use of FVA by South African banks was gathered 
from before and after the global financial crisis. One conclusion was that South African 
banks did not use FVA in a neutral manner; FVA generated profits were accepted but FVA 
generated losses were avoided. Another conclusion was that South African banks made pay-
outs from unrealised FVA gains leading to fragility. Asset expansion during the boom was 
also shown to be excessive. The question that arises is whether these results are due to the 
way FVA was used by the South African banks or whether the results are inherent to FVA. 
The use argument can be split further into two possibilities; the possibility that the results 
found were due to the inexperience of South African bank managers with IAS 39 (and IFRS) 
(South Africa only adopted IFRS in 2005) or the possibility that South African bank 
managers were using FVA to manage earnings. 
 
This section will proceed as follows. First, the possibility of inexperience with IFRS being 
behind the results will be investigated. Thereafter, the possibility that FVA is another 
earnings management tool will be investigated. Finally, the possibility that the results are due 
to inherent flaws in FVA will be investigated. 
 
2. Inexperience with IAS 39 (and IFRS) 
 
IFRS was complex to implement (Jermakowicz, Prather-Kinsey and Wulf, 2007; Paananen 
and Lin, 2009:38) with IAS 39 arguably one of the most challenging standards within IFRS 
(Jermakowicz, 2004:60; Sucher and Jindrichovska, 2004:112). Sucher and Jindrichovska 
(2004:126) also argue that IAS 39 implementation in a “transitional economy” is likely to be 
even more difficult due to interpretation issues of fair values and the greater use of fair value 
estimates. Brown and Tarca (2012:322) argue that the consequences of lack of expertise in 
IFRS (of preparers, auditors and information systems) may be significant. Based on the 
literature a plausible explanation for the South African findings is thus a lack of experience 
with IAS 39 as mandatory IFRS adoption was only in 2005.  
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How inexperienced were the South African bankers? South African banks in fact adopted 
IFRS already in 2004 as comparative figures according to IFRS were needed in 2005 (Bank 
Supervision Department of the South African Reserve Bank, 2006:27). The chapter on the 
South African context also showed that from the beginning of the 2000’s the local South 
African accounting standards were harmonised with IFRS. The South African version of IAS 
39, AC 133, was implemented in January 2001. For these reasons the switch to IFRS in 2005 
was a non-event as can be seen from the insignificance of the adoption adjustments of the 
five systemic banks: Absa Group (1.6% less net profit after tax in 2004), Nedbank Group (no 
change in net profit after tax in 2004), Standard Bank Group (0.6% less net profit after tax in 
2004), Firstrand Group (1.8%1 less net profit after tax in 2005) and Investec Group (6.4%2 
more net profit after tax in 2005). The implication is that by the time of the global financial 
crisis, South African bankers were not completely inexperienced with IFRS and IAS 39. 
 
The South African evidence obtained in this thesis provided two pertinent examples of a 
change in behaviour as it relates to FVA: Investec Bank Limited after 2009 started to base 
their bonuses on realised profits and Firstrand Limited from 2010 onwards based dividend 
cover on sustainable earnings excluding volatile FVA components. In addition, the CEO of 
Nedbank in 2013 acknowledged that FVA entries in earnings are of lower quality. The 
possibility that additional pay-outs were made due to inexperience with FVA and that going 
forward (with more experience) the same mistake will not be made again thus seems 
reasonable. The mistake picked up in the 2011 annual financial statements of the Standard 
Bank of South Africa also demonstrates inexperience.  
 
However, dangerous pay-outs were only one source of fragility in the model chapter. 
Commercial banks form part of a feedback process between the real economy and the 
financial economy where FVA increases the pro-cyclicality of lending as increases in bank 
profits and capital during upturns support the overextension of credit. Pay-outs, all else equal, 
actually dampened the feedback process. The conclusion that all would be well if banks 
refrain from making pay-outs from unrealised FVA gains ignores the core feedback process. 
If FVA gains in profits (and thereafter in capital) are risky then the heart of the problem is to 
not allow debt financed asset expansion underpinned with the risky capital. The implication 
                                                 
1
 Changes due to IFRS remeasurement. 
2
 None of the Investec Group change was due to IAS 39. IFRS 2 share based payments and goodwill 
adjustments made up the bulk of the change.  
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of the foregoing argument is that banks will need to track the risky component of retained 
income (whether for the pay-out or the asset expansion argument) and because of moral 
hazard3 disclose it, either to the bank regulator (regulatory rules will need to change) or to 
financial markets (accounting will need to change). Tracking the risky component of retained 
income will not be too onerous as banks already have to track it for other purposes. South 
African banks had to track it for income tax purposes (income tax is only payable on 
realisation) and in the case of Investec, after 2009, for remuneration purposes. 
 
It can be argued but not completely proven that increased pay-outs are a direct result of FVA. 
Inexperience can explain the pay-outs but the South African bankers were not that 
inexperienced. Inexperienced or not the results highlight that FVA components of retained 
income are risky and should be tracked and disclosed. The next section investigates whether 
the conclusion that South African banks did not use FVA in a neutral manner is not perhaps a 
manifestation of earnings management? 
 
3. Earnings management 
 
This section focuses on the finding that South African banks did not use FVA in a neutral 
manner and starts by defining earnings management and some key findings. Thereafter the 
focus shifts to earnings management in banks and the findings in the South African case 
study. 
 
Scott (2009:402) argues for both “good” and “bad” earnings management. “Good” earnings 
management allow managers to reveal their inside information to investors. “Bad” earnings 
management aims “to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999:368). No matter what the motivation, 
“earnings management is the choice by a manager of accounting policies, or actions affecting 
earnings, so as to achieve some specific reported earnings objective” (Scott, 2009:403). The 
use of real transactions to manage earnings, even though apparent in the definition above, is 
not the focus of this section. Rather, this section aims to investigate whether earnings 
                                                 
3
 Bank managers are not incentivised to act in the best interest of society and thus reliance should not be placed 
on their goodwill and experience. Banks play too an important role in the economic system.  
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management via accounting choice can explain the South African results; i.e. are the results 
attributable to FVA or to the way that management made use of FVA.  
 
 An important aspect of earnings management is the so-called “iron law” of earnings 
management; that accruals eventually reverse. Thus, higher earnings that cannot be sustained 
will lead to lower future earnings (Scott, 2009:404). This aspect of earnings management was 
referred to when making modest predictions of how future bank profitability is likely to 
unfold.   
 
Studies by Healy (1985) and Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) show that managers use 
accruals to manage earnings so as to influence their bonuses. For banks realised security 
gains (gains trading), loan loss provisions and loan write-offs are the common avenues of 
earnings management (Collins, Douglas and Shackelford, 1995:267; Healy and Wahlen, 
1999:378). Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995) found that regulatory capital affects 
loan loss provisions, loan write-offs and external financing simultaneously. The implication 
for this thesis is that the South African results can be due to bank managers maximising their 
bonus pay-outs, especially when considering that Investec Bank Limited applies no upper 
limit to potential bonuses. If bank managers use FVA for earnings management purposes then 
it is likely to be used in conjunction with other earnings management avenues. 
 
The obvious avenues of accounting choice in IAS 39 are the “designate at fair value” option, 
the different levels of fair value determination and reclassifications (Paananen, Renders and 
Shima, 2012). Paper I: Liberal fair value accounting in South African banks contributes to the 
accounting literature by identifying two more IAS 39 related avenues of accounting choice. 
First, the ratio between total assets at fair value and total liabilities at fair value is a key factor 
in determining fair value profits. Second, comparative figures can be adjusted in accordance 
with IAS 8 to overcome the IAS 39 ban on reclassifications into and out of the “designated at 
fair value” category.   
 
Table 4.11 summarised the evidence on the use of reclassifications, transfers and 
remeasurements to influence FVA outcomes by Investec Bank Limited and the Standard 
Bank of South Africa. What stands out is that all but one of the actions took place around the 
global financial crisis. The only exception took place in 2011 and was the transfer by the 
Standard Bank of South Africa of R 27 billion of liabilities from valued at cost to “designated 
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at fair value”. An interpretation is that prior to the global financial crisis the two banks used 
FVA as is, not using their accounting choice to influence outcomes. Further evidence to 
support this conclusion is that of the increased pay-outs; if management were using earnings 
management they would have been more likely to see the additional earnings as temporary 
and not make dividend pay-outs from it. In addition, during 2006 FVA had a negative effect 
on the annual profit of Investec Bank Limited. This took place in the midst of the overall 
build-up of unrealised gains in retained income as indicated on Table 4.4. If the bank was 
using FVA as earnings management tool during the upturn then why did it not avoid this 
negative adjustment and so smooth earnings? Finally, in Paper II: For banks fair value 
adjustments do influence dividend policy on Table 5.7 it was found that FVA adjustments 
from the banking book reduced the yearend earnings management dummy by only 8%. In 
other words, the impact from FVA was minimal during the upturn. 
 
However, the use of FVA during the crisis is another story. Clearly the flexibility in FVA was 
used by the two South African banks to avoid losses. The South African banks were not 
unique in avoiding FVA losses during the global financial crisis (Fiechter and Meyer, 2011; 
Bischof, Brüggemann and Daske, 2010). One can argue that this is an example of “good” 
earnings management where management signalled their inside knowledge that financial 
instrument values were not as bad as indicated by market values. Yet, one can also argue that 
this was not earnings management but rather a unique systemic event with banks expected 
and facilitated to have avoided FVA losses. Clearly, the flexibility in FVA regulations can be 
used to manage earnings and the 2011 adjustment by the Standard Bank of South Africa 
seems like earnings management, this time separate from the global financial crisis. 
 
Further evidence of no earnings management before the crisis can be obtained by 
investigating the mix of capital used by the Standard Bank of South Africa and the Standard 
Bank Group Limited before the crisis to fund the exceptional asset growth observed in the 
second paragraph of section 8 in Chapter four. If bank management regarded the unrealised 
FVA gains in retained income as temporary they would not have raised additional equity and 
subordinated bond finance to augment retained income. 
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3.1 Funding mix of the Standard Bank of South Africa and the Standard Bank Group 
Limited 
The idea behind this section is if bank management are managing earnings using FVA then 
they know that a portion of capital locked up in retained earnings is risky and they will thus 
not grow the bank’s other sources of capital (that funds the growing asset base) at the same 
pace (or faster) as retained earnings. This possibility for the largest bank in South Africa, 
Standard Bank, is investigated in the table below. 
    
 
Table 7.1 Summary of the funding mix of the Standard Bank of South Africa and the Standard Bank Group Limited 
over time (sourced from the annual financial statements). 
 
The data in Table 7.1 was hand collected from the balance sheets of the Standard Bank of 
South Africa Limited (the bank licence holder) and the Standard Bank Group Limited (the 
listed holding company). The first three rows, totalled in the fourth row thereafter, for each 
entity collates the regulatory capital of that entity, excluding reserves not through profit and 
loss (under Basel II such reserves were excluded from regulatory capital). This capital was 
available to fund the asset book growth, noted on page 103, of 13% (2004 to 2012) and 25% 
(2004 to 2008) for the Standard Bank of South Africa Limited and 12% (2004 to 2012) and 
STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2008 Actual 
capital 
ratios
Average 
capital 
ratios
2008 Pro 
forma capital 
figures
Share capital & premium 8197 10790 15790 21290 22790 46% 41% 10907
Retained income 9992 9403 9278 10530 14438 29% 33% 8717
Subordinated debt 7869 7832 10862 12985 11809 24% 27% 7156
26058 28025 35930 44805 49037
Defered tax balance due to FVA on financial 
instruments 1816 2241 3144 3844 4877
STANDARD BANK GROUP LIMITED
Share capital & premium 2676 2242 2439 1368 16997 18% 10% 8371
Retained income 30486 35198 41809 53028 59693 62% 68% 55042
Subordinated debt 9493 10445 15516 18759 19088 20% 22% 17523
42655 47885 59764 73155 95778
Defered tax balance due to FVA on financial 
instruments 1857 2319 3340 4039 4652
STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Compound 
growth 2004-
2012
Share capital & premium 22790 24290 25290 27290 35256 20%
Retained income 14438 19170 22212 26039 34277 17%
Subordinated debt 11809 15814 15683 16095 22400 14%
49037 59274 63185 69424 91933
Defered tax balance due to FVA on financial 
instruments 4877 3040 1293 1808 1807 0%
STANDARD BANK GROUP LIMITED
Share capital & premium 16997 17197 17522 17735 18092 27%
Retained income 59693 67999 75897 82777 92832 15%
Subordinated debt 19088 24195 20685 22328 29185 15%
95778 109391 114104 122840 140109
Defered tax balance due to FVA on financial 
instruments 4652 3213 1537 1882 2751 5%
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25% (2004 until 2008) for the Standard Bank Group Limited. What the compound growth 
figures on Table 7.1 indicate is that for the whole period capital grew faster than assets with 
“Share capital & premium” growing the fastest. This is consistent with a global financial 
crisis response of more capital held after the global financial crisis. The figures also show that 
the deferred tax liabilities due to FVA adjustments on financial instruments over the whole 
period hardly grew, but over the shorter term peaked and then dropped off – indicating risk. 
Retained income is the capital component where the related after tax portion of these 
unrealised FVA gains would have ended up (in Paper one it was found that South African 
banks did not have material AFS reserves).  
 
The focus of this section is not on the full period 2004 to 2012 but rather on the upswing 
period 2004 to 2008. The capital ratio columns indicate the portion of total capital 
represented by each capital item. The 2008 pro forma capital figures column indicates an 
adjusted value for each capital item. The adjustment worked as follows. “Retained income” 
in 2008 was adjusted for the risky portion of “Retained income”. The risky portion of 
“Retained income” was defined as the difference between the 2008 deferred tax balance and 
the long-term average deferred tax balance for that entity (2004 to 2012) divided by the 
current 28% South African income tax rate multiplied with (1-28%). With risk-free “Retained 
income” in 2008 known the values of the other two capital items could be calculated using 
the 2004 to 2012 average capital ratios. Now compare the 2008 pro forma capital figures with 
the 2008 actual capital figures. If management was managing earnings and capital, and thus 
aware that a portion of retained income was risky, then the capital base would have grown 
from 2004 to the 2008 pro forma figures. Instead, “Share capital & premium” and 
“Subordinated debt” grew much faster indicating that management regarded the whole of 
“Retained income” as risk-free. In terms of funding mix the managers did not treat the FVA 
generated component of retained income as temporary. 
 
4. Problems in FVA  
 
The possibility that the South African results are due to problems in FVA is investigated in 
this section.  
 
Neither the decision to expand a bank’s asset base nor the decision to pay out remuneration 
and dividends can be directly linked to FVA. Those are second order effects. Management 
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make those decisions. The use of FVA in earnings management is also the decision of 
management. Does this mean that FVA played no role in the South African results? A role 
for FVA can be argued, if FVA is used as an earnings management tool, based on FVA 
giving management too much flexibility. In addition, in the case of inexperience, a role for 
FVA can be argued based on FVA being too complex, FVA obscuring risky capital in 
retained earnings and the inability of bankers to act differently while “the music is playing”. 
 
The section above showed that it is unlikely that FVA was used for earnings management in 
South Africa before the global financial crisis. However, the probability is much higher 
during and after the global financial crisis that FVA might have been used for earnings 
management. FVA is clearly a more flexible accounting regime than earnings management 
under cost accounting. Some judgement must be permitted (Healy and Wahlen, 1999:366) in 
the use of accounting standards but the implication of allowing flexibility is that accounting 
standards cannot be regarded as blameless when that flexibility leads to unwanted outcomes.  
 
FVA standards are partly to blame even if it is accepted that the South African observations 
are based on the inexperience of managers with FVA. Accounting standards that are so 
complex that high-level managers (of large banks) and their big four auditors are still 
inexperienced after four years (2008 less 2004) of experience with IFRS, are arguably too 
complex.  
  
The model paper showed FVA to be central in a feedback process between the financial 
sector and the real economy with the debt-financed expansion of bank balance sheets and 
pay-outs from unrealised gains behind fragility. The model focused specifically on FVA 
adjustments that impact profit and loss and thus ends up in retained income and in regulatory 
capital. By allowing risky components into retained income accounting helped to obscure the 
risk. Management might have assumed all of retained income to be of the same risk as paid 
up capital as the realised and unrealised items are combined. Even if management was aware 
that all of retained income was not of the same risk as paid up capital (implying conservative 
asset expansion relative to available capital and conservative pay-out policies relative to 
profit levels) they would have found it difficult to justify conservative behaviour to the 
market during the boom years while the “music was playing”, famously said by Chuck Prince 
of Citibank when explaining why Citibank did not exit markets that they knew were risky 
(Cassidy, 2009:12).  
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A core issue that was highlighted in the modelling paper is that market values for financial 
instruments are not independent of banks as a group, unlike market values for financial 
instruments relative to non-banks. Banks as a group strongly influence values by being 
market makers, by influencing the money supply with their actions and by speculating. Even 
in very liquid markets, such as the foreign exchange market, banks have been shown to be 
able to influence values; testifying to the lack of objective values relative to banks. Without 
objective values banks as a group can get caught up in a cycle of increasing values generating 
more profit through FVA that further increase values through more financial instrument 
transactions. 
  
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter showed that the South African results are arguably due to inexperience with IAS 
39 and IFRS. It was shown that the results observed during the upturn (before the global 
financial crisis) are not likely to have been due to earnings management.  
 
Does this mean that FVA itself played no role in the South African results? If inexperience 
was behind the South African results then the FVA standard was arguably too complex if one 
considers the quality of the people involved at the large South African banks and the time it 
took them to gain experience. In addition (with inexperience behind the results) FVA 
obscured the risky components of retained earnings by allowing the combination of risky and 
non-risky components. Finally, even if management was experienced enough to not base 
further asset expansion and pay-outs based on the risky components of capital they would 
have found it difficult to justify conservative behaviour (relative to capital levels and profits) 
to the market whilst the upswing was in place. 
 
If the results (shown to be unlikely) were due to earnings management then FVA cannot be 
regarded as blameless when the flexibility in the standard leads to unwanted outcomes. 
 
Systemic risk is difficult to observe on a micro level and thus the possibility that FVA, banks, 
market making by banks, speculation by banks and money supply interact to form a feedback 
system that increases fragility should not be charged to individual bank managers to control. 
Even if bank managers are experienced enough they will probably be as unable as everybody 
else to spot financial bubbles reliably. And even if they are able to spot the bubbles then they 
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have to be able to convince the market that they are correct. Due to the centrality and 
importance of banks in the modern economy a regulatory intervention will be more 
appropriate rather than expecting the impossible from bank managers. 
 
The chapter hereafter will conclude this study. That chapter will review the research process, 
summarise the findings of each chapter and then link them together. Subsequently, the thesis 
statement will be evaluated and the overall conclusions drawn. Finally, suggestions for future 
research will be made.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
1. Review of the research process and summary of findings 
The overall objective of the larger study is to investigate the role of FVA in the global 
financial crisis by gathering empirical evidence on the use of FVA by South African banks 
(with the focus on the time period before the crisis) and then to develop a theoretical 
perspective on the problem. To this end, a South African case study was performed and a 
theoretical model was developed with bank capital and bank behaviour as the nexus and 
financial crisis endogenous. That case study informed and enriched the theoretical model. 
The advantage of using a case study design is that it allows an extensive and in-depth 
description of a given social phenomenon; an essential step in this instance as it was 
necessary to understand and explain the behaviour of bank management. The approach 
adopted in this study was to place the case study and the model in three separate publication-
ready papers. These papers were linked together by the use of additional chapters with a 
global introduction and conclusion. The remainder of this section will briefly revisit the 
findings of each chapter. 
 
1.1 Chapter two (literature review): The global financial crisis and the role of fair value 
accounting 
This chapter reviewed the global financial crisis and the role of FVA in that crisis. A possible 
reason for the lack of attention that has been given to the time-period before the crisis was 
also identified. 
 
As part of the review of the global financial crisis, the conclusions of the NCCFEC were 
discussed. At the end of chapter six (the model paper), the conclusions of the NCCFEC were 
related to what was found in the three papers. In this way, the global applicability of the 
study’s results was emphasised. The review of the global financial crisis showed that there is 
currently no consensus on what caused that crisis and that FVA played a potential role. The 
role of FVA in the global financial crisis was therefore reviewed next. What emerged from 
that review was that the empirical work performed focused on the role of FVA during the 
financial crisis. No strong role was found. The possibility that management used the 
flexibility in FVA to avoid losses during the crisis was not addressed in the empirical papers. 
A few researchers did raise the possibility that FVA encouraged dangerous behaviour prior to 
the global financial crisis but this idea has not been empirically investigated. The review 
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explained why the impact of FVA on profit and loss and not just AFS reserves should be 
investigated.  
The review also investigated the relationship between the EMH and FVA as a plausible 
reason for the lack of attention given to the time-period before the crisis. The rationale for 
this step was bolstered by the claims that the global financial crisis was caused by exogenous 
events and that “accounting is only a messenger”. The relationship between FVA and the 
EMH was found to be strong and combined with an EMH that does not imply market values 
are equal to fundamental values, opened the way for FVA playing a role in feedback 
processes working through market values. The first step in the empirical work was to explore 
how banks actually used FVA (the South African case study). 
 
1.2 Chapter three: The South African context 
This chapter contextualised the South African case study to follow. The chapter focused on 
South African banking regulations and accounting standards. The chapter also considered the 
question of whether the fact that no South African banks failed during the global financial 
crisis implied that South African banks and their actions are not comparable to other Western 
banks. The conclusion of the chapter was that South Africa can be regarded as a 
representative case. This conclusion concurs with the work done at the end of chapter six 
where the results of each paper were discussed relative to the NCCFEC report. 
 
Within this context the larger study can now move to the next chapter that forms the first part 
of the South African case study, which investigates how two South African banks actually 
implemented FVA in practice.    
 
1.3 Chapter four (paper one): Liberal fair value accounting in banks: A South African case 
study 
This paper used an inductive approach to investigate in detail how two South African banks 
used FVA before and after the global financial crisis. It was found that the two banks did not 
apply FVA in a neutral or impartial manner.  A novel way using deferred tax was devised to 
estimate the percentages of profit and capital that are due to unrealised fair value adjustments 
on financial instruments. The actual level of profits and capital derived from FVA was found 
to be surprisingly high and concurred with the view that FVA is procyclical over the long-
term. Over the short-term, it was found that both banks actively avoided the recognition of 
FVA losses during the downturn. The smaller bank was the slower one to recognise losses. 
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Techniques used to avoid the recognition of losses included intergroup transfers, transfers 
between FVA levels, reclassifications and adjustments to comparative figures. The result of 
changing the gap between total assets at fair value and total liabilities at fair value was a 
change in the group entity where overall FVA profits and losses manifested. The chapter 
concluded with a calculation of asset growth and a consideration of the evolution of 
remuneration in the two banks. It was found that assets increased the most during the period 
that FVA impacted profit positively and peaked as a component of retained income.     
Remuneration was overpaid before the crisis.  
 
At the end of chapter six a comparison was made between American banks and what was 
found for the South African banks. The outcome of that comparison showed that the overall 
conclusion of this chapter (four), that bankers accept FVA gains but resist losses, is likely to 
hold outside South Africa. Moreover, it was found that the tools used by the South African 
banks also seem to be used by U.S. banks and broker-dealers; these tools would include 
strategically altering the ratio between assets at fair value and liabilities at fair value and 
moving items along the fair value hierarchy.  
 
The next chapter continued the South African case study and investigated whether South 
African banks paid dividends from FVA profits during the boom; the investigation used 
South African banking system data obtained from the regulator. 
 
1.4 Chapter five (paper two): For banks fair value adjustments do influence dividend 
policy 
This paper investigated whether South African banks paid out dividends from profits that had 
been increased by FVA during the economic upswing. If banks did pay out dividends based 
on unrealised FVA profits then this is an example of bad capital driving out good capital. The 
unrealised FVA profits increase bank capital, all else being equal, and paying out dividends 
reduces bank capital; consequently, the end result of paying out dividends based on 
unrealised FVA profits should, on the surface, show no signs that anything has changed. 
However, this impression is incorrect because the counterpart to the increase in capital is 
found in less liquid financial instruments whereas the counterpart to the dividend payments is 
in the most liquid instrument: money. This leaves the bank more vulnerable to a crisis as 
capital quality was reduced in the process. 
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This paper could not test directly whether unrealised FVA gains are relevant when setting 
dividends because IFRS 7 does not require the disclosure of realised versus unrealised 
income statement items. As a result the conclusions of this study depend on three strands of 
evidence taken together. A panel data regression of the change in dividends of the five largest 
South African banks shows that unrealised FVA gains were probably ignored when these 
banks made dividend decisions. This was also confirmed at a meeting of the Banking Project 
Group and from the financial statements of the banks following the crisis. The materiality of 
transitory FVA gains in profit was shown with a co-integrated regression of the monthly net 
profit of the total South African banking system; FVA entries from the banking book 
increased profits materially. The proportion of profits paid out as dividends showed that the 
banks did not decrease their dividends in response. 
  
The next chapter developed an analytical model to make sense of what was observed in South 
Africa. 
 
1.5 Chapter six (model paper): Fair value accounting, fragile bank balance sheets and 
crisis: A model 
This paper proposed and developed an alternative theoretical model through which to view 
the use of FVA by large banks. This alternative model was developed as a model with crisis 
endogenous, enriched with the South African case study.  
 
That model explained the procyclical expansion of bank balance sheets during the economic 
upswing followed by a contraction during the downturn; any such contraction takes place 
over the long-term because of management intervention that blunts the impact of FVA over 
the short-term. By incorporating the payment of dividends and remuneration from profits into 
the model it was demonstrated that the need for balance sheet expansion during the upswing 
is moderated by these payments; this implies that the balance sheet contraction required 
during a downturn will be greater than the preceding balance sheet expansion. A state of 
crisis was shown to be inherent in the model’s working because of systemic fragility caused 
by running out of suitable investment opportunities, bad capital driving out good capital and 
reaching for yield.  
 
Two features of the model are highlighted next. First, money supply was not assumed to be 
just a response to credit demand in the economy. Rather, money supply was shown to be 
216 
 
critical to economic outcomes. Second, feedback effects were integral to the model and its 
predictions. The feedback effects are between the real economy and the financial sector and 
within the financial sector. These feedback effects explain why FVA is procyclical and 
amplifies the boom and bust business cycle: even though in equilibrium (the usual 
assumption made by economists), the real economy’s credit demand is unaffected by FVA.  
 
An empirical example was given towards the end of the paper to demonstrate the materiality 
of FVA components in profit and loss and retained earnings of Dutch bank ING and South 
African bank Standard Bank. 
 
At the end of the chapter the model was linked with the review of the global financial crisis. 
First, it was shown that the capital ratios of four large American broker-dealers evolved 
similarly to those of the South African banks. Next, it was shown that the model aligns with 
and explains observations made by the NCCFEC about feedback effects and a search for 
yield in the American economy during the run-up to the crisis. The payment of excessive 
remuneration can also be linked back to the model.  
 
1.6 Chapter seven: Separating fair value accounting from its use 
This chapter investigated whether FVA itself or rather its use by people could explain the 
results found. The chapter showed that the South African results are possibly due to 
inexperience with IAS 39 and IFRS. The results observed during the upturn are not likely to 
have been due to earnings management. Even if inexperience explains the results, FVA could 
have played a role in the crisis by being very complex, by obscuring the risky component of 
retained earnings or by putting bank management in a position where they have to act as if 
the capital is not risky due to market pressure. If earnings management explain the results 
then FVA could have played a role in the crisis by granting bank management the flexibility 
that they then abused.  
 
It is argued that regulatory intervention is needed as placing the burden on “experienced” 
individual banks to spot asset bubbles and risky capital is unreasonable.  
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2. General discussion1 
In the introduction chapter the literature review led to seven research objectives. The seven 
research objectives, taking into account that the thesis is structured as a compilation of 
research papers, were reduced to three research questions, one for each paper. Those research 
questions were joined together with a provisional global research question. The global 
research question led to the thesis statement. 
 
The first objective of the thesis was to determine how FVA was practically applied by banks, 
both before and after the global financial crisis. Paper one was exploratory and focused on 
this research objective with the research question: What can be learned from large South 
African banks’ practical use of FVA before and after the global financial crisis? The 
following was learned. That South African banks applied FVA asymmetrically; FVA 
adjustments that increased profits were accepted as is whilst FVA adjustments that decreased 
profits were actively avoided. That for South African banks FVA adjustments related to AFS 
assets were immaterial compared to FVA adjustments that impacted profit and loss. That a 
majority of assets and liabilities need not be subject to FVA in order for unrealised 
components of profits and regulatory capital to be substantial. That the unrealised 
components of profit and loss and retained income can be deduced by using deferred tax 
information. That the Standard Bank of South Africa in 2011 made a mistake of R26 992 
million in their annual report. That most financial instruments in South Africa (and also in the 
United States) are at level 2 of the FVA hierarchy. That IAS 8 can be used to get around the 
prohibitions of IAS 39. That the gap between total assets at fair value and total liabilities at 
fair value, combined with interest rate movements, determine whether FVA generates profit 
or losses.  
 
The second objective of the thesis was investigate the significance and impact of FVA entries 
that impact profit and loss from held for trading financial instruments (including derivatives) 
and financial instruments designated at fair value. Paper one addressed this objective and 
found that for South African banks FVA adjustments related to AFS assets were immaterial 
compared to FVA adjustments that impacted profit and loss. Paper two also addressed this 
                                                 
1
 Hofstee (2009), within the context of a normal monograph thesis, recommends that this section be a conclusion 
about the thesis statement whereas Gustavii (2012), within the context of an article-based thesis, recommends a 
general discussion section. The approach taken in this study is to combine their recommendations. First, the 
achievement of the individual research objectives will be discussed; thereafter the thesis statement will be 
presented and evaluated to comply with the University of Cape Town’s requirements.  
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objective by using monthly regulatory data for the total South African banking system and 
found that FVA adjustments from the banking book materially impacted profit and loss. 
 
The third objective of the thesis was to evaluate whether the observed usage of FVA before 
the global financial was due to implementation issues (inexperience or earnings management) 
or due to FVA itself. This objective was specifically addressed in Chapter seven and will be 
discussed as part of the thesis statement evaluation. 
 
The fourth objective of the thesis was to investigate whether the limited use of FVA can 
impact systemic fragility. This research objective was partly addressed in Paper one that 
found a majority of assets and liabilities need not be subject to FVA in order for unrealised 
components of profits and regulatory capital to be substantial. Paper three specifically 
addressed this concern with a running example in the appendix that show how fractional 
reserve banking amplifies a minor position.  
 
The fifth objective of this thesis was to establish whether the findings of Goncharov and van 
Triest (2012) hold in a setting of South African banks. Paper two was quantitative and 
focused on this research objective with the research question: Did South African banks pay 
increased dividends based on FVA gains? The results showed that South African banks did. 
 
The sixth research objective was to investigate how FVA was used by South African banks 
for specific reasons. Paper one addressed this objective. Most financial instruments held by 
South African banks are not liquid as assumed by the South African revenue authority. The 
behaviour of the South African banks was not always prudent as expected by the South 
African bank regulator. 
 
The seventh research objective was to find or develop theory that can explain what was 
observed. Paper three focused on this research objective with the research question: What 
theoretical perspective can best explain the South African and international observations? It 
was found that a stock-flow consistent accounting type model was a commonality amongst 
those who predicted the global financial crisis (Bezemer, 2010). This type of model was 
useful to understand what was found in South Africa. In modified form it could explain a link 
between FVA and excessive credit extension and dangerous pay-outs. Crisis was endogenous 
due to systemic fragility. Bank balance sheet fragility was due to the search for yield, bad 
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capital driving out good capital and the inversion of the yield curve. An empirical example 
was used to demonstrate the international applicability of the model. 
 
The overarching research question for the three papers was: Did FVA gains in profit and 
capital during the upturn support the overextension of credit and motivate dangerous pay-
outs in South African banks? Papers one and two showed that FVA adjustments through 
profit and loss were material in South Africa and that FVA adjustments on AFS assets were 
comparably insignificant; the focus on profit and regulatory capital is thus justified. The work 
at the end of Chapter four showed that for the period which FVA positively impacted profits 
and peaked as a component of capital, bank assets increased at a more rapid pace. Dangerous 
dividend pay-outs were shown in Paper two. The work at the end of Chapter four also 
showed dangerous remuneration pay-outs during this period. What remains is to address the 
third research objective as accounting cannot make somebody do something. Overextension 
of credit and dangerous pay-outs are second order effects related to FVA. 
 
The general thesis statement developed in the introduction is presented below and evaluated. 
 
FVA had negative financial stability implications in South African banks prior to the global 
financial crisis. 
 
In Paper one it was found that the South African banks’ profit and regulatory capital before 
the global crisis contained major unrealised FVA adjustment components. After the crisis 
these components decreased substantially. Evidence from the banks’ financial statements as 
well as interviews indicated that the banks made pay-outs from these unrealised gains. This 
was confirmed in paper two which found that South African banks paid increased dividends 
based on FVA gains. Thus, FVA materially increased the profits of South African banks 
before the crisis and the South African banks, mistakenly, made pay-outs from those 
increases, making the banks more fragile.  
 
It was also found that during the upswing, when FVA positively impacted profits, the South 
African banks grew their assets the fastest. Chapter seven showed how the Standard Bank 
grew their funding mix to fund the asset growth, treating the whole of retained income as 
permanent capital. Paper three, the model, showed how FVA adjustments in profit and loss 
can be central in a positive feedback process where banks expand their assets, financed by 
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debt, in an attempt to reduce their capital ratios and search for yield. This in turn, via 
increased market values, causes further FVA gains. This process is not dependent on the 
banks abusing FVA but is rather a systemic effect related to the banks’ economic size and 
financial firepower and the role of banks in the payment system. This feedback process 
makes the banks more fragile as riskier and riskier assets are originated in the search for yield 
and capital contains more and more unrealised gains. 
 
However, dangerous pay-outs and the overextension of credit are second order effects 
relative to FVA. Can the South African results be explained by inexperience or earnings 
management? Inexperience is a possible explanation but earnings management is unlikely to 
be an explanation (before the crisis) as argued in Chapter seven. This implies that the thesis 
statement is false in the sense that the use of FVA had negative implications and not FVA 
itself. But, by implication the complexity of FVA itself must be behind the inexperienced use 
of FVA. And, does FVA itself not obscure the risky component of retained earnings by 
lumping it together with realised earnings? Finally, how would an individual bank be able to 
observe and restrict a systemic feedback process; i.e. that one market value is reasonable and 
can be mark-to-marketed and the next market value is overdone and should not be mark-to-
marketed. Recognising “financial bubble” values are usually only possible with hindsight. 
 
Not finding earnings management during the upswing does not mean that FVA was never 
used for earnings management. The use of FVA during the financial crisis (and thus outside 
the scope of the thesis statement) was consistent with earnings management. However, it can 
be argued that the crisis and the response to it was a once-off event. In 2011 (again outside 
the scope of the thesis statement) the Standard Bank of South Africa did use FVA in a way 
consistent with earnings management, this time outside the global financial crisis period. 
FVA opens new potential avenues for earnings management. 
 
The objective of this last paragraph is to attempt, briefly, to use the model to predict the most 
likely development path for the global financial crisis. FVA leads to the earlier recognition of 
profits compared to realisation. Thus, if everything else remains equal, then under FVA, 
future bank profitability will be subdued after the crisis because profits have already been 
recognised.2 This fact alone is enough to expect a slow repair process for bank balance 
                                                 
2
 Profit representing a time value of money return will remain in each period. 
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sheets. However, when this is combined with the prediction of the model that FVA helped to 
inflate the upswing credit bubble more than normal through feedback effects, then it can be 
expected that the downturn will be protracted. After all, banks need to repair their balance 
sheets and the real economy cannot be counted on to help. 
 
3. Summary of contributions 
 
3.1 Overall 
Perspective: The empirical evidence and the model emphasises an alternative perspective on 
the relationship between FVA and the global financial crisis. This perspective is not new, but 
also not mainstream and few, if any, empirical studies have been done. The role of FVA in 
that crisis is rather to be found before the crisis, as opposed to during or after that crisis. Also, 
that role is most readily detected within large, systemic banks due to the role that these banks 
play in the economy.  
 
Bank regulators do not exclude most FVA gains from capital: The model is built on the 
assumption that FVA ends up in bank regulatory capital. In contrast, authors such as Barth 
and Landsman (2010) argue that FVA mostly impacts available-for-sale securities and, as 
available-for-sale reserves are excluded from regulatory capital, that FVA working through 
the regulatory capital channel is unlikely to have negative effects.  Research by Bakoro, de 
Jager and Parsons (2013) and Shaffer (2010) was cited to show that this argument by Barth 
and Landsman is not accurate. The two case study papers both concur with the model’s 
assumption that FVA does indeed influence regulatory capital materially. In the comparative 
case study of two South African banks it was shown that FVA gains formed a significant 
portion of net profit after tax as well as retained income. The case study that made use of 
regulatory data from the South African banking system showed that before the global 
financial crisis, FVA entries from the banking book increased the average levels of net profit 
after tax of the South African system by almost 20%. Combined, the evidence indicates that 
accounting scholars have underestimated the effect of FVA on banks when posted through 
profit and loss.  
 
 
 
 
222 
 
 
3.2 Chapter three: The South African context 
The South African context indicated that a study of banks in South Africa can be regarded as 
a representative case study because of the country’s propensity to implement international 
accounting and bank supervisory standards quickly. 
 
3.3  Chapter four (paper one): Liberal fair value accounting in banks: A South African 
case study 
This paper investigated empirically how large South African banks actually implemented 
FVA.  It was important to explore the detail of how FVA is implemented by banks as 
accounting by itself cannot make anybody do anything; at best it can change behaviour. It 
was necessary, therefore, to develop an understanding of the behaviour of bank managers and 
how they use FVA. The detail points towards FVA providing bank managers with the 
flexibility to facilitate reaching the required profit and/or capital levels. Further investigation 
reveals the use of deferred tax balances to derive the unrealised portion of profits and capital 
due to FVA on financial instruments. Moreover, the gap between assets and liabilities at fair 
value was identified as a key instrument that determines where eventual profits or losses 
realise in a banking group. Also, the restatement of comparative figures was identified as a 
way to avoid the prohibition on reclassifications into and out of the “designated at fair value” 
category. 
 
Accounting standard setters should be interested to know how banks apply their standards, 
and should note that management sometimes does not adhere to the spirit of those standards. 
The South African bank regulator should be interested in findings concerning the quality of 
South African bank capital through the business cycle, as bad capital drives out good capital. 
Likewise, the regulator could be expected to note the inappropriate use of the fair value 
option by the Standard Bank of South Africa. The South African Revenue Services, which is 
in the process of implementing an income tax on FVA bank profits, should be interested in 
how taxpayers implement FVA. The results show that this tax change assumes, incorrectly, 
that most fair valued financial instruments in the South African banking system are liquid. 
 
Procyclicality was found during the upswing as managers accepted profits generated by FVA 
but they did not do so during the downturn, when FVA losses were postponed. The 
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increasing percentage of equity that was made up out of unrealised FVA gains points towards 
bad capital driving out good capital. 
3.4 Chapter five (paper two): For banks fair value adjustments do influence dividend 
policy 
On a high level this paper investigated empirically a hypothesis, that bad capital drives out 
good capital; this is the end-result of payments being made that are based on unrealised FVA 
profits. The findings confirmed this prediction of the model in a setting of South African 
commercial banks. 
 
The paper also quantifies the effect on average bank profit levels due to FVA. It demonstrates 
the usefulness of an alternative source of higher frequency accounting data (data on banks 
obtained from a bank supervisor) and makes the finding that FVA profits from the banking 
book abnormally lifted profits: not the FVA profits from the trading book. This last finding is 
important as it points toward the use of the banking book as the nexus where FVA is can be 
opportunistically used. 
 
3.5  Chapter six (paper three): Fair value accounting, fragile bank balance sheet and 
crisis: A model 
The model answered the call for accounting researchers to become more involved in 
economics. A realistic, accounting focused model was developed that links FVA, bank 
regulatory capital and the economy. The model should help accountants to recognise that in 
banking, accounting is more than just a messenger. At the same time a contribution is made 
to monetary economics with a detailed description of the effect of FVA on the banking 
system and the alternative view that the focus should be on credit supply rather than on credit 
demand. 
 
The implication for accounting research and monetary economics research is that accounting 
in a large bank is systemically important and that any changes in accounting standards should 
be carefully considered: economic models should be updated to incorporate any such 
changes. 
 
4. Comparison to other studies 
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The main argument of this thesis concurs with the Bank of England in its Financial Stability 
Report (2009:43). That report found that a tendency for excessive risk-taking during the 
upswing of the credit cycle was one of the root causes of financial instability; the model 
developed in this study explains why there was this tendency. Writers Taylor (2009), 
McMahon (2011) and Kusano (2011) all believe that FVA was an important factor behind 
this tendency. During the upswing FVA increases bank capital and makes banks seem less 
risky, even though bank capital is increasingly full of unrealised profits and unstable gains; 
further risk-taking is encouraged. 
 
The use of FVA by banks for earnings management purposes, not found during the upswing 
but during and after the crisis, is hardly a surprise if one considers the evidence presented by 
other authors on earnings management in banks during the financial crisis. Laux and Leuz 
(2009:830) found that banks overvalued financial assets during the crisis stating that: “There 
is evidence that managers can be reluctant to take write-downs even when assets are 
substantially impaired” (Laux & Leuz, 2009:829). Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011:330) 
conclude that managers can use the incurred loss approach to loan loss recognition to increase 
current earnings to the detriment of future earnings and Vyas (2011) found that write-downs 
during the global financial crisis were less timely than implied by credit indices. The finding 
in chapter six that fair value entries from the banking book are used to lift the overall bank 
profit levels, concurs with Nissim (2003), who found that banks manage the fair value of 
loans.  
 
But it is arguably the current call for a return to prudent accounting by banks that provides 
the greatest support for what was found in this study. Because of large banks’ important 
economic role they systemically influence market values and make the mark-to-market aspect 
of FVA dangerous. To stop the feedback process between market values, money supply and 
financial instrument demand unrealised FVA gains in profit and loss should be tracked. 
 
5. Suggestions for further research 
 
As indicated in the introduction chapter, the empirical work described in this thesis can be 
seen as a South African case study whilst the model makes global predictions. The obvious 
next step is to collect more international evidence of the model’s predictions. The South 
African evidence has been shown to have importance for specific local actors and has 
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confirmed a model that can be used elsewhere. This research should enable future researchers 
to test the predictions of the model, as well as the South African empirical evidence, in other 
localities. 
The thesis went to great lengths to draw the distinction between FVA entries that are allowed 
as part of capital under Basel II (those through profit and loss) and FVA entries that are not 
allowed as part of capital under Basel II (the fair valuation of available-for-sale assets). Basel 
III changes all of this by allowing all FVA entries as part of capital. Future research should 
investigate whether this change in regulation led to a change in bank behaviour. 
 
In Paper one it was found that the size of the gap between assets at fair value and liabilities at 
fair value determines where in a banking group FVA gains materialise. The compliance 
departments of banks go to great lengths to oversee the valuation of instruments under FVA. 
However, few enquire as to movements in the gap between assets at fair value and liabilities 
at fair value; i.e. on the micro level controls are strong but on the macro level they are 
probably not that strong. Future research should investigate the relationship between this gap 
and the business cycle and other indicators of earnings management in banks.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This thesis investigated the use of FVA by South African banks and found that during the 
upswing, FVA gains substantially increase profits and capital. This increase in capital leads 
to feedback effects whilst at the same time systemic vulnerabilities build up. The model and 
the South African empirical evidence show that FVA is central in processes that weaken the 
banking system during the upswing. An option that should be considered is to prescribe 
conservative accounting standards for systemically important institutions. Bank supervisors 
would agree with this suggestion. Moreover, conservative accounting for banks would create 
a buffer against opportunistic behaviour by management. 
 
An argument for conservative accounting is not an argument against FVA in general. First, 
the argument is only raised for large (systemically important) commercial banks. Second, it is 
FVA during the upswing that is dangerous. During the downturn FVA can have benefits such 
as the faster recognition of losses; this thesis did not focus on the downturn (but did find in 
the comparative case study that the recognition of losses under FVA was delayed) and thus 
these potential benefits of FVA remain. Last, conservative accounting for large commercial 
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banks need not imply that the financial instruments be accounted for at historic cost. What is 
needed is to ringfence the profits and the resultant tier 1 capital that arise from unrealised 
FVA gains. By creating a new reserve account as part of retained earnings this objective 
would be met. Bank regulators and shareholders would then be in a position to evaluate the 
riskiness of this portion of capital. Conclusions must be tempered by the fact that only South 
African empirical evidence was considered. 
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